IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The deal revives a largely identical agreement secured last year with the so-called P5+1 states on exchanging Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) at 3.5% in return for higher enriched uranium for use in a medical reactor. The Iranian stocks will be held in Turkey while the return fuel will be sent to the Islamic Republic within a year of the agreement by Russia, the United States, and France. |
Implications | Much remains uncertain, not least because Iran's motives are under scrutiny, with many foreign powers worrying that it is once again playing for time. The agreement is a gamble for all parties involved. |
Outlook | The deal has made the imminence of a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran less likely, making it significantly more difficult for the United States and its partners to push hard for sanctions. For Iran, the agreement provides a much-needed breather after months of mounting pressure. |
Iran today signed an agreement with Turkey and Brazil for the revival of a nuclear fuel-swap deal, initially agreed in October year with the so-called P5+1 states (the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom) in addition to Germany last year. The new agreement is hoped to break the international stalemate over the country’s long-running nuclear saga. The agreement would see Iran ship 1,200 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium (LEU) of 3.5% to Turkey, in exchange for the return of 120 kilogrammes of 20% enriched uranium for use in a medical research reactor in Tehran. Russia, France, and the United States will be responsible for the return fuel being delivered to Iran within a year of the agreement. According to the terms of the agreement relayed by Agence France-Presse (AFP) Iran must notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the details of the agreement within a week for a formal approval. Negotiated by Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, his visiting Brazilian counterpart Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the agreement has already been hailed by the three as a victory for diplomacy over the type of punitive pressures that the United States and its partners sought to put on Iran to push it towards greater nuclear compliance.
Swapped Enrichment
Acquiring 20% enriched nuclear fuel for its medical research and production facility in Tehran will allow Iran to continue producing nuclear isotopes for medical use although there have always been some fears aired that the exchange actually will supply the Islamic Republic with uranium substantially closer to weapons-grade then its original LEU stockpile. Although that is true, Iran has a domestic need for isotope production and has spent a previous stockpile—acquired in the early 1990s—on producing nuclear material for medical use.
More interestingly perhaps, Iran has had time to enrich a substantial amount of new LEU in the six to nine months which have passed since the first round of potential LEU-for-20%-enriched-fuel proposal was tabled, making the 1,200 kilogrammes of LEU constitute a less comprehensive part of its total LEU stockpile. Iran’s LEU is enriched to levels of about 3.5%—levels at which they could be used as fuel in a nuclear reactor—but still very far from the levels of about 95–97% needed for nuclear weapons. Iran’s determination last year to start enrichment to a 20% level in order to enrich feedstock for its Tehran medical reactor was therefore seen as a potential avenue for the country to develop a much higher enriched stockpile, which in the future potentially could be further enriched to weapons-grade quicker, should Iran chose to do so. However, it would appear that Iran has suffered considerable technical difficulties in launching industrial-scale 20% enrichment, still only operating one cascade—a serially connected string of 164 enrichment centrifuges—in its 20% enrichment operation, with another one reportedly just now being connected, according to Associated Press (AP), albeit not for independent enrichment but to process waste from the first cascade and raise operational efficiency. The failure to rapidly start 20% enrichment would hardly be surprising given Iran’s constraints in acquiring up-to-date enrichment technologies and its need to develop and refine many core components itself. Indeed, low operating efficiency and reliability has dogged its production of LEU from the start of the enrichment programme, with many of its thousands of centrifuges still remaining offline.
It would thus appear that Iran in practice would have struggled to produce 20% enriched fuel for its Tehran facility in the quantities needed in the short-term, while it actually continues to build a significant stockpile of LEU for which it lacks any use—the core of Western suspicion about its motives—meaning that it purely technical terms it has been needing to agree to the swap all this time, with the end timing and characteristics of the deal being political.
A Diplomatic Victory?
To be sure, Iran has cultivated ties to Turkey and Brazil with some determination lately in the hope of easing mounting international pressure. Both countries hold non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council and have been vocal about their disapproval of a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran. The sense of achievement today was apparent in Turkish foreign minister Ahmed Davutoglu’s statement that there is no need for sanctions now, adding: "This agreement sends the international community a message that there is always room for diplomacy. Turkey and Brazil showed that it was time for diplomacy."
High Political Stakes for Brazil
Indeed, expectations on both Turkey and Brazil’s potential roles had been growing of late. Ahead of Lula’s two-day visit (16–17 May) Russia and the United States had cautioned Iran that this was its last chance for a diplomatic breakthrough. The Brazilian president’s apparent support for Iran has grown over recent months. The strength of his 300-person delegation certainly testified to this. However, Brazil has taken a huge gamble by engaging with Iran both politically and commercially. Not only is the Middle East outside of Brazil's normal realm of influence but the government's support for dialogue with Iran and opposition to sanctions have brought its foreign policy into direct opposition with that of the United States (see Country Intelligence: Brazil: 27 November 2009: U.S., Brazil Relations Reportedly Still Good After Leak of Letter from U.S. President; Brazil - United States: 5 March 2010: U.S. Secretary of State's Visit to Brazil Ends with Continuing Differences over Iran; and Brazil: 12 February 2010: Foreign Minister's Comments on Iran Put Brazil at Odds with U.S.). Brazil's support for Iran also threatens to draw attention to the lack of transparency over its own nuclear programme (see Country Intelligence: Brazil: 19 October 2004: UN Inspectors to Visit Brazilian Uranium-Enrichment Facility). Brazil may not be seeking to build a nuclear bomb but its earlier reluctance to allow IAEA inspectors full access to its enrichment facility and its opposition to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty bring it into uncomfortable alignment with countries whose intentions may not be wholly peaceful. This means that the stakes involved in Lula's visit to Tehran are particularly high for Brazil. The failure of meditating efforts would have given political capital to domestic and foreign critics who have accused the Brazilian president of political immaturity with regard to its involvement with Iran (see Country Intelligence: Brazil – Middle East and North Africa: 16 March 2010: Brazilian President Arrives in Middle East amid Mounting Controversy over Foreign Policy Direction). Meanwhile success would not only give Iran breathing space but would support Brazil's pretentions to take a more active role on the international stage and validate TIME magazine's recent selection of President Lula as the world's most influential leader ahead of U.S. president Barack Obama.
Turkish Gamble
The deal is a double-edged sword for the Turkish government. It is fully in line with Prime Minister Erdogan's ambitious "zero-conflict" policy to forge good ties with all governments in the Middle East. If the deal goes well, it will further advance Erdogan's long-term plan to turn Turkey into an energy hub (see Country Intelligence: Turkey - Russia: 13 May 2010: Russian and Turkish Leaders Sign Multi-Billion-Dollar Energy Deal Boosting Bilateral Commercial Ties) and further strengthen Turkey's role as prime go-between in the region. The Israeli government is thoroughly opposed to the deal but Erdogan gambles that his support for Iran on such a controversial issue will earn him great dividends in the long run. Yet, Turkey may have fallen for a honeyed trap by Iran, and may incur the wrath of Russia along the way. Russia was long the main prospective facilitator of the fuel-swap deal; Russia was most probably greatly offended when Iran rebuffed its offer and went for Erdogan's instead. Russia and Iran have strong trade ties, notably as regards arms trade, and co-operate on a civilian nuclear energy project in Bushehr as well as the exploration of the Caspian Sea's hydrocarbon resources.
Outlook and Implications
Stalling for Time?
It is perhaps too early to tell whether the deal represents a resounding success for Iran and its partners. Of course if Brazil and Turkey’s engagement does work, this would strengthen both countries’ international and regional standing. For Iran, by engaging Brazil and Turkey, its independence has been marked and Western efforts to reach an agreement rebuffed. Even so, the deal differs little in content from the October agreement reached last year. Iran has unlocked nine months of impasse, although by now the agreement is—from a Western perspective—less relevant and comprehensive than when it first was launched. Hailed then as a great diplomatic breakthrough and victory for the President Obama administration’s diplomacy-prone attitude to Iran, the deal fell through on the back of the Islamic Republic’s altered demands. Iran posed strong objections to shipping out the greater bulk of its stocks all at once, and also demanded that the swap be carried out on Iranian soil. Neither of these demands were deemed acceptable by the negotiating powers, not least because the October agreement was aimed at building confidence with Iran by shipping out the bulk of its LEU stocks, thus reducing its so-called break-out capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. A stalled swap was perceived as failing to achieve this purpose. For now, Iran may have secured a breather as it will be difficult for the United States and its partners to deliver a fourth round of sanctions imminently. However, objections are likely rise from Western states. Iran has spent the past year stalling for time, initially agreeing to the swap deal, then refusing it and consequently providing a series of unofficial counter-proposals. The new deal is a half-step forward for now but does not fundamentally address the distrust that has built up over time, and Iran’s perpetual failure to deal with the international community in a transparent way.