New Ethiopian PM's approach towards demonstrators' demands, contraband networks will determine protest and violence one-year outlook

Key choices in the cabinet reshuffle include the appointment of Motuma Mekassa (formerly minister of mining) as minister of defence, the retaining of Workneh Gebeyehu as minister of foreign affairs, and the appointment of Abadula Gemeda (formerly speaker of the House of People's Representatives, the lower house of Ethiopia's parliament) as national security adviser, a minister without portfolio. All three are members of the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO), the same constituent party of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Consequently, the OPDO now holds the key positions in and dominates Ethiopia's National Security Council.

Addressing protester demands

Prime Minister Ahmed partly owes his swift political rise to an openness by EPRDF leaders to an Oromo prime minister in the hope that this will help placate widespread anti-government protests in Ethiopia's Oromia region, which these elites believe is key to ensuring the coalition's political future (see Ethiopia: 21 February 2018: Ethiopia's ruling coalition likely to remain stable after appointing consensus replacement for outgoing PM by end-March). Consequently, he faces the expectation that his premiership will not see significant protest resumption. IHS Markit sources in Ethiopia also indicate that the Oromo protest movements, including the Qeerroo activist networks, are cautiously optimistic about Ahmed, the first ethnic Oromo prime minister since the EPRDF took power in 1991, but that they expect him to deliver significant results on addressing their grievances within six months of taking office. Key demands of protesters include:

• Ending the state of emergency;
• Releasing imprisoned Oromo demonstrators, officials, and politicians (both EPRDF and opposition);
• Allowing peaceful demonstrations to take place; and
• Ending violence along the border between the Oromia and Somali regions, and fully implementing the results of the 2004 referendum on the route of this border.

Already since taking office, Ahmed has restored internet services in Oromia (restricted from the beginning of the state of emergency) and visited the city of Ambo (a focal point for anti-government protests), and released a number of prominent prisoners. Ahmed will likely seek to deliver progress on these demands gradually over the coming months in order to derive the greatest positive response from each action. He is unlikely to officially end the state of emergency early, but instead will likely ease its restrictions (for example, ordering federal forces back to their barracks and allowing peaceful demonstrations), so that it has less impact on the population. He will be facilitated in this by his new defence minister, who officially oversees the emergency, and an OPDO-dominated National Security Council.

Outlook and implications

Protest outlook

How responsive Ahmed is to protesters' demands will be a key indicator of the likelihood of violent anti-government protests resuming within Oromia in the one-year outlook, with wider issues such as land reform and the relationship of the OPDO leadership with its grassroots increasing in significance beyond this timeframe. The return of widespread anti-government protests to Oromia would increase the likelihood of general strikes, fuel blockades (preventing fuel trucks from crossing Oromia to reach Addis Ababa), and demonstrators targeting state-owned assets and foreign-owned commercial properties and road cargo for arson and vandalism (see Ethiopia: 14 March 2018: Ethiopian security crackdown in Oromia region will likely spread violent protests, targeting road cargo and commercial property), and of similar protests returning in the Amhara region as well. The elevation of Abadula Gemeda to national security adviser, in particular, presents a risk to Ahmed, as this gives Gemeda (who has a history of being outspoken on such issues) a higher-profile from which to criticise the prime minister if protests resume.

Outlook for paramilitary-related violence in Oromia and Somali regions

IHS Markit sources indicate that the president of Ethiopia's Somali region, Abdi Iley, views Ahmed's elevation to prime minister as part of a growing Oromia and OPDO assertiveness that threatens both his own interests and that of his region. Iley's key relationship to the central government has historically been through the military's Eastern Command (based in nearby Harar), and any replacement of this command's head by Ahmed would increase the risk that communication and co-ordination between Iley and the central government would degrade.

The Somali region's 30,000-strong Liyu ("special" in Amharic) paramilitary police force is extensively involved in smuggling and criminal networks, and this was as a key factor in sparking the Oromia-Somali region cross-border violence in the latter half of 2017 (see Ethiopia: 8 September 2017: Spate of violence involving Somali-region police and Oromo militias risks triggering new protests in Ethiopia's Oromia state). Members of the Somali region's political and business elite, as well as elements of the military in eastern Ethiopia, benefit from these networks. Attempts by Ahmed's government or Oromia authorities to enforce the 2004 border referendum results or crack down on these criminal networks would, therefore, threaten the interests of these elites. Umar Hussein, an ally of Abiy Ahmed who was appointed director-general of the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority in the recent reshuffle, would play a leading role in crackdowns on smuggling and contraband.

The alienation of Somali region elites from the central government would risk these elites utilising the Liyu police for violence as leverage against Ahmed's government, and facilitating anti-government violence in Oromia by ceasing to prevent weapons smuggling into the region. In particular, small-arms violence against civilians in Oromia's zones bordering the Somali region (or against ethnic Oromos in the Somali region) would be harmful to Ahmed's popularity in Oromia. Oromia regional authorities blamed the Liyu police for a grenade and gun attack in Moyale town on 17 April, which killed three people and wounded 50. IHS Markit sources indicate that most of the 1,500 Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) militant group prisoners who the government claims to have released in February 2018 were actually directed to join the Liyu police. Violence against oil and gas investments and personnel in the Somali region, likely blamed on the ONLF but potentially involving members of the Liyu police, would be damaging to the government. In March, a Chinese firm engaged in oil and gas exploration in the Somali region announced new finds at the Hilala and Calub fields. Key indicators that such violence is increasing in likelihood would include:

• Government crackdowns on smuggling and criminal networks in the Somali region;
• Statements from leading Somali region politicians and officials warning against "Oromo nationalism" and, conversely, voicing Somali autonomist or nationalist sentiments;
• Numerous desertions from the Liyu police; and
• Increased illegal weapons smuggling into Oromia.