Indian and Pakistani military statements indicate intent to observe Kashmir ceasefire, at least until after national elections

Former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a meeting in New Delhi on 27 May 2014.

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On 29 May, the Pakistani and Indian militaries issued almost identical statements announcing their intent to re-impose the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) – first introduced in 2003 – in the disputed territory of Kashmir. The announcement was finalised between the Indian and Pakistani directors-general of military operations during a call on a dedicated military hotline, which is reportedly used on a weekly basis. The statements are significant, given that relations between the two countries have progressively deteriorated since Prime Minster Narendra Modi assumed power in India in 2014.

The deterioration in relations occurred despite initial indications that Modi and Pakistan's then-prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, would seek to initiate wide-ranging talks on bilateral trade and Kashmir. Significantly, Sharif attended Modi's inauguration in 2014 while Modi made a surprise visit to Sharif's granddaughter's wedding in Pakistan the following year. However, these moves were undermined by Sharif's domestic confrontation with the Pakistani military that led to his disqualification in July 2017, partly driven by the military's objection to Sharif's aspiration to repair ties with India.

Following a policy departure in India in September 2016 – when the Indian military publicly announced that it was conducting cross-border raids on suspected militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir – cross-border firing along the LoC, ranging from small-arms to artillery fire, has intensified to unprecedented levels. Pakistan accused India of violating the ceasefire on more than 1,300 occasions in 2017 alone, while India reported 860 Pakistani attacks in the same period. This is a significant increase from the 2015–16 period, which registered 250–300 violations by both sides.

Statements in support of ceasefire indicate intent for military de-escalation

The statements by the Indian and Pakistani militaries are the latest indicators of a new intent in both countries to de-escalate the volatile situation along the LoC. Most notably, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa delivered a speech in April emphasising that India-Pakistan disputes – including Kashmir – should be resolved through dialogue. Given that the Pakistani military controls the country's India-related foreign policy, Gen Bajwa's statement is likely to have been received seriously by Indian policymakers.

Similarly, on 16 May Modi's government announced a unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir, stating that security forces would not initiate action against suspected militants based in India-administered Kashmir during the month of Ramadan, and that this policy was likely to continue following the conclusion of Ramadan if the number of militant attacks were contained. This marks the second indication of a shift in Modi's foreign policy towards pursuing peace along India's northeastern and northwestern fronts: on 27 April, Modi met with Chinese President Xi Jinping for an informal summit in the Chinese city of Wuhan to seek de-escalation along India's northeastern border, where India and China were engaged in a 73-day military standoff in June along the Doklam plateau.

Outlook and implications

The statements in favour of de-escalation suggest that cross-border violations across the LoC in Kashmir and the Working Boundary (official border) in northern Punjab are likely to reduce in number and intensity over the one-year outlook (that is, until after elections). However, an end to ceasefire violations is unlikely, considering the proximity of the opposing forces and the risk of localised incidents. Given that there is very little commercial property along the border, further violations are likely to result in loss of military and civilian lives and damage to property.

Although upcoming elections in both countries – in Pakistan by July 2018 and in India by April 2019 (and potentially earlier) – mean that sustained bilateral talks between the two sides remain unlikely, a degree of military de-escalation is probable. Neither government is likely to offer major concessions in the realm of bilateral trade ahead of polls, so as to maintain electoral support: Modi's robust stance against Pakistan has particularly resonated with his reportedly nationalist voter base. Furthermore, although Modi's government has mooted the idea of seeking political resolution to the territorial dispute in Kashmir – and the Joint Resistance Leadership (a group of separatist leaders in Kashmir) has supported the idea, providing that Pakistan is included as a stakeholder in talks – engagement in substantive talks prior to the elections appears unlikely.

The increased prominence of domestic matters ahead of elections in both Pakistan and India – and the need to focus political energy internally – mean that both countries will probably pursue de-escalation along the border, at least until after the elections. A similar trend was observed when the ceasefire was first imposed in 2003: both counties were scheduled to hold general elections in the following year, and according to data provided by Indo-Pak Conflict Monitor, ceasefire violations reduced by more than 90% in 2004.

Local police data based on numbers of militants arrested in Indian-administered Kashmir show increasing indigenisation of militancy in Kashmir. In the period following the implementation of the ceasefire, if militancy were found to involve a higher proportion of militants from Pakistan, the Indian army would be likely to resume cross-border operations. Furthermore, the materialisation of a rumoured prisoner-exchange deal involving an alleged Indian spy arrested in Pakistan in 2016 will serve as an indicator of both sides' commitment to pursuing an improvement in bilateral relations; in Pakistan in particular, such an arrangement would be contingent on military approval.