Malian president's re-election bid raises terrorist attack risks to government, foreign assets in capital in coming weeks

The incumbent president had been widely expected to seek a second term, but made the official declaration on state television after his endorsement by 68 parties, which form a pro-Keïta coalition known as Together for Mali (Ensemble pour le Mali: EPM).

Poll confirmed despite growing insecurity

Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga on 27 May confirmed that the presidential election would be held as scheduled on 29 July. If so, this will be the first time an election in Mali has been held on time since Keïta came to power in 2013. Municipal elections, originally due in 2014, were postponed four times due to jihadist violence before finally taking place in November 2016, although turnout was low and they were withheld in parts of northern Mali. Local and regional polls, due in April 2018 and already delayed from December 2017, have been put back until after the presidential election, also for security reasons. Parliamentary elections are due in four months' time. Terrorist attacks against foreign bases, military personnel, and civilians have been increasing in northern and central Mali in the lead-up to elections, with jihadists seeking to create further turmoil by manipulating historical inter-communal conflicts in these areas (see Mali: 10 May 2018: Jihadist exploitation of Malian inter-communal violence triggered by counter-terrorism increases risks to French military and commercial interests).

Keïta's re-election challenges

Despite the advantage of incumbency, Keïta faces a number of challenges in his attempt at re-election and his popularity has dwindled. Since his landslide 2013 election, he has had five different prime ministers and failed to make progress in implementing the 2015 northern peace accord signed in Algiers between the government, ex-separatist Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), and pro-government Plateforme militias, which continue to fight each other for control of key areas such as Kidal. Despite the presence of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (known by the French acronym MINUSMA), the French Barkhane counter-terrorism operation, and lately the regional G5-Sahel anti-insurgency force, jihadist violence has spread from Mali and spilled over into Niger and Burkina Faso. Security forces are unable to contain widening inter-communal conflict in central and northern Mali, and Keïta's government is facing widespread criticism of corruption and mismanagement as living standards decline. In August 2017, mass popular protests forced him to backtrack on a referendum to amend the constitution that would have increased presidential authority.

In the meantime, Soumaïla Cissé of the Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union pour la république et la démocratie: URD) has been endorsed as presidential candidate by an opposition coalition known as Alternation and Change (l'Alternance et le Changement) and has been increasing his support base. Tens of thousands of supporters attended a rally at which he declared his presidential candidacy. About 10 individuals, including former prime minister Moussa Mara, have announced they will run for president but Cissé, who has already warned of potential electoral fraud, is likely to pose the major challenge to Keïta's re-election bid.

Outlook and implications

It is unlikely that any candidate will win outright in the first round on 29 July, with a second round on 12 August most likely taking place between Keïta and Cissé. Despite Cissé's growing popularity, Keïta is likely to garner support from defeated candidates by promising them government posts. His greater access to resources and support from the military, combined with the multitude of opposition parties which weakens their efficacy, will probably give him the edge. Nevertheless, if Keïta senses that his support base is waning, which would be indicated by members of the EPM changing allegiance as the poll date approaches, he is likely to cite security issues as a reason for postponing the election.

Despite the government's insistence that the election will be held on time, insecurity in northern Mali makes it unlikely that polls will take place on time in volatile areas such as Kidal, Ménaka, and Tessalit. This lack of a consensus across the country and continued state absence in the north means the status quo of jihadist attacks and intra-Tuareg fighting will persist, hindering progress on implementing the peace agreement. In the coming weeks, a surge in terrorist attacks in northern areas targeting MINUSMA, which is providing logistical support for the polls, election officials, and troops will indicate the jihadists' intention to create major disruption. Attacks would likely involve vehicle ambushes, the detonation of improvised explosive devices, and small-arms fire around military bases. Jihadists are likely to view successful and timely elections in Mali as a return to normality, scuppering their aim of imposing sharia (Islamic law) across the country.

As such, Keïta's intention to run again and the prime minister's confirmation of the election date are likely to act as triggers for more spectacular jihadist attacks, including attempts to target military, government, UN, or French assets in the capital, Bamako, by first detonating suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and then storming the facility with gunmen. In November 2015, jihadists attacked the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, killing over 20 people. Under the joint banner of the transnational jihadist front Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), based in Mali, they are now much better organised and have greater capacity. The March 2018 attack in Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou, claimed by JNIM, which targeted the armed forces headquarters and French embassy using SVBIEDs, is a likely indicator of similar attacks in other Sahelian capitals.