Mullah Akhtar Mansour's killing will intensify the civil war in Afghanistan, as hardliners are likely to replace Mansour from within the Taliban leadership.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | On 22 May, US and Afghan officials announced that Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the head of the Afghan Taliban, had been killed in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strike in Nushki District, in Pakistan's Balochistan province. |
Implications | Since ascending to the Taliban leadership after the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar in July 2015, Mansour had struggled to consolidate his hold over the various Taliban factions. Several factions condemned Mansour for favouring peace talks with the Afghan government and for his pro-Pakistan position. |
Outlook | As surely anticipated by the US government, Mansour's death will almost certainly reduce the likelihood of any peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in the next six months. While this indicates an increase in attacks against government targets, the US and Afghan governments likely hope that a more credible interlocutor will emerge from a new power struggle for leadership of the Taliban. |
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Purported photo of the destroyed vehicle in which Mansour |
Over the past several months, the Afghan Taliban has appeared to be at substantial risk of disintegration as a single organisation. Mullah Akhtar Mansour was never able to properly consolidate his leadership, despite having the advantage, according to an IHS source, of having access to most of the Taliban's financial resources and of considerable support from the Pakistani military establishment, who regarded Mansour as their key proxy within the Taliban. However, that relationship – and Mansour's support for pursuing a peace process with the Afghan government – drove several Taliban commanders to oppose the former leader. Mullah Rasul, Mansour's principal opponent, had proven capable of attracting not only commanders and cadres from Mansour's ranks, but had also begun to attract some senior commanders of the Haqqani Network. Despite having been appointed Mansour's deputy in 2015, an IHS source claims that Sirajuddin Haqqani and his supporters remained dissatisfied with Mansour's leadership. In March 2016, Sirajuddin reportedly openly challenged Mansour's policy of reconciliation with the Afghan government, and his pressure was apparently the reason for the cancellation of an expected meeting between the Taliban and the government's representatives in March 2016.
Losing ground
The haemorrhaging of support from Mansour to other factions, including the Islamic State's affiliate in Afghanistan, Wilayat Khorasan, had considerably weakened Mansour's position. In spite of the Taliban's military successes in the past year – such as the temporary capture of the city of Kunduz in October 2015, the encirclement of several districts of Helmand earlier this year, and the successful start of the spring offensive (codenamed Operation Omari) – Mansour was not able to take advantage of these successes to consolidate his leadership. Even before the announcement of his death in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strike, rumours had been circulating that Mansour had been killed by rival factions. An IHS source claimed that Mansour had not been heard from since April 2016, and had ceased to attend Taliban shura meetings. In his stead, Sirajuddin Haqqani had taken over as acting leader, but seemed to be operating as more of a permanent fixture, taking decisions to dismiss field commanders and even to replace Mansour's other deputy, Hedayatullah. Such actions indicate that Sirajuddin was already planning to permanently step into Mansour's role.
Outlook and implications
As the US government must have anticipated, its decision to eliminate Mansour is likely to seriously affect any prospects for peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Mansour was by far the most moderate leader within the Taliban, and with Sirajuddin Haqqani almost certain to be confirmed as the new leader of the Taliban, the group is likely to shift towards a more hardline position regarding talks. The US government is also unlikely to take a positive view of the Haqqani Network leader assuming leadership over the Afghan Taliban.
The decision to eliminate Mansour, reportedly endorsed by President Barack Obama, probably reflects US and Pakistani frustration at Mansour's inability to bring the Taliban to the peace table. The US decision was likely predicated on the belief that although killing Mansour would be detrimental to peace talks, it would nonetheless be preferential to assassinate the former leader and thus disrupt a resurgent Afghan Taliban that had intensified attacks against US forces in recent months, and provide a signal that the United States would continue to target Taliban safe-havens in Pakistan. For the Pakistani military – which may even have supplied targeting information for the strike covertly (although this remains unclear) – the move signalled a conviction that Mansour no longer held credibility as a valid interlocutor. Moreover, although Sirajuddin Haqqani would appear to be a far less acceptable figure to the US and Afghan governments, he would probably carry greater credibility within Taliban ranks and would therefore be more likely to unite the Taliban factions under his control. Although this will carry a strong likelihood of an increase in attacks against government targets and security forces in southern, eastern, and northern Afghanistan, as well as in major cities like Kabul and Kandahar in the six-month outlook, Washington may have calculated that – in the longer term – Haqqani will probably bring a greater probability of winning over at least the majority of Taliban commanders to accept peace talks as the only viable solution to the conflict.