The Burkinabé armed forces on 18 July announced they had arrested 60 suspects in northern Burkina Faso during counter-terrorism operations, which began earlier this month. In a statement, the army said associated support networks and infrastructure had been dismantled, explosives seized, and 100 suspects questioned, 40 of whom were later released. The operation was conducted along the border with Mali where jihadist groups established themselves and engaged in a campaign targeting the military, killing and kidnapping civilians, particularly local officials, and forcing the closure of schools by murdering or threatening teachers for not teaching the Koran. Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou, has suffered three terrorism-related attacks since January 2016. The latest was a co-ordinated attack on 2 March 2018, which targeted the armed forces' headquarters and French embassy using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and armed fighters reportedly wearing military uniforms, who exchanged fire with security forces; the Mali-based transnational jihadist front, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed the attack. The severity of this attack in Burkina Faso has placed President Roch Kaboré under extreme political pressure to ensure that his government can deliver security and has motivated ongoing counter-terrorism operations.
Significance: The army statement did not specify the groups associated with the latest operation. IHS Markit assesses that the operation most likely targeted the home-grown jihadist group Ansarul-Islam, which is active in the northern Soum province and is thought to have 200 active members. The probably sustained counter-terrorism operations, and the wide net cast by security services, indicated by the number of people arrested and released shortly afterwards, are likely to weaken JNIM's local affiliate and disrupt its support network in Burkina Faso, and prevent a major expansion in the scope of its operations. Security operations, however, are unlikely to effectively mitigate the risk of jihadist attacks targeting foreign mining operations in the north, such as Inata in Soum province and Essakane and Tambao in neighbouring Oudalan province, involving the use of improvised explosive devices around perimeters or kidnap-for-ransom operations using ambushes along access routes. Ansarul-Islam’s leader, Jafar Dicko, remains at large and is likely to focus recruitment efforts on the marginalised Peul community to help rebuild the movement. Likely increased reliance on JNIM to provide the necessary training and weaponry, and existence of JNIM safe havens on the Malian side of the border, will sustain this risk over the coming year.
Risks: Terrorism; Kidnap
Sectors or assets affected: Mining; Security forces; Expatriates,

