IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | This was the first time that the new administration had hosted either president in the capital, Washington DC, with the dialogue later described as "extraordinarily constructive". The military activities in Swat ordered by the Pakistani PM are unprecedented on this scale, including heavy weaponry and aerial attacks, and mark an abrupt termination of the highly controversial policy of engagement. |
Implications | The overall message was however less upbeat and made resoundingly clear: there was consensus on the need to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida", but it has become clear that setbacks and more violence could be expected as part of this. |
Outlook | Gone are the days of personalised relationships that underpinned much of the Bush foreign policy thrust. Instead, Obama's administration appears to prefer clear-set goals, an arms-length approach to key leaders, and in many respects, offers a more realistic appraisal of the situation. A lot will depend on specific action on the ground, however, and whether the military actions succeed in neutralising the ascendency of the Pakistani Taliban. |
The Overall Messages
On Wednesday (6 May), U.S president Barack Obama held talks separately with Afghan president Hamid Karzai and Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari before bringing the two together for round-table talks. At the subsequent press briefing, Obama outlined a number of key issues, but refused either to take questions or allow the other leaders to speak. This in itself is revealing, underlining just how careful the United States is being about orchestrating its relations with the troubled region and its governments. Obama's key points are outlined below.
The bottom line was the defeat of al-Qaida in the region. This reflects U.S. concerns on two fronts: first, militancy in the region, particularly Pakistan's border areas, clearly needs addressing if the U.S.'s policy to support Afghanistan's stabilisation is going to have any chance of success. More broadly, the region's radicalisation is regarded as a catalyst for a growing interest in extremism and extremist activities elsewhere, including in the United States. Recent press reports suggest that Pakistan's militant training camps now enjoy a strange new kudos, regarded as the place to be (as opposed to Iraq) for an individual interested in jihad. Obama took the opportunity to again express his fears of another 11 September 2001-styled attack in the United States, stressing that "we have learned time and again that our security is shared".
The second major point was to stress the U.S.'s long-term support for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. administration is attempting to rebrand its activities as much more than just military operations, with a clear focus on a comprehensive strategy that has clear civilian and military aspects, and pledges greater non-military resources to both nations. Overshadowing this pledge were press reports suggesting that U.S. aerial attacks in the west of Afghanistan earlier this week had killed as many as 100 civilians, which sparked angry protests in Afghanistan yesterday with demonstrators chanting "Death to America". Both Obama and U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton expressed their apologies and regrets for these casualties. There was also a stronger commitment to an enduring relationship with both nations, in an attempt to counter regional fears of being "dropped" by the United States once U.S. policy in the region concludes, as has previously been the case. Obama announced that "no matter how long it takes and what it takes, democracies will deliver, my democracy will deliver". Obama's emphatic policy focus on al-Qaida also provides delineation from the issue of the Taliban, the internal resolution of which has been perceived as being core to the integrity of both states, but especially of Pakistan.
Characterising the Problem Differently
More than eight years after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, and with the end of the President Bush administration, it comes as little surprise that the Obama administration has decided to handle relations differently. The United States had learnt a lot about the region and the characters involved, and this inevitably colours the policy outlook. Broadly, there has been a shift away from pledges to democratise Afghanistan. Instead, aims have been scaled back, with the Obama administration looking to stabilise the country, support the broadening of federal control, and support the development of Afghan institutions. Attention is being paid to many more non-military aspects, with a focus on areas like improving expertise in agriculture. At the same time, there has been a refocusing of military resources towards Afghanistan. For some time now, Obama has suggested that the Bush administration took its eye off the ball in Afghanistan, allowing al-Qaida and the Taliban to regroup, rearm and spread their influence. The current U.S. administration appreciates that it is taking a gamble, but has decided to reinforce the military presence, seeking to bolster the capacity, numbers and training of the Afghan forces, and with this concerted push, try to regain better control over the country's security situation.
Turning its attention to Pakistan, the Obama administration is clear that the country is now very much a part of the problem, rather than looking to it to provide the solution as was the case during the Bush years. Pakistan's unwillingness and/or inability—depending on how the situation is regarded—to address the presence of al-Qaida and the Taliban within its own borders has created a huge problem. Although Pakistan has made much of its military operations in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), these have so far failed to contain the problem, and in some instances, exacerbated it. Mismanaged and changeable policy, vacillating between military operations and negotiations, coupled with the support that vested interests within Pakistan's security and intelligence services have given to the militant element, have created a threat of sizable domestic, regional and global proportions. With the Pakistani leadership recognising a threat to Pakistan's and their very own existence, there are now signs that Pakistan is now intent on addressing the problem more decisively. The order of Zardari to the Pakistani Army to crush the Taliban militancy in Swat until "normalcy" returns is a landmark decision, even though the aims are still somewhat ambiguous. Indeed, it appears that there is no post-war strategy as yet, and analysts doubt that the military is adequately equipped to fight a guerrilla war against the Taliban, raising fears that this could be the beginning of prolonged conflict with heavy casualties on all sides. Zardari also officially renounced the peace deal between the Pakistani government and the Taliban that has drawn fierce criticism especially from the United States.
New Outlook, New Relationships
Given this sea-change in U.S. outlook and rhetoric, it should come as little surprise that the Obama administration is seeking to manage its relations with both governments differently. One of the defining aspects of the Bush era was the U.S. president's very friendly, personalised relationships with leaders like Karzai and former Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf. Conference calls were held with both regularly, and the rhetoric when discussing these ties was, at least in the earlier days, generally positive and often light-hearted. Obama and his team have taken a much cooler approach. Certainly between U.S. vice-president Joseph Biden and Karzai there is some history, with the former walking out of a dinner at which the latter was present last year because Biden felt that Karzai was not taking the issue of corruption within Afghanistan sufficiently seriously. This coolness and distance has so far translated into some forceful criticism of both administrations and the situations that they face within their country. Clinton in particular has been keen to stress the vulnerabilities of Pakistan's administration and the threat that the country poses more broadly to U.S. and other interests. This criticism has only served to exacerbate bilateral tensions. However, after both Karzai and Zardari stressed their support for the Af-Pak strategy, it appears that there is a more conciliatory stance towards the activities of both leaders. Obama, Clinton and Gates, for example, have all hailed Pakistan's recent upsurge in military activity in Swat valley accentuating the more concerted strategic approach.
In terms of dealing with the country's leaders, the Obama administration appears to readily appreciate the limitations of what and who they have to deal with. The Karzai administration has proved to be a disappointment and is now regarded as largely unreliable. He has failed to extend the central government's remit much beyond the capital, Kabul. His administration has been found to be wanting, and corrupt, and domestically his popularity has fallen. It will be interesting to see how Karzai will fare in the upcoming presidential election. While Karzai has time and again showed his ability to form alliances, these have crumbled frequently. Karzai's former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, who was ousted by Karzai in 2006, could be a powerful contender to his rule. A re-election of Karzai is thus far from assured. Opposition to Karzai may be viewed as welcome, particularly in strengthening the nascent democratic process in Afghanistan although the election of a leader without a clear mandate could further muddle policy at such a critical juncture.
While highly different in context, the government in Pakistan has proven ineffective, and its popularity, along with that of Zardari, has fallen swiftly since its election last year. As such, the United States cannot guarantee that it will be dealing with this particular government for the foreseeable future. It comes as little surprise therefore that the Bush era policy of dealing with one or two key individuals has been dropped in favour of dialogue with many more political players, including opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif. The United States has also become accustomed to Pakistan's standard line that it is doing its utmost to address the militant presence, but eight years on, this argument has worn thin and mistrust has grown. Given the question marks over the military's commitment and the fact that Pakistan remains adamant that U.S. troops not be allowed into its territory, the Obama administration is laying greater stress on development rather than military aid. It is hoped that a concerted push on the development front, with a focus on providing education and employment opportunities for individuals in the militancy-affected areas, will reduce the appeal of taking the path of radicalisation. With the pledge of Zardari to support the Af-Pak strategy, and steps like decisive military action against militants and the renouncing of a controversial peace deal with the Taliban, relations between Pakistan and the United States are set to improve, wrong-footing Sharif in his positioning as "president-in-waiting".
Outlook and Implications
Obama's carefully orchestrated press conference stressed that all parties were agreed on the primary goal of eradicating the region's militant presence. Notably, he didn't express just how this would be achieved, but this is characteristic of his administration's preference against setting specific timescales and targets. He revealed that following the talks there was a "renewed sense of partnership to share intelligence and to co-ordinate our efforts". This adds to the sense that following the recent release of his administration's policy strategy on the region, followed by these talks, the United States has outlined the direction in which it expects policy to go, and now expects Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet these commitments. Notably, there was no public mention of the funds that the United States has offered and is considering providing, particularly to Pakistan. A total of US$5 billion was pledged by the Friends of Pakistan at last month's Tokyo (Japan) conference, while the Biden-Lugar aid bill of over US$7.5 billion for Pakistan over the next five years is back on the agenda in the United States. The use of these financial tools should not be downplayed, and may prove to be a key means by which the United States seeks to influence policy in the region, when the "renewed sense of partnership" begins to falter.
However, on a more cautious note it remains to be seen how the officially pledged support for the Af-Pak strategy translates into fielding support for it domestically (no direct reactions have been reported so far). Anti-western sentiment has been stoked in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by western military intervention, and any activity carried out by the two countries' leadership that is seen as bowing to the West's demands is likely to increase this brand of nationalism. In addition, investment in development will take years to bear fruit and remains highly contingent on the maintenance of a stable security environment. In this respect, a great deal will depend on the way in which civilians will be protected during and after military activities, especially on the capacity of the authorities to support huge numbers of IDPs (internally displaced person). Any humanitarian crisis caused by escalating military action (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees already reports 500,000 IDPs from fresh violence, in addition to 550,000 already displaced since last August) will cause further resentment against central state structures and thus lead to an increase in radicalism throughout the country.