DPR leader's IED killing elevates likelihood of controlled Russian escalation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine

On 31 August 2018 in Donetsk, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in a militia-controlled café killing DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko; another person died and 12 others were injured, including DPR's Tax and Duties Minister Alexander Timofeyev. The DPR and another breakaway entity, Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), have been functioning as effective Russian protectorates since 2014 (see Russia – Ukraine: 25 July 2016: Separatist-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine likely to remain Russian protectorates, depending on Moscow's financial and material support). Zakharchenko had served as DPR leader since August 2014. Both DPR militias and Russia blamed Ukraine for the IED attack in Donetsk on 31 August. Ukraine rejected the accusations, and Ukraine’s security service (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny, SBU) suggested that Russia was involved in Zakharchenko’s assassination. The DPR announced that Dmitry Trapeznikov, Zakharchenko’s deputy, would serve as acting head of the entity.

Significance: IHS Markit assesses that Zakharchenko was killed either by competing warlords within the DPR separatist militias, or by the Russian security services. Over the past several years Zakharchenko has proved difficult for Russia to control, and IHS Markit’s sources in eastern Ukraine suggest that Moscow wanted to have him removed. In November 2017 the head of LPR in Luhansk, Igor Plotnitsky, was removed by a ‘coup’ in the entity and fled to Russia (see Russia – Ukraine: 22 November 2017: Power struggle among east Ukraine separatists indicates likely Russian consolidation of increased militia control in Donbass conflict). Plotnitsky’s removal in Luhansk provided better Russian control of LPR militias since late 2017. Increased Russian military control of the DPR and LPR militias is indicative of Russian designs for controlled re-escalations along the line of contact (LoC) in eastern Ukraine in the one-year outlook. Such re-escalations would involve increased use of heavy weapons, such as tanks and artillery, to shell the Ukrainian armed forces positions along the LoC, as well as sabotage attacks behind the LoC, involving IEDs and arson attacks against government, military and economic assets. Military re-escalation in Donbass would likely seek to keep Ukraine destabilised politically from within rather than to take control of more Ukrainian territory, as this would risk further Western sanctions against Russia. Russian accusations of Ukrainian failures to implement the Minsk II ceasefire agreement would serve as an indicator for an upcoming re-escalation. Social media reports of heavy weapons forward redeployment towards the LoC in the DPR and LPR controlled areas would also indicate impending re-escalation.