Latest Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan Presage More

Only a day after the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack at a regional headquarters of Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Lahore, Pakistan has been rocked again by a string of blasts in the north-western cities of Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan that left at least 15 people dead and wounded more than 100. While the most recent attacks remain as yet unattributed, it appears clear that these, as the suicide attack in Lahore yesterday, can be attributed to the Taliban as a revenge for the army's punishing campaign against militants in the northwest of the country launched in early May 2009. In an unprecedented announcement, Hakimullah Mehsud, deputy of Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud, claimed responsibility for the Lahore suicide attack that claimed at least 30 lives, and, just before the latest attacks, called upon residents to leave the country's major urban areas of Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar and a number of other cities in order to remain unharmed by "massive" and "unprecedented" attacks. So far, although civilians have died in these attacks, the main target were the security forces. A marked development was the targeting of the ISI in Lahore, which was widely suspected as having covertly supported militants.

The latest attacks come in the wake of Pakistan's newly found consensus against militants, that put Pakistan's leadership strategically on a par with the United States and Afghanistan. Early this month, the trilateral Af-Pak Summit agreed upon a common stance against militants. As a result, Pakistan has become the recipient of major aid packages in return for a decisive clampdown against Taliban insurgent groups. Unprecedented in scale and commitment, military operations against Islamic extremists have been carried out largely by using heavy weaponry, which in turn has caused massive numbers of civilian casualties and a surge of internally displaced people (IDPs) that, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), number approximately 3 million. Reports over the past weeks have indicated the refugee crisis, rising socio-economic distress and social unrest among IDPs, and, most importantly, a de-territorialisation of conflict, will render the authorities unable to deal with the situation and predict an extremely gloomy outlook for Pakistan's immediate and medium-term future. Considering the government’s current approach to the country's multiple and interlinked problems, an end to the crisis is not in sight. 

Outlook and Implications

Victory in Conventional Warfare Against Taliban Largely Irrelevant

Until recently, Pakistan's national security focus was heavily focused towards the country's arch-enemy, India. Three wars between the two countries since their partition in 1947 have led to a heavy build-up of troops along both sides of the border. With this in sight, Pakistan's military has mainly been trained for conventional warfare scenarios that would have come handy for a conventional threat such as that emanating from India. Islamic militants did not figure highly on Pakistan's national security imperative, and indeed were viewed less a threat than as a useful tool to further its regional strategic interests. Until 2001, Islamic militants were for various reasons overtly supported by Pakistan's authorities, and indeed Pakistan was one of the few countries that recognised the Taliban regime in Kabul between 1996 and 2001. After the Taliban regime's sudden ouster from power following the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, much of their leadership took refuge along the permeable Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While from 2001 then-President Musharraf became an avid supporter of the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, his co-operation pertained mainly to the arrests of foreign militants. Inroads against Islamic extremism were made half-heartedly and ineffectively, as it was a well-known secret that elements within the ISI nurtured extremists on its soil. In Pakistan's intelligence circles it was seen as imperative to keep checks and balances against a too-strong central government in Afghanistan in order to contain fears of Pashtun nationalism, something that Pakistan has historically countered by nurturing the religious as opposed to the nationalistic sentiments among groups. In this respect, the ousted Taliban evidently fitted their purpose well, as much of Afghanistan's instability today relates to the Taliban's resurgence since 2006.

Notably, the Taliban have made a resounding comeback despite increasing numbers of NATO troops that have been at pains to push back the insurgency. What the United States has only recently realised is that the resurgence of the Taliban, and the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops' inability to contain it, relate to the two very different kind of wars that the two sides were fighting: ISAF troops were largely waging conventional war against the Taliban, but were tied to fixed bases, mostly in Afghanistan's plains or valleys. The Taliban, on the other hand, have taken refuge in the highly mountainous and, for ISAF forces, largely impassable areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Since 2006, the Taliban have also been highly successful in expanding their reach in Pakistan. From there, they have waged highly successful hit-and-run attacks on various targets in Afghanistan across the porous border. While the United States has tried to fight the Taliban's advances by using drones to attack their strongholds on Pakistan, these have not led to a significant weakening of the movement. The new U.S. administration under Barack Obama has, however, made a significant overhaul over its Afghanistan strategy, noting that Pakistan plays an important part in this game and replacing its military commanders with specialists in asymmetric warfare.

The advances of the Taliban have started to worry the Pakistani leadership only recently. However, following the trilateral Af-Pak Summit in Washington earlier this month, there apparently was a new-found consensus among Pakistan's leadership to abolish its ambivalent stance towards extremists and to clamp down more decisively. Indeed, the suicide attack against the ISI may even indicate the severing of legacy ties between the country's intelligence service and militants. Since 2 May 2009 the military has been fighting a massive war against the militants by mostly using heavy weaponry including war planes and artillery. Recent reports suggest that the government forces have freed important areas of the Taliban and that they might even declare military victory in Swat's capital, Mingora. However, as the precedent of Afghanistan shows, this might be a case of history repeating. In essence, the conventional warfare tactics that the Pakistani military has been trained to use are likely to disperse, rather than defeat, the Taliban. Furthermore, even if Mingora is entirely captured, it was reported that the Taliban still control more than 10% of Pakistan, in the most rugged and impassable terrain. Militarily defeated or not, the recent attacks have shown that the Taliban are highly capable of regrouping and doing what they have always been good at: asymmetric warfare.

Taliban Highly Capable of Concerted, Targeted Attacks

The Taliban's announcement of massive, co-ordinated attacks throughout Pakistan indicate a strategic move of the Taliban that may in the short run abet a military victory over certain former Taliban strongholds in the north-west provinces. However, a declared military victory is unlikely to bring peace to Pakistan, as the conflict then is rendered a de-territorialised one that will increase insecurity throughout Pakistan creating profound uncertainty in the security environment. A first indication for the dissolution of conflict from its traditional theatre is the announcement that a splinter group of the TTP, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab, was responsible for the Lahore suicide attack two days ago. Furthermore, the apparent targeting of the police and the ISI in recent attacks indicate strong co-ordination capabilities within the Taliban movement that appears unhampered by claims of sweeping military victories of the Pakistani Army in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and NWFP (North-West Frontier Province). The insecurity that is potentially being wrought by such concerted attacks is likely to gradually bring about public discontent against the government's handling of the militant problem, even though the public tide at present is reported to be primarily against the Taliban and for the offensive

Military Operation Likely to Further Destabilise Situation

The large-scale military operation in FATA and NWFP not only has strategic dimensions in military terms. Indeed, it could be argued that the main source for unrest sits with the massive number of civilian casualties. The UNHCR now estimates that at least 2.4 million IDPs have fled recent fighting. The humanitarian catastrophe that is unfolding in the northwest of Pakistan is set to present Pakistan with unprecedented challenges. Already IDPs are complaining about feeling alienated by the government, as state resources simply cannot match the immense need of the close to 3 million refugees. This is likely to turn affected IDPs against the government, at a time when it is relying heavily on public support to win this war. The increasing infiltration of IDP camps by social wings of militant groups who step in to provide food and shelter could also increase support for extremists. Although an increased foreign aid inflow would release resources to support the IDPs, logistical and distribution networks remain limited, frustrating the distribution of aid. Concurrently even the expanded aid sought by the government will not be sufficient to sustain 2.4 million people over a longer period of time. With reports of indiscriminate shootings in combat areas on the part of the government, as well as the use of heavy weaponry to drive out militants, it is likely that numbers of civilian casualties and refugees will increase rapidly. Significantly, in the military's reports about gains against the Taliban, no mention is made about civilian casualties, while casualties on the side of the Pakistani army appear understated. From a broader perspective, this situation is also likely to significantly affect Pakistan's already weak economic situation. Crops are likely to be lost in large swathes of NWFP, with the military operation there coinciding with harvest season. Even if a military success can be brought about in the near term most will find themselves deprived of means of income for at least a year, as most in Buner, Lower Dir and Swat districts depend on their crops. The NWFP is also Pakistan's second-largest producer of fruits and vegetables after Punjab, rendering any failed harvest season not only a local, but national problem.

Future Prospects Grim