Several months of election delays likely after which electoral law favouring Hizbullah and the president likely to be agreed

Lebanon’s political parties are struggling to agree an electoral law under which to hold the parliamentary elections, scheduled for May and June 2017. Elections were last held in 2009, and parliament extended its term twice, citing security concerns. During that period, the presidential election was also delayed. It was held in October 2016, having been due in April 2014. For much of that period, Lebanon had caretaker cabinets, with senior political and security positions left vacant or held by officials extra-legally. Another constitutional vacuum, this time at the legislature, would occur if a new electoral law is not approved. Previous experience suggests that several months of delays to the election during which governance limps along is likely.

Competing laws

Since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war, electoral laws in Lebanon have been designed to preserve the leadership of a few key families and parties over their respective religious communities. As such, electoral district boundaries are organised so that key political actors, such as Walid Jumblatt of the Druze, the Shia Muslim Amal Movement and the Hariri Sunni Muslim family, retain their presence in parliament, and thereby ensure their representation in the executive. However, Hizbullah remained in parliament but outside of the cabinet until 2005. It entered the cabinet after Syria ended its 30-year military presence in Lebanon following former prime minister Rafic Hariri’s assassination, of which Hizbullah and Syria were accused of involvement by UN bodies. Now, under the same laws, Aoun and Hizbullah control more than half of the seats in parliament. Their next step is to permanently weaken Hizbullah’s Druze, Sunni, and Christian rivals, as Hizbullah continues its confrontation with the US and Aoun consolidates power before proceeding with his agenda.

Hizbullah militants and supporters gather to mark the 'Ashura' celebration in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, on 12 October 2016.

PA: 28905933

Hitherto power has been shared among the above key actors by diluting the Christian community’s ability to elect its own representatives, instead giving each of the three key players the ability to guarantee the election of Christian representatives loyal to them. The electoral law currently in effect, referred to colloquially as the 1960 Law, is for this reason unacceptable to Aoun, who sees himself as the most important representative of the Christian community, and who has to sign off on the processes that permit the elections to take place. Aoun and his key ally, Shia militia and political organisation Hizbullah, are demanding an electoral law that relies mainly on proportional representation, which, due to the intricacies of Lebanon’s demographics and to laws requiring that Christians and Muslims have exactly the same number of MPs, would result in a greater number of parliamentary seats for them. Proportional representation would also lead to more fragmentation among Sunni MPs and Christian MPs not loyal to Aoun. On the other side, Jumblatt and Hariri are demanding that the law offers a mix, combining first-past-the-post with proportional representation. A baffling array of proposals has been put forward, with most intending to ensure that the two do not lose out in the next election, and that only a small number of seats are really contested, with the majority being relatively safe seats.

Outlook and implications

Elections cannot be held without Aoun’s approval. In previous instances, for example, during the formation of the 2008 and 2013 cabinets, Aoun managed to delay cabinet formation for several months at a time, and to delay the election of a president for almost 30 months, when he did not get his way. There is no reason to believe that he would be more flexible now. As such, the delay in agreeing an electoral law can result in an open-ended stalemate. This may well suit Aoun’s rivals, who are keen to ensure that he does not succeed in upending the Lebanese political system as he had repeatedly promised to do. However, it is likely that a delay would backfire, with Aoun and Hizbullah having their way in the end.

If a system based purely on proportional representation is passed, it would significantly weaken Hariri and Jumblatt, while strengthening Hizbullah’s hand. Hariri would probably seek assurances from Hizbullah that he would retain the premiership after the elections, although there is no guarantee that Hizbullah would fulfil any such promise. Risks to contracts signed by previous governments would rise if Hizbullah and Aoun dominate the cabinet, along with the risk of corruption investigations into previous governments’ activities. A parliament dominated by Aoun and Hizbullah would be able to pass legislation pertaining to offshore energy, but their ability to attract foreign investment if Hizbullah is sanctioned by the US would be reduced. Moreover, proportional representation, in the longer term, would facilitate the emergence of new political alliances that are not based exclusively on religious affiliation. It is likely that the Druze community would protest, with the Beirut-Damascus Road being blocked for hours at a time over a period of days or weeks at multiple points including Aley, Bhamdoun, and Sawfar.

On the other hand, if the elections are held under a mixed system, which would be designed to protect the interests of Hariri and Jumblatt, this would essentially perpetuate the current Lebanese government model, along with its propensity for gridlock and policy paralysis. It would result in small-scale, mostly non-violent street protests, particularly in downtown Beirut on roads leading to parliament and the Prime Minister’s offices.