IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The ruling from a federal judge in New Orleans reflects growing concern from service and rig operators in recent weeks who have claimed that the six-month ban on drilling in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) is disproportionate and unfair, with devastating economic consequences for coastal communities that, de facto, outweigh the risks of a second accident. |
Implications | The administration remains wedded to its position that a six-month ban is in the best long-term interests of all concerned, in order to enable a thorough review of permitting and safety procedures and the Macondo spill in the GOM. A stay of execution on the ruling, an appeal, and a new order from the Department of the Interior are promised in the coming days. |
Outlook | Legal uncertainty means that any near-term resumption in drilling is unlikely, with new offshore equipment and reviews already introduced that require government approvals and the pledge for strong follow-up action from the government side. |
New Orleans federal judge Martin L.C. Feldman has issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the U.S. administration's six-month drilling ban in the offshore Gulf of Mexico (GOM), which followed a one-month suspension in activity in May, in the immediate aftermath of the Macondo oil spill. However, the status of the ban will remain unclear until an appeal from the U.S. administration is heard, meaning "no change" on new deepwater drilling activity for the time being.
Feldman cited the damage to businesses, workers, and the local economies of the Gulf from the ban and said that the administration had failed to justify the need for "a blanket, generic, indeed punitive, moratorium" on deepwater oil and gas drilling, which affects all exploratory and development drilling in water depths of over 500 feet. "Are all airplanes a danger because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez? All trains? All mines?" asked Feldman, in comments carried by the Associated Press. "That sort of thinking seems heavy-handed, and rather overbearing". The case was brought on behalf of service companies by Hornbeck Offshore, with another case pending in Houston, Texas, brought by rig specialist, Diamond Offshore (which may be pre-empted by the Feldman ruling). Diamond is amongst those facing claims of force majeure from leaseholders affected by the ban, in one of a number of signs of the ripple effects of the moratorium within the oil industry (see table below). Their position has received verbal backing from many of the GOM leaseholders, including Chevron, which has been one of the most vocal in its criticism of the ban, although that has not translated into any legal action from leaseholders directly, as yet.
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar has already stated that he plans to issue a new order in the days ahead that will elaborate on the reasoning behind the six-month ban, which affected 33 drilling projects in the GOM region (see table) but has had no impact on current production. The Department of the Interior (DOI) will also ask for a stay of execution on the ban and lodge an appeal against Judge Feldman's ruling at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in New Orleans.
In a sign of some of the partisan affiliations guiding thinking on the drilling ban, Democrat Representative and a front-row player in recent hearings on deepwater drilling, Edward J. Markey, called the judge's ruling "another bad decision in a disaster riddled with bad decisions by the oil industry". To date, congressional hearings on the spill have thrown up questions about the role of the regulator, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the decisions taken by companies under time and cost pressure at the Macondo site, and emergency response plans in place in the event of a spill. In this regard, BP's plan was found to closely resemble those of other major operators, with four (BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil) citing measures to protect walruses, which do not live in the region, and three listing the number of an expert who died some years ago, although many of the executives cited key differences with the approach followed by BP.
Ripple Effects
The pressure to lift the ban reflects the mounting ripple effects from the oil spill and the resulting moratorium, which have taken in a number of developers and explorers in the GOM region and the rig and service contractors supporting them. This includes the 33 rigs identified by the MMS who were told to halt activity on 27 May, in addition to a number of other exploration and development efforts in play, although Brazil's Petrobras has said this week that it still expects its Chinook/Cascade commissioning to begin on schedule in the second half of the year.
The table below shows information gathered so far on the main leaseholders and rig operators involved, with day rates for rigs alone averaging around US$500,000/day—in cases, as high as US$603,000, for the U.S. Noble Clyde Boudreaux operating for Noble Group—showing the scale of potential losses from the ban, and the incentives to move rigs and activities elsewhere if it runs its full course. There are some differences between MMS data and those reported by news agencies and fleet updates from rig operators in the region (as well as movement on rigs in the interim), but a picture of those immediately affected is becoming more apparent, with implications less evident for those responsible for supplying smaller bespoke services and parts to the industry. While Anadarko, Statoil, and Cobalt have all invoked force majeure on some or all of their GOM rigs, affecting rigs leased by Transocean, Noble, Diamond and Maersk, Transocean and Noble have already stated that they reject Anadarko's claim, with Diamond seeking an overturning of the whole GOM moratorium in the courts (as mentioned above).
GOM Operators and Rigs, Details as of 21 June 2010 (updates ongoing) | |||||
Rigs/ Location/ Acreage* | Rig 1 | Rig 2 | Rig 3 | Comment | |
Anadarko | 3 rigs: | Transocean: Discoverer Spirit (US$505,000/day to Nov. 2010 rising to US$520,000/d to Nov. 2013). Force majeure blocked June 2010. | Noble: Amos Runner (leased to March 2011 at US$439,000–441,000/d). Noble objected to force majeure. | Diamond: Ocean Monarch (to mid-March 2013, low US$440,000s/d) | Called force majeure on three rigs with Ensco 8500 still operating. |
ATP | 1 rig | ||||
BHP Billiton | 2 rigs | Transocean: GSF C.R. Luigs (US$522,000 to Sept. 2013) | Transocean: Deepwater Development Driller I (US$514,000/d to June 2012) | Moved rigs to support BP. BP partner in Mad Dog and Atlantis. | |
BP | 2 rigs affected: | Transocean: Deepwater Horizon | Transocean: Deepwater Discoverer Enterprise (US$523,000/d to February 2011, down to US$435,000/d to July 2012) | Transocean: Development Driller II (US$540,000/d to November 2013) and III (US$403,000/d to November 2016)—now at Macondo site. | Macondo spill costs already estimated at US$2 bil., with a number of funds set up including the US$20-bil. escrow account to cover economic compensation claims. |
Chevron | 2 rigs | Transocean: Discoverer Clear Leader (US$500,000/d to July 2014) | Transocean: Discoverer Inspiration (US$472,000/d to Feb. 2015) | Transocean: Discoverer Deep Seas (US$512,000/d to Feb. 2011) | |
Cobalt | 1 rig: | Diamond Offshore Company for the Ocean Monarch drilling rig. | Force majeure on Ocean Monarch estimated net expenditure to the company of approximately US$15 mil. | ||
Devon | 2 rigs | Seadrill: US$473,000/d | Diamond: Ocean Endeavor (mid-US$290,000s/d to June 2011) | ||
Eni | 3 rigs | Ensco: ENSCO 8500 (high US$290,000s/d) | Transocean: Marianas (US$565,000/d to Dec. 2011). | Transocean: Deepwater Pathfinder arriving Sept. 2010 to April 2015). | Limited impact |
ExxonMobil | AC 25 | Diamond: Ocean Endeavor | |||
Hess | 1 rig | ||||
LLOG Exploration | 1 rig | Noble: Noble Lorris Bouzigard (rate increase to US$334,000–336,000/d from June 2010 to June 2011). | |||
Marathon | 3 rigs | Noble: Paul Romano (US$374,000–376,000/d to July 2010) | |||
Murphy Oil | Diamond: Ocean Confidence (low US$510,000s/d to March 2012) | ||||
Nexen | 1 rig | Ensco: ENSCO 8501 (mid–US$360,000s/d to May 2013. | Ensco: ENSCO 8502—due to start up in August (low US$480,000s/d to Aug. 2012) | Minority partner in Shell's Appomattox | |
Newfield | 1 rig | Diamond: Ocean Victory (low US$300,000s to July 2010) | |||
Noble | 2 rigs: | Ensco: ENSCO 8501 | Noble Clyde Boudreaux (US$602-604,000 to Nov. 2011) | ||
Petrobras | Cascade/Chinook Development under way for 2010. Recent comment suggests it will come online to schedule. Viking Poseidon assigned to help BP in subsea work. | ||||
Shell | 5 rigs: | Transocean: Deepwater Nautilus (to Dec. 2011 at US$542,000/d) | Noble: Noble Danny Adkins (to Feb. 2014 at US$446,000–448,000/d) | Noble: Noble Jim Thompson (US$504,000–506,000/d to March 2011) | Delay to Appomattox oil find in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. |
Statoil | 2 rigs: | Transocean: Discoverer Americas (to Oct. 2013 at US$482,000/d) | AP Moller/Maersk: Maersk Developer (to Oct. 2013) | Invoked force majeure on rigs, June 2010. | |
Walter Oil & Gas | 1 rig | Diamond: Ocean Voyager (low US$200,000s/d to July 2010) | |||
*MMS data and company reports (do not necessarily match data from rig fleet owners) Sources: MMS, Current Deepwater Activity report, 21 June 2010. | |||||
Outlook and Implications
With a litigious culture, legal challenges not immediately related to the Macondo incident were always likely, although perhaps the speed with which the moratorium has been overturned has come as a surprise to the administration, which is now scrambling to put together evidence to support its continuation, with some reports that it may even seek to ramp up some measures based on evidence gathered on the Macondo spill. That is likely to see new evidence heard in the coming days, all of which makes any resumption in GOM activities unlikely until operators and contractors are clearer on the legality of a return to "business as usual". President Barack Obama's administration, meanwhile, is very clear that a return to "business as usual" is the last thing it is seeking from this incident, with upstream regulation, equipment requirements, and the opening-up of new areas to exploration all likely to be changed in the wake of the Macondo spill and growing signs that the administration wants to use the incident as a wake-up call to persuade the United States into cleaner energy use, where hydrocarbons are an element in the mix, rather than the dominant ingredient.
Sustaining the moratorium—or a more focused ban—will be an important element in this effort, keeping the public pressure on the industry at large as well as BP and getting to the bottom of the "cozy relationship" that is thought to have contributed to lax safety regulations in the region. With the oil still flowing into the Gulf, the administration has some clear and persuasive evidence on the dangers of a return to work for the rest of the industry without serious new procedures in place. The economic and ecological damage of the spill is likely to far outweigh that of the moratorium in the longer term, though this is of little comfort to the coastal communities who are bearing the brunt of both.
