New Iraqi government likely to seek US military withdrawal regardless of election outcome, Shia infighting increasingly likely

The Iraqi electoral system makes it almost impossible for any single party to win a majority. Consequently, the immediate aftermath of the election is highly likely to involve a race by the competing factions to establish the largest coalition in parliament, which would then be issued the mandate to form a government and appoint a prime minister. Therefore, even if a party or pre-election alliance does not secure the highest number of votes, it can still win the prime ministry if it succeeds in establishing a coalition with the highest number of parliamentary seats post-election. With Shia Muslims constituting the demographic majority in Iraq, the eventual governing coalition is still highly likely to be led by one of the competing Shia factions. It can nevertheless end up relying on the support of Sunni or Kurdish factions, depending on the post-election parliamentary arithmetic.

Key contestants

The incumbent prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, and his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, despite both belonging to Dawa, will nevertheless be competing separately: Maliki with his pre-existing parliamentary coalition, State of Law, and Abadi with the cross-sectarian Nasr al-Iraq. Despite his public reputation having been undermined because of his perceived role in the rise of the Islamic State in 2014, Maliki retains strong influence within Dawa as well as the wider government bureaucracy. However, Prime Minister Abadi's key competitor is likely to be Shia contestant Hadi al-Ameri, who leads the Kataib al-Fatah al-Mubin alliance, the umbrella political organisation of the Iran-backed PMU militias. Despite his deliberate effort to cultivate an Iraqi nationalist image in recent years, Ameri represents the pro-Iran wing of Iraq's Shia political class.

Outlook and implications

Regardless of the election outcome, it is highly likely that the next prime minister will set a timeline for a US military withdrawal, in accordance with the standing demand of Iran-aligned factions in parliament. Any potential timeline for this process would probably stipulate gradual withdrawal before 2020, with at most only a small contingent of military advisers and trainers being allowed to stay.

The most likely post-election scenario would involve a reunited Dawa party, where Abadi and Maliki reconcile. If Abadi secures at least 60 seats, he would likely retain the premiership. If not, it would be more likely to go to a similar moderate candidate, preserving the status-quo. Such a government formation would be willing to tolerate continued Iranian infiltration of Iraq's security apparatus, while providing Iran with access to Iraq's financial system and transportation infrastructure. However, this would be highly unlikely to extend to a complete severance of Iraq's political and economic ties with the United States and the Persian Gulf countries. This is partly because of the sizeable reconstruction market that Iraq will have to offer in the next decade, valued at USD900 billion during a 10-year period from 2018. In addition, Iraq's sizeable Sunni minority means that Shia leaders will have to compromise and form alliances across ethno-sectarian lines to govern.

An emboldened Abadi, if buoyed by a strong election victory by securing 80–90 seats, would be able to build a broad coalition with one of the Kurdish factions, Sadr, Hakim, or Allawi. A coalition with the Kurds would create an opportunity for negotiations over direct fiscal transfers to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), serving to reduce the risk of instability in the Kurdish region (see Iraq: 30 March 2018: Kurdish participation in Iraqi government after parliamentary elections, while unlikely, would ease Baghdad's punitive measures against KRG). An emboldened Abadi would also likely be more aggressive in his efforts to control the PMUs and bring them under state control.

Faced with an existential threat, larger militia groups, such as Kataib Hizbullah, Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, and the Badr Corps, would be likely to resort to violence. This would most likely take the form of attacks on US troops and bases, with a view to renewing these groups' legitimacy as independent armed entities. All US-linked assets and personnel, military or civilian, would become potential targets. These militias are well trained and equipped through their collaboration with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hizbullah, and through fighting together with pro-government forces in Syria. In addition, Iran and Syria have provided the militias with advanced weapons systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles. Consequently, these militias pose a greater threat than they did during their previous campaign targeting the US between the start of the Iraq War in 2003 and the US troop surge in 2007. Similarly, if the US were to reject a call for full withdrawal, Shia militia groups would be likely to commence attacks on US troops and bases before the end of 2018. However, in the six-month outlook, provided that the US does not reject calls for a full withdrawal, these groups are likely to refrain from such attacks, focusing instead on achieving political gains and pressuring the government with the threat of attacks.

In the event that the PMUs' political ambitions fail, there would also likely be an intensification of fighting between rival militias, in the form of turf wars over key trade and hydrocarbon assets in southern Iraq. Any armed confrontation would be likely to start in Baghdad, from where it would spread farther south, to the oil-rich Basra region. The militias would also be likely to increasingly resort to criminality, such as extortion and kidnap-for-ransom in cities such as Baghdad.

A deterioration of the security environment resulting from intra-Shia fighting and reduced US military presence would risk providing the Islamic State, or a new Sunni militant group, with space to regroup in the northern Sunni provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, and Salah ad-Din. Reports of human rights violations by Hashd militias in liberated Sunni areas would serve to generate support for the revival of Sunni militancy.