Military Claims to Have Thwarted Coup Attempt in Bangladesh

A written statement by army spokesman Brigadier General Razzaq said that "the attempt has been thwarted with the whole-hearted effort of army soldiers". In the statement, Razzaq asserted that the coup plot involved at least 16 active and retired army officers; however, security forces were able to arrest only two of these , while he said that the "co-planner" of the coup, serving officer Major Syed Ziaul Haq, has fled the scene.

The status and identities of the remaining 13 individuals were not immediately disclosed and remain unclear, although local news reports suggested the involvement of mainly mid-ranking officers with overseas connections. This lack of more specific information makes it difficult to assess the degree of the threat that the coup plans would have had to the government if they had been implemented successfully. In his statement, Razzaq provided a broad summary of the coup plot, claiming that Ziaul had sent emails to an undisclosed number of serving officers, outlining a plan to overthrow the government on 9-10 January. He furthermore suggested the involvement of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamist group, which was banned from the country in 2009, although the nature of the group's involvement was not explained. (IHS Global Insight has reported on the activities of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a global organisation, in Pakistan. The group shares some of the pan-Islamic goals of militant jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda, but it firmly denies allegations that it engages in militant activity. In Pakistan, the party's refusal to participate in elections and attempts to recruit military officers has added to fears among Pakistan's US allies that an "Islamist coup" is a possibility at some point. See Pakistan, 22 July 2011: Pakistani Brigadier Arrested over Links to Hizb ut-Tahrir).

The government is taking the issue seriously, with Awami League (AL) spokesman Ashraful Islam asserting yesterday that "there is no room for conspiracy in the army", adding that "those who are involved in such conspiracy will be given exemplary punishment". It is unclear when the coup plot was uncovered, although it is likely that this happened sometime in mid December last year, given that the military said that a special army court of inquiry into the matter was already set up on 28 December.

History of Military Coups

Since independence in 1972, Bangladesh's political establishment has been subject to three serious and numerous more minor failed military coups, and the killing of several national leaders. These have been motivated by a complex mix of struggles over national identity, power politics and specific historical contexts. As such, it is undisputable that the army has played a crucial role in the country's political arena, with civilian political leaders in need of the support of the military to govern effectively. However, the military has always lacked cohesion and efficacy, reinforced by factionalism that has been spurred by the country's two main national parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which have sought to bolster their support base among specific groups of favoured officers. While difficult to measure, this has severely affected the organisational cohesion of the military.

Since assuming power again, Hasina appears to have eschewed the usual practice of civilian rulers in Bangladesh purging officers deemed to be or to have been over-supportive of the other political party's aims and ideals. Wary of potential coup attempts, Hasina has been circumspect about exercising too much influence on the armed forces by not publicly attempting to influence postings or promotions. Nevertheless, local press reports in Bangladesh have recently suggested increasing anti-government sentiments within the military, as well as increasing desertion rates. The mutiny by Bangladesh's border guards in late February 2009, which left at least 74 people dead, provided the first real test of the authority of Hasina's government, and is a case in point in highlighting the military's strong political role, continuing divisions within it, and its lingering tensions with the government. Although Hasina took a strong line with the mutineers and stabilised the situation swiftly, there had been a strong dissatisfaction in the Bangladeshi army over the government's initial attempt to secure a negotiated settlement that allowed the situation to spiral out of control (see Bangladesh: 26 February 2009: Security Rating Downgraded As Armed Mutiny Spreads in Bangladesh). As such, the mutiny was a test of Hasina's capacity to restore order and stability quickly. Although the national army is under the control of Hasina's government, it still remains a powerful institution in the Bangladeshi polity, reflecting the severe constraints on civilian institutional capacity engendered by endemic corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and political polarisation. Past coups and coup attempts underscore that in this context, it does not require the involvement of the entire military to attempt a coup, with even relatively small numbers of military officers sufficient to challenge the political status quo.

Unresolved Issues of National Identity

The military has sought to play up the significance of the coup attempt by suggesting the involvement of "religiously fanatic" elements. Indeed, it is notable that Islam has become an increasingly defining feature of Bangladeshi politics in recent years. One consequence of this has been a deterioration in the security environment. The former BNP-led government (2001–06), which included the Bangladesh Islamic Conference (Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh: JIB) and the Coalition of Islamic Unity (Islami Oikya Jote: IOJ), came under pressure for its tacit support of radical Islamist groups, although it clamped down against militant activity following a spate of religiously motivated bombings in the country in 2005. The AL-led government stated in April 2009 that there were 122 organisations involved in terrorist activity in the country, the result of increased factionalisation among militants. The current government has sought to crack down on the spread of Islamism by strengthening the counter-terrorism apparatus internally and increasing international co-operation.

Tensions between the secular government and religious parties increased after Bangladesh's parliament, the Jatiya Sangsad (JS), passed the controversial 15th amendment to the constitution in July 2011, among others scrapping the interim caretaker government system. While the government resolved to retain Islam as the state religion and re-legalised religious-based political parties that were banned by the government in 2009, several provisions prompted angry anti-government protests by Islamist groups that have subsequently termed the government "un-Islamic". In particular, this concerned amendments that restored what was termed the "spirit" of the 1972 constitution, that of secularism, which was abolished after the 1975 coup. The amendment bill passed near-unanimously, with 291 votes for the changes and one against, but those present in the JS included mainly members of the ruling coalition government, with the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and its political allies boycotting the vote. If the "religiously fanatic" element of the coup attempt is indeed established, the plot could have been an attempt to throw out the secular character of the government, a move that is currently not possible by legislative means given the overwhelming majority of the ruling coalition in the JS.

While the tensions between the military and the AL-led government stem partially from the two sides' contradicting views regarding the country's status as a religious or secular society, the military has no reputation as an institution harbouring particularly hard-line or militant views on Islam. With the military yet to explain the "religiously fanatic" element of the coup plot, this suggests that the coup would have been unlikely to have found widespread support within the military, if this was really the motivation behind it. The picture would look different, of course, were other, as yet unmentioned, issues behind the failed coup attempt. However, this likewise is unlikely, given that the plot was foiled by the military itself.

Outlook and Implications

Factionalism within the military is an issue that could prompt further coup attempts in the future, and as such is an issue that is to be watched closely, especially in light of as-yet-uncorroborated reports that Hizb ut-Tahrir is actively seeking to recruit military officers, as it ostensibly does in Pakistan. This is particularly the case as the past has shown that even the involvement of small numbers of military officers could have a significant effect on the status quo of the political establishment. While more specific details of the coup attempt would be crucial to really assess the danger that it could have posed to the government, the incident does not generally alter the risk picture in Bangladesh—the risk of such events happening is already taken into account in IHS Global Insight's risk assessment of the country. As such, the coup attempt itself is unlikely to have a major impact on Bangladesh's investment environment and, more broadly, on its economy, given that it has taken place in an environment of already increasing political tensions between the AL and the BNP. If anything, the issue is likely to feed into these tensions as the political stand-off between the two parties is likely to result in an increase of political violence in the run-up to the general elections that are scheduled for December 2013. Given this, IHS Global Insight is currently in the process of downgrading Bangladesh's political risk score from 3.5 to 3.75.