Medvedev, Russia's Clandestine Reformist, Celebrates a Year as President

More than any other country, Russia is associated with strong rule. The country's first president, Boris Yeltsin, came to power as a result of the first free open vote in Russia; second president Vladimir Putin's election, though more secure, was also fairly democratic. Third and current President Dmitry Medvedev's election was virtually assured by Putin's and the Kremlin's endorsement. Given that Putin stayed in power as the prime minister, most analysts remained sceptical about Medvedev's ability to cut an independent political figure, and waited for him to surrender the presidential seat to Putin at any moment. Yet, the anniversary of Medvedev's inauguration on 7 May 2008 is marked today with no sign of Putin making a return in the short term. Instead of concentrating on the arguably fruitless debate about the vagaries of power-sharing between Medvedev and Putin, IHS Global Insight finds it more useful to take stock of Medvedev's own record during his first year, highlighting his efforts at institutional reform in Russia that may bring sustained benefits for the country in the long term.

When assuming the presidential post, Dmitry Medvedev emphasised the importance of rule of law and private property in Russia, words easily dismissible as token. For Medvedev, however, these reflected a personal mission. When still a law student in Soviet times, he reportedly drank a toast to private property; once president, he wasted no time in realising his beliefs. In the course of his first year in power, Medvedev made significant inroads in laying the foundations of rule of law and deeper democracy in Russia, largely to the derision or neglect of the Kremlin elites and the media.

Medvedev's policies fall into five broad strands: judicial reform, fight against corruption including administrative reform, support of private businesses, political reform, and modernisation of Russia through IT technologies.

• Judicial: The changes that Medvedev propelled in the judicial field include the creation of a single disciplinary body for judges and enhanced qualification requirements for them. A Judicial Ethics Code has been introduced, and the powers of arbitrage courts are being enhanced, while online consideration of cases is in the pipeline to help avoid bribery.
• Corruption: As regards the fight against corruption, Medvedev initiated the adoption of an Anti-Corruption law as well as relevant changes to 26 legislative acts while subjecting 10,000 pieces of local, regional and federal legislation to review for corruption potential; the weak regulations are currently being amended.
• Governance: The President also launched a five-year administrative reform programme that would see bureaucratic posts at all administrative levels filled with professionals from an officially published rota selected against recognised criteria, with the intention to replace Russia's medieval appointments system based on personal loyalty. He replaced 14 regional governors, and made changes in the leadership of the armed forces.
• Private Business: Supporting private initiative, Medvedev introduced a three-year moratorium on unscheduled governmental checks on small and medium companies, warning zealous officials to stop harassing private businesses.
• Political Reform: On the political front, Medvedev challenged the Putin-era ideological notion of "sovereign democracy" that justified subjecting democratic norms to purported national interest, saying instead that democracy is an absolute value, and any attempts at contextual qualification defeat its nature. An advocate of civil society, the president pushed for political reform to improve the quality of popular representation and strengthen multi-party system; only one its provision—that for extended presidential rule—caught the public eye.
• Information and Communication Technologies: With regard to Russia's modernisation, Medvedev eschewed Putin's much-celebrated emphasis on nanotechnologies, a phenomenon still barely understood even by the government itself, and concentrated instead on getting every secondary school in Russia connected to the Internet, a promise he has already fulfilled. He also started a personal videoblog, a LiveJournal, and gives television interviews monthly to communicate his policies to the government.

Thus, during his first year in power, Medvedev has taken bold strides in all his policy priority areas.

Many remain sceptical about the effort, and for good reason. The anti-corruption legislation is simplistic and hard to enforce. Judicial reform may get bogged down during the implementations process. Meritocracy in state administration can be sabotaged by bureaucrats as suicidal, moreover, it is tricky as the president himself is part of a well-defined elite body. The importance attached to IT may be seen as a whim in more conservative social quarters. Furthermore, some say Medvedev preoccupies himself with state reforms simply because it is the only field he knows how to plough, being a gifted lawyer. Few believe in their validity, and hardly anyone minds. This cynicism may actually play into the president's hands. Partially out of the still prevailing disregard for the law in Russia, Medvedev's legal initiatives get approval and become translated into legislation by the rubber-stamping parliament. The road to implementation will be much rockier, but Medvedev of all people knows how to fall back on legal norms when they are already in place. The seeds of liberalism and democracy in Russia that Medvedev is sowing have the best chance of growing while unnoticed and unharmed.

Outlook and Implications 

Dmitry Medvedev's record as Russia's top executive has been more characteristic of a president of a Western country with a fair division of presidential and parliamentary powers. Given Russia's perceived tradition of undivided rule, Medvedev does not fit the type; hence some wait for him to assume the qualities of a tsar, and others to step aside for a more typical ruler. This is a mistaken approach. Instead, Russia is best understood and dealt with as a competitive oligarchy in which policies and decisions are made as the result of a continued contest between several influence groups; neither Putin nor Medvedev is the ultimate decision-maker and neither can be, in spite of prevailing stereotypes. Medvedev quietly but persistently follows an agenda that may not take him to be Russia's next tsar but nevertheless may leave a deep—and liberalising—imprint on the Russian state and politics.