IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The Iranian electorate is finally heading to the polls after an intense run-up to the country's presidential election. |
Implications | The degree of public support seen in the past couple of weeks for the incumbent's main challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi has significantly heightened anticipation; the incumbent's re-election bid is no longer safe. |
Outlook | Although it is unwise to place any bets, even at this point, there is a strong possibility that the two top contenders will meet in a second-round vote next week, as neither of the candidates are likely to receive 50% of the vote in this first round. |
Iranians head to the polls today to elect Iran’s tenth president. Amid mounting anticipation stemming from the fierce competition between the four candidates, unprecedented public debates which have illustrated deep divisions within the Islamic Republic’s institutions and personalities, and mass public gatherings, the significance of today’s election cannot be overstated even if the actual outcome does not amount to significant policy change. Although yesterday was relatively calm (official campaigning ended on Wednesday—June 10—evening), the election fervour has not settled. This morning, hundreds of thousands of Iranians headed to the polls suggesting that there could be a significant upswing in voter turnout compared to other recent elections. President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad faces a strong contender in former prime minister and moderate, reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, while the other two candidates—reformist cleric Mehdi Karroubi and the conservative Mohsen Rezai—are currently lagging behind. Without reliable polling data, which is hard to come by, the result could still be highly unpredictable as Iranian presidential elections often are. If neither of the candidates secure 50% of today’s vote a run-off election will be held between the top two candidates next week.
Observers and government officials have suggested that we might see extremely high voter turnout. Forty-six million of Iran’s 71-million-strong population are eligible to vote. The majority are under the age of 30 and represent the so-called Children of the Iranian Revolution—those born after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Their participation in today’s election will be crucial in countering a trend of political apathy which appears to finally have given way to longstanding discontent over mass youth unemployment, a dire economic outlook, and social and political clampdowns over the past decade resulting from conservative inroads into key government institutions. Meanwhile, concerns have been raised over electoral fraud. Yesterday, Mousavi’s camp published an open letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urging the senior figure to prevent fraud and to ensure that the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij volunteer force (which serve under the Guards) are not deployed to sway voters. A similar call was made by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani on Wednesday, also in an open letter to Khamenei. Fears over fraud are particularly pertinent as reformist candidate Karroubi blamed his electoral failure in 2005 on the "militarisation" of the elections by the Guards and Basij and on vote rigging.
The Candidates
Four main contenders emerged from nearly 500 hopefuls after Iran’s 12-member Guardian Council put candidates through a strict vetting process May. Much as had been expected, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (who came to power in a surprise victory in 2005) submitted his bid for re-election and has since been tipped as the likely winner. Over the past three weeks he has been deluged with criticism by his opponents, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohsen Rezai, who have fiercely condemned his four years of unconventional economic policies and risky foreign strategies; this has been to such a degree that Ahmedinejad has been said to be endangering the security of the Islamic Republic. Here follows a brief description of the contenders (see Iran: 20 May 2009: Election 2009: Top Candidates in Iranian Presidential Race Approved by Conservative Watchdog and Iran: 3 June 2009: Daunting Challenges Lie in Wait for Victor as Iran Votes).
Mehdi Karroubi (Reformist)
The two-time parliamentary speaker and reformist politician has long been a vocal critic of the incumbent. He has vied for support in rural areas and has found key support among reformists as well as the young, university students, and intellectuals. The 72-year-old former cleric was a speaker of the Majlis between 1990 and1992 as well as between 2000 and 2004. The middle-ranking cleric has launched an election campaign on the slogan of "change", hoping to rally support for greater reform in the political and social spheres. He has lambasted the president’s foreign-policy style, criticised the growing militarisation of society and institutions with the growth of the powers of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, and has proposed to introduce more liberalisation in the economy. Dubbed the "Sheikh of Reform", his chances have been weakened by Mousavi’s strength and by his own failed election bid in 2005.
Mir-Hossein Mousavi (Moderate-Reformist)
Mousavi, a middle-of-the-road reformist served as prime minister during the Iran-Iraq war (1981—1989), overseeing the period during which the forces of the 1979 Islamic Republic cemented control over all Iranian political, social, economic, and military institutions. For that reason at least Mousavi has been able to breach the conservative-reformist divide. Although in recent weeks as his popularity has grown and his campaign has been more fiercely pitted against that of the incumbent’s, Mousavi has come out more strongly on social and political issues; this has drawn him closer to the reformist camp. His track record as prime minister and in handling the austere wartime economy has secured him a reputation for being a prudent statesman and a level-headed decision maker. This week the increasingly popular ex-premier published a 100-page vision for governance, hoping to inject additional credibility into his bid.
Mohsen Rezai (Conservative)
Rezai has won the least attention among the four main candidates and probably has the weakest support. Rezai has put forward interesting proposals which have diverged from his conservative roots, including a suggestion to place Iran’s nuclear programme under the oversight of an international consortium; he has also criticised the incumbent harshly on the grounds of foreign policy and economic issues. Nevertheless, Rezai remains a staunch conservative and is closely associated with the Revolutionary Guards and security forces. He spent 16 years as a top commander at the Guards; these are ties which may serve him as an ideological alternative to the incumbent who also has close ties to the organisation.
President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (Conservative)
The firebrand president—a former Tehran mayor with close links to the Revolutionary Guards—propelled himself onto the international scene with his radical approach to regional politics, his outright support for the Palestinian cause, his harshly worded threats to Israel, and his forceful running of the country's nuclear programme, which has left the international community fearing a possible military stand-off with the United States. Having pursued highly populist economic policies for the past four years, Ahmedinejad retains the support of the rural and urban poor who have benefited from cash handouts and other beneficial policies. Furthermore, due to the tacit support he has from the Supreme Leader, Ahmedinejad also has the backing of the deeply religious and staunch conservatives. In recent weeks Ahmedinejad’s outspokenness has turned inwards as he has focused much of his campaign on lambasting all previous governments in the Islamic Republic—causing an unprecedented debate on corruption, nepotism, and internal criticism within the top-levels of the republic. In so doing, Ahmedinejad has also created powerful enemies—mainly former president and powerful political heavyweight Hashemi Rafsanjani who Ahmedinejad accused of corruption during a televised debate.
Outlook and Implications
Although Iran’s presidential election has been long anticipated across the world by governments and observers alike, the events of the past couple of weeks have taken most by surprise. An outpouring of public participation, likened to a weeks-long carnival in main cities and in the capital Tehran in particular, has deep roots in unvoiced but brewing general discontent. Although none of the candidates running against the incumbent originally appeared to stand a strong chance against him, the emergence of Mir-Hossein Mousavi as a symbol of hope has channelled a great deal of pent-up frustration into his bid to unseat Ahmedinejad. In turn, fearful of a possible defeat at the hands of the moderate-reformist former premier, Ahmedinejad’s supporters have over the past couple of weeks matched the fervour which has surrounded Mousavi’s campaign. The intensity of the popular zeal has been fuelled by a series of televised debates between the main contenders. Watched by as many as 50 million people, the debates have seen mudslinging and personal attacks taken to new heights (see Iran: 9 June 2009: Election 2009: Fervour Builds in Iran Ahead of Presidential Poll and 11 June 2009: Election 2009: President Under Mounting Pressure over Personal Attacks Ahead of Iran Poll). In more than one way the past week’s intense debates have brought to the fore existential issues which are rarely touched upon in public debates in Iran. Issues such as corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement by former governments have almost overtaken key issues such as the economy and foreign-policy conduct.
Meanwhile, Iranians may turn up en masse today at polling stations because there appears to be a revived sense that political participation is once again significant. This has certainly increased the likelihood that a second-round election will be held between the top two candidates, with Ahmedinejad and Mousavi in the lead. As for predicting a possible policy shift in Iran, the fact remains as ever in the Islamic Republic that although the role of president is undoubtedly significant, true power resides only with the Supreme Leader. For that reason, a new president could bring an era of limited rapprochement with Western governments, a degree of moderation in foreign policy, and even cooperation with arch-foes such as the United States on issues of mutual concern (such as countering the revived Taliban movement in Afghanistan). However, such moves will be mere window dressing for the Supreme Leader’s core stance which is unlikely to change.