Jihadist exploitation of Malian inter-communal violence triggered by counter-terrorism increases risks to French military and commercial interests

Addressing the United Nations Security Council, Secretary-General Guterres noted that the regional G5-Sahel counter-terrorism force missed its March deadline for full deployment due mainly to lack of training and equipment. He urged Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, which make up the G5-Sahel countries, to deploy troops as quickly as possible and "resolve command and control issues".

French tactics

French President Emmanuel Macron has indicated frustration over the slow progress in the G5-Sahel counter-terrorism force's deployment, and during a visit to Burkina Faso in November 2017 he urged the G5 countries to quickly achieve their "first victories" in combating Sahelian terrorism. Although there has been no official confirmation, French media reports claim the new strategy of France's Operation Barkhane counter-terrorism campaign is to kill or capture the main jihadist leaders – notably Iyad ag Ghaly of the Al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Adnan al-Sahrawi of the ISGS – believing that 'decapitating' the insurgencies will quickly weaken them. This has led to a collaboration between Operation Barkhane and Malian government-aligned Tuareg militia groups, Groupe d'autodéfense touareg Imghad et allies (GATIA) and the Mouvement pour le Salut de l'Azawad (MSA), in the Ménaka region, where Sahrawi is likely based. The more chaotic composition of his group is likely to make him easier to dislodge than Ghaly, who withdraws to Algeria when under pressure, and JNIM generally is larger, better-organised, and more capable than ISGS. Last month, Operation Barkhane said it had killed 30 ISGS jihadists on the border with Niger.

Encouraging historical rivalries

Operation Barkhane's collaboration with GATIA and MSA has allowed jihadists to leverage long-rooted historical rivalries around Ménaka between the Tuareg Daoussahak community and the Peul Tolebe sub-clan. At least 47 Daoussahak civilians were killed in separate attacks on their camps at Aklaz and Awakassa on 26 and 27 April, while a further 17 Tuaregs were killed on 1 May in Tindinbawén et Taylalene. The killings follow UN reports of the summary execution of 95 people, believed to be Peuls, in Ménaka, blamed on the GATIA and MSA militia groups. Operation Barkhane commander General Bruno Guibert has said that co-operation with these groups is essential for intelligence gathering, and denies that it damages the reputation of French troops. There has been no claim of responsibility for the attacks against the Tuareg civilians, but they were most likely retaliatory assaults carried out by ISGS. This group draws much of its recruitment from the Tolebe Peuls, who – motivated by their perceived marginalisation and the lack of state intervention in Ménaka regarding land and water conflicts – also formed the bulk of Sahrawi's former Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (known by its French acronym MUJAO) splinter group.

Outlook and implications

Manipulation of the historical conflicts in Ménaka will likely enable ISGS to expand its recruitment base among Peul groups on both sides of the Malian border with Niger. On 7 May, the Council of Peul herders in Niger condemned alleged Malian incursions into Niger, accusing the Nigerien authorities and Operation Barkhane of collaborating with the Malian Tuareg groups. Furthermore, the easy access to weapons in the Sahel is likely to result in the proliferation of armed ethnic self-defence groups. Peul militias, in particular, are likely to work together across borders in Ménaka, Niger's Tillabéri region, and Burkina Faso's Soum province, targeting national armies, foreign troops, and Tuareg militias or civilians. Foreigners working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in these areas face severe kidnap risks, although their local counterparts will most likely be spared. On 11 April, a German humanitarian worker was abducted by gunmen at Ayorou in the Tillabéri region and is still missing.

In addition to the conflict in the Ménaka region, two other major historical inter-communal conflicts in Mali are likely to be exploited by ISGS and JNIM jihadists, who in December 2017 announced they were co-ordinating activities. This would be indicated by an increase of violence between the Dogon/Bambara and Peul communities around Mopti in central Mali (where the presence of foreign troops is minimal), and between the Tuareg Ifoghas and Imghad communities in the northern Kidal region. Destabilisation of these key areas would likely result in the end of the 2015 Algiers peace accord between the government and Tuareg militias and prevent the restoration of state control in the north of Mali. It also increases the risk of regional civil wars in the centre and north of Mali, and renewed demands for an independent Azawad state, although the presence of Operation Barkhane troops and UN peacekeepers mitigates the risk of civil conflict spreading to the capital Bamako and southern Mali.

However, French counter-terrorism co-operation with government-aligned militias increases the risk of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks against French military bases and commercial interests, particularly the Areva uranium facility east of Ménaka in Niger's Agadez region. The SVBIED attacks that allowed gunmen to penetrate the Operation Barkhane base in Timbuktu, Mali, on 14 April are an indicator that this tactic is likely to be increasingly used.