Gaza protests reduce likelihood of interstate conflict, but unlikely to improve Hamas’s domestic popularity without external support

Palestinian protesters burn tyres and throw stones at the Israel-Gaza border on 5 April 2018.

Mormen Faiz/NurPhoto/Getty Images

The protests, dubbed a ‘March of Return’ by Hamas and Palestinian media, coincided with the Palestinian commemoration of Land Day and were organised with the intention of breaching the barrier and continuing within Israel. The 30 March demonstrations are likely to be the first of a series of protests by Palestinians in the lead-up to the anniversary of the founding of Israel on 14 May.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gave advance warning that attempts to enter the border security zone or breach the border wall would be met with force. In the event, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live fire were used to counter marchers, with designated snipers stationed along the border. At least 17 protesters were killed, and a further 773 wounded by live ammunition during the protest, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza. The IDF claimed that eight of those killed were Hamas militants, with a further individual belonging to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and another belonging to an unnamed Salafist group operating in Gaza. Hamas has acknowledged that at least five members of its armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades, were among those killed. Attempts to breach the border barrier have involved groups with wire cutters or blunt instruments and are unlikely to represent a genuine attempt by Hamas’ leadership to move significant numbers into Israel.

Hamas’s strategic weakness

Hamas’s leadership, particularly that of leader Yahya Sinwar, lacks options with which to continue to govern while maintaining an active resistance to Israel. The reconciliation with Fatah that has been ongoing since October 2017 has stalled, and brought only minimal benefit for the Gaza economy.

The organisation of the march was not initiated by Hamas but has been expropriated by it as part of a committee within Gaza – the governing faction in Gaza – and it provided the logistical support required to transport residents to the border. In the weeks preceding the protests the movement received endorsement from Fatah and other Palestinian factions. Although Hamas claimed, unrealistically, that the march would involve one million Gaza residents, the final turnout of between 35,000 and 40,000 is a demonstration of the lower level of popular support that the group’s leadership can currently mobilise in Gaza. The IDF stated that it had prepared to repel upwards of 100,000 demonstrators.

The IDF is constructing a 37-mile anti-tunnel barrier around the Gaza border, due for completion in mid-2018 and with full operational capacity in early 2019 that will almost certainly reduce the offensive capacity of Hamas to launch raids into Israel. Israel has destroyed at least four Hamas tunnels since October 2017. Their utility for infiltrating Israel with the intent of either offensive operations or kidnapping Israeli citizens in the event of a conflict similar to 2014 is being reduced. Losing this offensive option will effectively limit Hamas once more to launching rockets from Gaza and risking a direct response from Israeli airstrikes.

Hamas has spent an estimated USD40 million annually on tunnel construction and their loss will weaken Hamas militarily and likely be seen as a major source of embarrassment and political criticism from within Gaza – which is suffering from an unprecedented level of infrastructural failure (see Israel; Palestinian Territory, Occupied: 11 May 2017: Domestic pressures on Hamas emanating from tax collection and electricity shortages raise war risks with Israel).

No rockets were fired from Gaza on 30 March or in the week following the protests, and Hamas has attempted to prevent any major escalation in hostility with Israel since the beginning of 2018. The complete absence of any rocket fire is unusual during a period of increased violent confrontation with Israel. It indicates that Hamas’s internal security services are making an extra effort to police rival militant groups in Gaza and minimise the risk of an unintended escalation, and are intent on focusing attention on the presentation of the civilian aspect of the protests.

Absence of Arab support

The protests themselves have not generated renewed support from other Arab states for the Palestinians. The head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate, Abbas Kamel, reportedly served as an intermediary for Israel to inform Hamas that any further mass demonstrations would be met with the same level of force. Quoted in an interview with The Atlantic published on 2 April, Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who is currently on a US tour, indicated his support for the Israeli state’s right to exist, a historically controversial decision by an Arab head of state and a break with the traditional Saudi state line.

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas encouraged the protest movement, but his motivation was likely based on undermining the future credibility of Hamas, rather than as a genuine shift in the political status quo (see Palestinian Territory, Occupied: 18 December 2017: Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric, Hamas’ weakness limits military options and means it cannot abandon reconciliation with Fatah).

Outlook and implications

IHS Markit assesses that Hamas’s senior leadership has made the tactical evaluation that the cost of military conflict with Israel is at present too high, with insufficient likelihood of any material or political gain. Israeli defensive technology and subsequent retaliation on targets in Gaza is acting as sufficient deterrence, and Hamas likely concedes that a major conflict would irreparably weaken Hamas’s hold on power. Continuing support for a prolonged period of civilian protest will reduce the risk of interstate conflict between Israel and Hamas as it likely to prove a more effective method of gaining external political support.

The PA is unwilling to supplant itself as the central representative of the Palestinian cause and is unlikely to suspend security co-operation with the Israeli government to allow such protests to take place in the West Bank. Furthermore, Abbas is diplomatically isolated; he has outright rejected any co-operation with the United States while the Trump administration seeks to formulate a new peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians (see Israel: 07 December 2017: US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital weakens PA’s authority and increases protests and terrorism risks).

Hamas is likely to use the upcoming six weeks of proposed protest and demonstrations as a means of escalating non-military confrontation with Israel, focusing international media on Gaza and reducing the risk of large-scale retaliation on Hamas targets from airstrikes or artillery fire that is incurred by mortar or rocket fire from Gaza. Protests will likely continue if it is civilian fatalities in particular, rather than injuries, that continue to be high; funerals will be used as a means of inflaming public sentiment and larger gatherings.

It is likely that other militant factions in Gaza such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or dissident members of Hamas, will use the cover of mass protests to attempt to breach the Gaza border wall or plant explosives on the border with the intention of targeting IDF patrols. Israeli rules of engagement will continue to permit the use of live fire against any individuals approaching the security barrier and indiscriminate casualties will be more likely if protesters attempt to rush the border barrier. An indicator of reduced risk of protester casualties will be if the current deployment of IDF troops and security forces at the border is largely replaced, or supplemented, by police forces with more sophisticated riot suppression training, then the high risk of Palestinian casualties would be reduced.