A drive-by shooting attack took place at the US embassy in Ankara during the early morning hours of 20 August, with three 9-mm pistol rounds fired at the embassy’s entrance from a moving vehicle. The shots caused only minor damage to the embassy’s security booth, while no injuries were sustained by the security staff. Turkish government spokespersons described the attack as a “clear provocation” and an “attempt to create chaos”. Later that day, Turkish police arrested two individuals suspected of having conducted the attack; both were reported to have criminal records.
Significance: The attack occurs during the ongoing diplomatic conflict between Turkey and the United States, with the US imposing sanctions on two Turkish ministers and double tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium imports, triggering a drastic slide in the Turkish lira (see Turkey - United States: 15 August 2018: Turkey-US reconciliation unlikely without Turkey releasing US pastor; increasing risk of targeted US sanctions on government-affiliated businesspeople). The perpetrators are likely to have intended the attack as retribution for what they believe to be an “economic coup” being staged in Turkey by the US. This is the narrative being promulgated by the Turkish government to absolve itself from responsibility for Turkey’s economic instability and ultimately a potential economic crisis. Government supporters are likely to accept this narrative, particularly given the existing anti-Americanism prevalent in Turkish public opinion, with a 2017 Pew survey showing that 79% of the Turkish population harbours unfavourable views regarding the US. However, the government is highly unlikely to encourage these attacks, even from behind the scenes, given that such incidents compromise Turkey’s bargaining power at the negotiating table with the US administration. Therefore, this entails an elevated risk of individuals acting on their own initiative to target US diplomatic and readily identifiable retail assets. With the potential perpetrators being much more likely to be regular individuals or, at worst, criminals rather than members of terrorist groups, the attacks are likely to remain limited to low-capability shootings and vandalism. There is no indication, at present, of intent to harm US individuals, which would require at least minimal planning to identify targets. The embassy attack is likely to have been deliberately staged at a time when the consulate was closed. Risks to US individuals would become more likely in the event of a full-blown economic crisis, manifested by successive corporate bankruptcies, particularly if precipitated by further punitive measures by the US on Turkey. However, such an outcome is likely to be further than six months away, pending difficulties being faced by private-sector groups in rolling over maturing corporate bonds. Meanwhile, the threat emanating from Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C), the far-left militant group that conducted a suicide bombing attack on the embassy in 2013, is negligible, with the organisation likely to be experiencing a drastically reduced capacity, having been unable to launch any attacks since 2015.
Risks: Terrorism; Death and injury
Sectors or assets affected: US diplomatic and retail assets; US individuals