Pashinyan's likely election to mitigate Armenian protests but bring legislative gridlock until early election in two-month outlook

Late on 30 April, Nikol Pashinyan, an opposition MP from the Yelq party and leader of the peaceful nationwide civil disobedience campaign that forced Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan to resign on 23 April, distributed a video message via Facebook. This claimed that based on information he had received, the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun, HHK) will attempt to block the selection of a new Prime Minister on 1 May. According to Pashinyan, this had been decided at an emergency meeting of HHK convened by Sargsyan, who remains at the party’s helm. HHK controls 58 seats in 105-seat legislature, technically allowing it to block the vote. On 28 April, HHK’s Press Secretary Eduard Sharmazanov announced that the party will not nominate anyone for the prime minister's position. Pashinyan has met with at least 30 HHK members and it is unclear (ahead of the vote) whether Sargsyan has sufficient authority to enforce party discipline and to prevent defections from within HHK ranks, especially given the unprecedented nature of the protests which started on 13 April.

Failure to elect “people’s PM” will lead to escalation of protests

In the unlikely event that HHK successfully derails Pashinyan’s selection, protests are very likely to escalate. Pashinyan called on supporters to gather at Yerevan’s central Republic Square on 1 May and turnout is very likely to be in the tens of thousands, as it has been consistently during the civil disobedience campaign. The protesters already have demonstrated that they can cause significant disruption to public transport by paralysing parts of Yerevan through coordinated road closures. The police have been careful thus far to avoid the use of force, but if this changes, it is very likely to result in a large-scale public reaction, boosting the turnout to an extent that is likely to overwhelm riot police units.

Pashinyan’s interim premiership to focus on organising fair early election

It is more likely that Pashinyan will be elected as prime minister by the National Assembly on 1 May, with support from the opposition Yelq party (9 votes), the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) (7), the bloc of oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, Prosperous Armenia (31) and at least six defecting MPs from HHK. If appointed, he is very likely to prioritise preparations for an early general election. However, it is unclear how receptive HHK deputies would be to Pashinyan’s ambitious legislative agenda going forward, especially regarding amendments to the electoral law. Avoiding potential legislative gridlock will depend on Pashinyan’s power of persuasion to encourage more HHK members to defect. If selected, Pashinyan would have to form an interim cabinet within 15 days and within a further 20 days to present the government’s broad policy program for parliamentary approval. Given HHK’s parliamentary majority, such support will be far from guaranteed. At best under this configuration an early general election will be held in two months.

Russian government increased attention

Supporters of Armenian protest leader Nikol Pashinyan attend a rally in downtown Yerevan on 1 May 2018.

VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images

As a clear indication of growing Russian focus, Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the incumbent Armenian authorities twice in the last week. On 25 April, he spoke with President Armen Sarkissian reiterating his expectation that the transition should be conducted within the constitutional framework. On 26 April, Putin called Acting Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan and emphasised respect for the “results of the legitimate parliamentary election held in April 2017,” obliquely rejecting the planned early general election demanded by Pashinyan. In addition, on 28 April, the visiting delegation of Russian MPs led by the Chairman of Committee on CIS Affairs Konstantin Zatulin held several meetings in Yerevan. They met with the Speaker Ara Babloyan, Acting Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan, MPs Gagik Tsarukyan and Nikol Pashinyan, among others. Russian representatives have been eager to gauge Pashinyan’s stance regarding Armenian-Russian relations. In response, he has consistently emphasised the domestic nature of the protests, rejected any notion of foreign interference, and insisted on Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as reflecting its national interests.

Outlook and implications

Even under the best-case scenario of Pashinyan’s election as Armenia’s new Prime Minister, he will still have to deal with a thoroughly discredited HHK until an early election is held, which is likely to take at least two to three months. Pashinyan has yet to formulate a specific action plan, but based on his public statements it is clear that he intends to dismantle Armenia’s oligarchic political system. This monumental task necessarily entails attacking the economic interests of government-connected oligarchs and it is unclear whether Pashinyan and his allies have the capacity to accomplish this. The Russian government will continue to monitor his actions closely and hint of pro-Western sentiment is likely to indicate a more interventionist stance by Russia. If Pashinyan is not elected, this would clearly indicate continuation of Armenia’s political crisis. It would also point to increased risk of a controlled escalation of Armenia’s dispute with Azerbaijan, similar to events in April 2016 at the Line of Contact (LoC) in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. This would be driven by Azerbaijan being tempted to exploit Armenia’s internal divisions. In this context the defence ministry of the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region has recorded an increased concentration of Azeri armed forces at certain locations along the LoC in recent days, including the Fizuli district.