IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Maliki was yesterday expected to put forward only about half of his proposed ministers, but in the end parliament ratified his list of 31 cabinet ministers and three deputy prime ministers. |
Implications | Iraq finally has a new government tasked with dealing with the country’s multitude of challenges. The formation of an inclusive government was the only real alternative for Iraq’s political parties, and bodes well for security and stability. |
Outlook | However, this government will be highly prone to deadlock and disagreement, as many of its constituent factions disagree on many key issues. |
Iraq’s parliament yesterday (21 December) approved 31 cabinet ministers and three deputy prime ministers proposed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki yesterday. As expected, several posts will remain vacant. Three so-called security portfolios—the ministries of the interior, defence, and security—will remain under Maliki’s own custodianship; the three are by far the most politically contentious positions. Maliki had previously come under fire by parties that are now part of his government coalition, for controlling and centralising security affairs, so for wider political harmony it is crucial that these posts be designated as soon as possible.
Another seven ministries will be overseen by acting ministers until Maliki is able to nominate candidates for the posts. According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Maliki said that more time was needed for the remaining appointments. He also said that he was waiting for political blocs to present more women candidates for remaining positions, as only one woman was appointed to a cabinet post: Bushra Hussein Saleh is a new minister of state representing the Shi’a National Alliance bloc.
The international media has provided conflicting reports regarding the division of portfolios between the blocs. Of the appointments, Iraqqiya appears to have received as many as 10 posts, the Kurdistan Alliance 4 posts, while the National Alliance—to which Maliki’s State of Law belongs—seems to have been given 19 posts, of which 8 were said by The New York Times to be held by the party of firebrand Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
The Iraqi news agency Aswat al-Iraq reported the following cabinet list yesterday:
- Minister for Transport: Hadi al-Aameri
- Minister for Education: Mohammad Tamim
- Minister for Health: Mohammad Amin
- Minister for Industry: Ahmad Naser al-Dali
- Minister for Agriculture: Ezz al-Din al-Dawla
- Minister for Water Resources: Muhanad Salman al-Saadi
- Minister for Housing and Reconstruction: Mohammad Saheb al-Daraji
- Minister for Sports and Youth: Jassem Mohammad Jaafar
- Minister for Justice: Hassan al-Shammari
- Minister for Communication: Mohammad Tawfiq Allawi
- Minister for Social Affairs: Nassar al-Rabiaee
- Minister for Science and Technology: Abdulkarim al-Samarraie
- Minister for Environment: Sirkon Sliwa
- Minister for Culture: Saadon al-Dalimi
- Minister for Tourism: Lewaa Smisam
- Minister for Oil: Abdulkarim al-Luaybi
- Minister Ali for Higher Education and Scientific Research: al-Adeeb
- Minister of Finance: Rafa al-Essawi
- Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hoshyar Zebari
- Minister for Human Rights: Mohammad Shayaa al-Sudani
- Minister for Immigration: Dindar Shafiqq
- Minister of State for Foreign Affairs: Ali al-Sajri
- Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs: Safaa al-Din al-Safi
- Minister of State and official spokesman for the government: Ali al-Dabbagh
- Minister of State for Provincial Affairs: Tourhan Mathhar Hassan.
In addition, Rozh Nuri Shaways was approved as a deputy prime minister, and he is the acting minister for trade. Furthermore, the former oil minister Hussein al-Shahristani is a new deputy prime minister for energy affairs; the news agency said he would be the acting minister for electricity, although media reports yesterday suggested that Iraqqiya’s Ziad Tareq would hold that post.
Maliki’s Road to Success
The prime minister was cited by The New York Times yesterday as saying: “I have not satisfied anybody at all. Everybody is angry with me, and everybody is frustrated with me.” Certainly, his task has been very difficult. His State of Law bloc narrowly lost the election to former prime minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqqiya. Nonetheless, Maliki entered the race to form a government as a man convinced of his own victory and position. At times over the past nine months, his overconfidence appeared misplaced and destined to fail. To begin with, Maliki was countered by most of Iraq’s neighbours. During his first term in power he had clashed considerably with Syria and Saudi Arabia, drifted away from his former Iranian backers—who now are in the “backing game” again—and was countered by most Iraqi political parties.
At an early stage, Maliki must have had some certainty that he would be able to squeeze Allawi out of the leadership post. This may have come from an early indication that he would have the support of the Kurdish bloc. The Kurds kept their positioning and alliance preference quiet for a long time. However, given the strong policy disagreements between the Kurds and several constituent Iraqqiya blocs, it would not be a surprise if the Kurds had made a calculated decision early on that their best bet lay in a renewed alliance with Maliki. This would have put the premier in a strong position to approach the Shi’a parties, whose support he eventually gained after Iran suddenly removed its opposition to his return to a second term. Iran’s change of heart—prompted perhaps from knowing that the alternative to Maliki would be the fiercely anti-Iranian Allawi—in turn triggered Sadr to support Maliki, which shifted the mood in the Shi’a bloc and unblocked the greatest hindrance to his return.
Outlook and Implications
When it comes to the the verdict on Iraq’s democratic experience, the jury is still out. The elections were largely free and fair—several blocs claimed a level of fraud; Iraq’s electoral commission investigated the allegations and later largely refuted them. That the election results were not fully respected testifies to the country’s lack of experience with representative politics. Much of the uncertainty that followed the elections can be attributed to the immaturity of the political institutions and political rules—including the constitution, which has been technically breached on occasion.
The post-election period has, more than ever, illustrated Iraq’s deep national, sectarian and political divides that will no doubt persist over time. Nevertheless, the past nine months have proceeded without a severe institutional breakdown, without the eruption of mass violence or a civil war between opposing factions, or a stability-threatening political crisis. The Sunni insurgency has continued to attempt to stage wide-scale attacks to derail the political process, but has ultimately failed in doing so; violence levels over the past several months have considerably lowered. Going forward, the stronger representation of Sunnis in the new government is likely to further weaken the insurgency. The Sunni-majority Iraqqiya ultimately decided to be part of the government and will continue to participate as long as its criteria are met. Allawi said yesterday that "we wish and we hope for this government to succeed in meeting the people's requirements", adding "we are announcing our full support for the government"; these comments are hoped to drain some of the insurgency’s political capital.
To suggest that the government is historic in its diverse make-up—despite all its flaws—would not be an exaggeration. Going forward, this critical milestone will be followed with difficult questions to be dealt with in parliament. The downside of this type of power-sharing government is, of course, that it will be prone to deadlock at a time when Iraq needs to move rapidly forward.