Newly Unveiled Government Structure Diminishes Presidential Powers in Kyrgyzstan

Carrying On with Third Kyrgyz Republic

On 14 July, the newly elected Kyrgyz president Roza Otunbayeva unveiled her caretaker government, which is largely made up of technocrats. On 12 July she signed a decree on government structure. She also formed a new caretaker government of 17 ministers which will run the country until the extra-term parliamentary election in October, and there will be seven government agencies and six state services along with two foundations under the government auspices. Most of the new cabinet members have been transferred from the provisional cabinet that was formed immediately after the ousting of the authoritarian president Kurmanbek Bakiyev during the 6-16 April uprising. The move follows the 27 June constitutional referendum in which 90.5% of voters backed Otunbayeva's plan to create a parliamentary republic (see Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan: 28 June 2010: Kyrgyzstan Becomes First Parliamentary Republic in Central Asia). This, first of all, means transferring most of the presidential powers to the Jogorku Kenesh, the Kyrgyz parliament. Technically this new government and its structure should be approved by the parliament, but it was disbanded following the April uprising.

Otunbayeva has already ordered a new parliamentary election but also clarified in her decree that until the new legislature is formed, the government of technocrats will be in place and she will lead it. This government is permitted to run the administration of the country but will not have a mandate for political decisions. The plan is to form a new fully fledged government after the October election. According to the new constitution, the president will nominate ministerial candidates for the parliament's approval. Most of the technocrat ministers are not likely to be elected in the new cabinet in October. Otunbayeva has also formed her presidential office, which will be directed by Emil Kaptagayev. Interestingly, members of the caretaker government can still be nominated for the new cabinet to be formed in October, but a number of provisional cabinet ministers decided to resign and prepare for the parliamentary election campaign, including deputy Prime Ministers Omurbek Tekebayev and Temir Sariyev, both likely to have ministerial roles in the future government.

Dismantling Authoritarian Legacy

Otunbayeva and the other Kyrgyz revolutionary leaders are taking consistent steps to rid the country of the authoritarian structures of government, a legacy of Bakiyev, who had gradually concentrated all the executive and legislative powers in the presidential office in the five years of his presidency (see Kyrgyzstan: 21 October 2009: Worrying Signs of Authoritarianism Emerge as Kyrgyz President Replaces Cabinet). Most notably, key agencies such as the Interior and Foreign Affairs ministries were put under his direct control, along with National Security Agency, the former Kyrgyz KGB. The parliament was turned into an obedient body rubber-stamping Bakiyev's decisions. This unhealthy concentration of power was one of the factors behind Bakiyev's downfall in April this year.

Unsurprisingly, the revolutionaries declared dismantling Bakiyev's monarchic state structures as their number one goal. Furthermore, they also declared their plans to build the Third Kyrgyz Republic—the first one being the Soviet Kyrgyzya and the second, the authoritarian post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The details of the revolutionaries' plan have been shaped by their experiences in the 2005 Tulip Revolution that many of them led together with Bakiyev. The past five years have taught them that any revolution is likely to be hijacked, just as Bakiyev hijacked the Tulip Revolution and turned away from democracy. They believe that creating a parliamentary republic is the best way to prevent this from happening as well as stopping regular popular uprisings against the usurper.

Otunbayeva and her fellow revolutionaries have already registered success by receiving a resounding endorsement for the new constitution laying out the basis for a parliamentary republic. The new Jogorku Kenesh will have the real power of appointing ministers and setting out national policies. The new rules will also try to prevent any political party taking the majority seats in the parliament as no party will be allowed to have more than 60% of the seats. It is still unclear what the role of the president will be. The new government structure shows that most of the ministries are removed from direct presidential supervision, including the Foreign Ministry and Internal Affairs. However, the State National Security Service will remain under Otunbayeva's control. Meanwhile the all-important defence minister's post remains vacant. Otunbayeva has informed the media that it will be filled in consultation with the Interim Government's Special Representative for the south region, Ismail Isakov.

Outlook and Implications

Will Otunbayeva and her team succeed building a parliamentary republic in Kyrgyzstan? This depends on three main factors. Firstly, the achievements of the revolution must be institutionalised, which primarily means creating democratic institutions and a working system of checks and balances to prevent a return to an authoritarian regime. Secondly, the degree of opposition, mainly of the southern political clan that maintains support for the old Bakiyev regime. Thirdly, the possible return of ethnic violence between Kyrgyz on one hand and local Uzbeks and Tajiks on the other hand. Otunbayeva's project of a Third Kyrgyz Republic will fail if the southern opposition resorts to further confrontation and violence against the new government. Reportedly, over 10-15 June it was this southern political clan that instigated the attempted ethnic cleansing against local ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks. The violence not only destroyed the Uzbek economic dominance in the south clearing the way for Kyrgyz business circles but also brought into question the ability of the new revolutionary government to administer the country. Moreover it even created rifts between the revolutionaries themselves. Thus, Acting Defence Minister Isakov and many representatives of the security agency voiced their doubts over Otunbayeva's plans to build a parliamentary republic. They argue that given the real danger of a new ethnic conflict in the south and also the traditional mindset of many Kyrgyz citizens, perhaps a strong-man-style government is better suited for Kyrgyzstan. Incidentally, this view was supported by Russia. Against the backdrop of security risks it is not surprising that Otunbayeva has kept the National Security Service under her supervision. She has also entrusted the security of southern Kyrgyzstan to Isakov, while keeping the defence ministerial post empty.

Kyrgyz democracy has a testing road ahead but should it succeed, it will certainly find followers not only in Central Asia, notably in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but also further away in Armenia and Azerbaijan.