Islamist attack in Burkina Faso's capital indicates increasing vulnerability of hardened security force targets

Smoke rises above Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou, during multiple attacks on 2 March, which targeted the military headquarters and the French embassy.

Ahmed Ouoba/AFP/Getty Images: 926202038

The group of at least eight Islamist militants divided into two teams conducted two co-ordinated and simultaneous attacks in the centre of Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou, detonating a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) at the armed forces headquarters and attempting to storm the facility with small arms. Another unit conducted a small-arms attack at the French embassy approximately 1 kilometre from the military target. In a statement on 3 March, jihadists claimed responsibility for the attacks, highlighting that they were in response to the recent killings of six senior Al-Qaeda leaders, including founding member of Al Murabitoun and JNIM Mohamed Ould Nouini (alias Hassan al-Ansari), killed on 14 February during French raids on the Malian-Algerian border.

JNIM is an Al-Qaeda-aligned jihadist coalition, which comprises Harakat Ansar al-Din, Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), Al-Murabitoun, and the Sahara branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The attacks coincided with the first anniversary of JNIM's formation on 2 March 2017, but also occurred within the context of ongoing competition between JNIM and Islamic State-affiliated groups in the Sahel region. A group of JNIM and Harakat Ansar al-Din militants had previously pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Ibrahim al-Badri (alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) on 19 February. JNIM had also previously threatened in December 2017 to retaliate against various regional counter-terrorism operations including the G5 Sahel counter-terrorism force (see Mali: 19 December 2017: Progress with formation of Sahel force triggers union of jihadist rivals in Mali, raising terrorism risks).

Improving jihadist intelligence

The attack revealed security vulnerabilities around highly secure areas after an SVBIED gained access to the military compound and appeared to target a specific room that had been scheduled for use by the G5 Sahel counter-terrorism meeting. On 3 March, Burkinabé Prime Minister Paul Kaba Thieba stated that the attack on the military compound had resulted in the destruction of a room in which officials from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were supposed to gather for the meeting, but were moved shortly before the attack. The timing of the attack and deliberate targeting of the location indicates that jihadists received intelligence regarding the meeting, and that it was part of the intended target set. One of the attackers was allegedly dressed in a Burkinabé military uniform. This, together with the fact that one of the jihadists killed was identified by the authorities as someone expelled from the army following a number of mutinies in 2011, suggests that JNIM may have a range of former soldiers with some connections to serving security services, and at least can opportunistically receive tip-offs from their network for one-off attacks.

The attack was the second in 2018 in which jihadists disguised in security uniforms attacked military positions in the Sahel; the first took place in Niger (see Niger: 1 February 2018: Niger's de-radicalisation programme and G5 Sahel's second operation increase terrorist attack risk).

Outlook and implications

Jihadists have typically relied on mass-casualty attacks in central Ouagadougou on targets such as restaurants and hotels, as was the case in 15 January 2016 and 13 August 2017, for example. Their progression to attacks which likely required more complex planning, surveillance, and intelligence gathering, against harder-to-attack targets such as the army headquarters and the French embassy, indicates improving operational capability and increasing terrorism risk. Following JNIM's consolidation in March 2017, and considering its improved ability to successfully attack more ambitious targets in the capital, we assess that the group is likely to increasingly focus on security force and government targets in coming months, with the objective of testing the response and identifying new vulnerabilities. Increasing frequency of attacks on security forces in and around urban areas, even if they involved simpler tactics such as shootings, ambushes, and roadside IEDs, would indicate that jihadists were succeeding in establishing footholds in the areas and an expanded reach for their attacks. This would increase the likelihood of complex attacks by JNIM involving combined tactics such as IEDs and small arms not only in the capital, but also less well-defended cities, most likely through its network of local affiliates.

Although the militants failed to gain access to the French embassy, the brazen targeting of the highly secure compound and its location near the Prime Minister's Office served as a symbolic show of both intent and capability, and highlighted an increased risk to French assets, both military and civilian. French participation in counter-terrorism operations and the targeting of JNIM commanders in the Sahel region will continue to strengthen the resolve of JNIM and other militant Islamist groups to target French assets in the Sahel countries (see Niger: 14 February 2018: Increased counter-terrorism operations in Sahel leading to pooling of jihadist resources, with capital cities likely targets).