IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | The future of Pakistan's coalition government, led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), appears increasingly uncertain after two key parties announced their withdrawal from the coalition and the governor of Punjab province was assassinated. |
Implications | In many ways, the current political turmoil highlights just how complicated, fluid, and shaky the political environment in Pakistan is. |
Outlook | Although the situation looks bleak and government collapse (and ensuing early elections) are a possibility, the government is likely to hang on to power for a little longer. Most importantly, the opposition, led by the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) has shown no appetite for causing a quick dissolution of the government. Although the government may survive, its unpopularity is set to ensure that it will be unable to muster enough strength to persuade political parties to join it and to regain its majority. Most immediately, the past weeks' developments complicate the passing of crucial legislation. |
The future of Pakistan's coalition government, led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), appears increasingly uncertain after two key parties announced their withdrawal from the coalition and the governor of Punjab province was assassinated. Pakistan's prime minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani has spent the past few days attempting in vain to rally support for his government after key coalition partner, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), announced that it quit the coalition due to hikes in gasoline prices on 2 January. The MQM, holding 25 seats in parliament, has its stronghold in Karachi, Pakistan's commercial hub, and mainly represents ethnic Mojahirs. The MQM has blamed corruption and rising prices for its departure, saying that the government "has failed to address the serious problems confronting the poor masses" (see Pakistan: 13 December 2010: Inflation in Pakistan Continues to Rise on High Food Prices and Excessive Government Borrowing). Just weeks before, the departure of a key Islamic party, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal (JUI-F) already raised the possibility of a "domino effect", at the time depriving the government of seven seats in parliament and forcing the replacements of three cabinet positions (see Pakistan: 15 December 2010: Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Hit By Withdrawal of Key Islamic Party). Effectively, the PPP now stands deprived of 32 members of parliament, leaving it short of a majority in the 342-seat assembly.
The assassination of Salman Taseer on Tuesday (4 January), the governor of Punjab province and a member of the PPP, has added yet another layer of insecurity. Taseer was shot repeatedly at close range as he was getting into his car in a fashionable area of the capital, Islamabad, marking the most high-profile assassination in Pakistan since the death of Benazir Bhutto in 2007. Police are holding Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, one of Taseer's police bodyguards, in connection with his killing. Qadri surrendered to the police immediately after the killing and according to Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik, has confessed to the murder. Shortly after the incident Qadri told a Pakistani television crew that he was "a slave of the Prophet" and that "the punishment for one who commits blasphemy is death". A liberal, Taseer was a vocal opponent of religious extremism and of the country's blasphemy law. This campaign proved particularly divisive. On 31 December last year conservative religious groups held a nationwide strike against plans to amend the law (see Pakistan: 31 December 2010: Nationwide Strike Held in Pakistan over Plans to Amend Blasphemy Law).
In many ways, the current political turmoil highlights just how complicated, fluid, and shaky the political environment in Pakistan is. The government's position is greatly complicated by impossible expectations to tackle the country's many, often interrelated problems that include massive economic and socio-economic implications of the worst floods in history in summer 2010; massive security problems due to widespread militancy, especially in the Northwest; major economic instability; poor international relations, particularly with neighbours India and Afghanistan; and natural resource shortages. More broadly, Pakistan has a history of institutional weakness, poor governance and corruption.
Outlook and Implications
Government Surviving for Now, But Facing Increasing Pressure
Although the situation looks bleak and government collapse (and ensuing early elections) are a possibility, the government is likely to hang on to power for at least a little longer. Most importantly, the opposition, led by the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) has shown no appetite for causing a quick dissolution of the government, knowing full well that in the current environment of instability this could trigger a military intervention rather than benefitting its own political prospects. Furthermore, the scale of problems in Pakistan would likely render the party, if in power, unable to be much more effective than the PPP, which would bode unwell for its own political survival. Rather, the PML-N seems to be biding its time, as it did after the devastating floods last year. This does not mean that the PML-N will remain inactive, however. Without seeking its outright collapse, the PML-N is increasing its pressure on the government; yesterday it issued a three-day deadline to the government to endorse demands to act on corruption, cut government expenditures by 30% and reverse its decision on fuel price increases, threatening political agitation after another 45-day deadline if the demands are not implemented. This could potentially resemble protests for the reinstatement of Supreme Court judges in early 2009. However, while Sharif said that he could finish the alliance of his party with the PPP in the Punjab assembly, there are currently no signs that a vote of no-confidence could be levelled against the Gilani administration (which would require the fractured opposition to unite), and it is even less likely that the government would resign on its own terms. A military intervention currently appears unlikely unless the situation spirals out of control.
Although the government may survive, its unpopularity is set to ensure that it will be unable to muster enough strength to persuade political parties to join it and to regain its majority. The Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid-e-Asam (PML-Q), which holds 49 seats in parliament, yesterday already refused to work together with the government. Most immediately, then, the past weeks' developments complicate the passing of crucial legislation. Among others, this concerns the passing of legislation to reform the country's tax system. Failure, or further delays, to reform taxes could lead to problems with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others, which has determined tax reforms are part of the conditions in return for the disbursal of a massive bailout package in November 2008. One of the key components of tax reforms will be the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) system with a single-rate system at 15%, which is intended to replace the multiplicity of rates of the current general sales tax (GST) system and increase the government's revenue base.
No Immediate Effect on Fight Against Militants
The U.S. administration has stressed that Pakistan's active support to tackle militancy is key to defeating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and as such has placed significant emphasis on pressuring Pakistan to do more on this front. Government instability is a key hindrance to doing so and as such the mere possibility of government collapse was set to raise eyebrows in the United States. However, the United States has made clear that the recent developments would not affect its dealings with the Gilani administration, with U.S. State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley in a statement to the press saying that "this is about internal politics within Pakistan, which has a parliamentary system".