UAE-backed counter-terrorism operations unlikely to fully succeed in rooting out Sunni jihadists from southern Yemen

Since January 2018, the UAE has intensified its operations in southern Yemen aimed at degrading AQAP's presence in the area, leaving Saudi Arabia to focus on the task of assisting Yemeni forces loyal to internationally recognised president Abu Mansour Hadi against the Houthi movement in central and northern Yemen. This reflects the UAE's strategic interests, which are primarily in southern Yemen, and not in supporting Hadi's resumption of power in Sanaa, a dynamic that has already caused friction with Saudi Arabia and the legitimate Yemeni president (see Yemen: 5 February 2018: Fighting in Aden indicates Yemeni president's isolation and assertiveness of southern secessionists, backed by UAE).

In February, the Hadrami Elite Forces, a militia established and trained by the UAE, concluded Operation Faisal, a two-stage ground operation with Emirati offensive air support, focused around the al-Masini valley in Hadramawt province, a long-standing AQAP stronghold. This was followed in late February by Operation Decisive Sword, conducted by UAE-backed Shabwani Elite Forces in Wadi Yeshbum, in the al-Said district of Shabwa, with the aim of preventing AQAP forces from retreating there from the adjacent Hadramawt. The latest offensive, Operation Sweeping Torrent, focused on al-Muhafad and Wadi Hamara districts in Abyan, where AQAP has maintained a presence over the past 10 years. UAE military officials claimed that these operations resulted in the killing of more than 50 AQAP militants, the seizure of a number of caches of heavy weapons and the discovery of improvised explosive device (IED)-making facilities. They also claimed that the operation had successfully cleared the area of jihadists. Local media outlets and reliable social media sources, however, cited lower counts of AQAP casualties and said that AQAP had employed its well-tested tactic of avoiding a full-scale confrontation with the UAE-backed forces and retreating to border areas between Shabwa and Hadramawt.

Challenges faced by the UAE

UAE-led efforts to combat AQAP in southern Yemen have followed a two-fold approach: first, restoration of a measure of authority in those cities under its control, mainly Aden and Mukalla, and, second, mounting clearing operations from there aimed at dislodging AQAP and intended to progressively expand the area controlled by UAE-backed forces.

IHS Markit assesses that this approach is also intended to create a "jihadist-free" buffer zone around key strategic and energy assets, such as Mukalla port, the Balhaf LNG terminal, and al-Riyan airport, in an area where the influence of pro-independence forces supported by the UAE is growing. The UAE's long-term objective is likely to stabilise the area by stimulating economic recovery through the resumption of commercial activities, entrusting these efforts to pro-secessionist elements and political entities such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which the UAE considers more efficient and reliable than the Hadi government. This approach, however, runs counter to the efforts of the Aden-based Hadi government that is attempting to impose its own authority in southern Yemen. On 8 March, for instance, the STC urged the Saudi-led coalition to prevent pro-Hadi government forces from deploying to Balhaf so the Shabwani Elite could protect it instead.

The topography of Shabwa and Hadramawt – characterised by deep valleys, canyons, and mountains – poses a secondary challenge to this effort. Security forces will likely struggle to hold an area that is ideal for ambushes and hit-and-run assaults, a tactic that AQAP has mastered and used frequently by exploiting its knowledge of the terrain and its relationship with local tribes. Moreover, as has occurred after previous security operations, there is a high risk that these gains will be overturned due to the lack of co-ordination between the different UAE-backed elite forces, which do not have a unified chain of command.

AQAP's strength

Unlike the UAE, AQAP is familiar with local socio-political tribal and other dynamics and is an established actor in southern Yemen. The group has been forging alliances with local tribes for two decades and has greatly benefited from the ongoing civil war, acquiring further combat experience and establishing a solid presence in new areas such as Ibb, Taiz, and al-Bayda, where it is fighting on the front lines against Houthi militants. There is some evidence that AQAP has been weakened by the ground campaigns and the targeting of its operatives by the United States' unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); however, as it has demonstrated in the past, the group is resilient and able to exploit local grievances and those with the national government and the Saudi-led coalition, whose military campaign remains largely unpopular across the country. The UAE-led effort to combat AQAP is heavily reliant on Yemeni fighters, and the country has been wary of the presence of foreign mercenaries among its own forces. Local and international media reporting of secret prisons set up by UAE forces, abuse of detainees, and UAE plans to build a military base in the island of Socotra have provoked angry responses from many sectors of Yemeni society, accusing the UAE of being a colonising force. AQAP has been quick to incorporate this reporting in its messaging, presenting UAE involvement as evidence of that country's fight "against Islam and Muslims" in Yemen. This message is likely to resonate among those tribes that have not been incorporated into UAE forces and that have been affected by the US UAV campaign, enabling AQAP to find shelter and recruits among them.

Outlook and implications

AQAP's ongoing attacks against UAE-backed forces across southern Yemen, coupled with renewed Islamic State activity in Aden, point to a still fragile risk environment across southern provinces that calls into question UAE claims that its counter-terrorism operations have heavily degraded the jihadists' capabilities. On 13 March, an Islamic State suicide vehicle-borne IED targeted a Security Belt headquarters in Aden, killing three people and wounding 30. This was the third similar attack perpetrated by the group in the Yemeni transitional capital in three weeks.

UAE attempts to consolidate control of southern Yemen through its local proxies is likely to push the Islamic State, and particularly AQAP, to devote more resources to mounting asymmetric attacks against UAE-backed forces, especially in Aden and across Abyan and Shabwa, and on key strategic assets controlled by these forces, especially al-Riyan airport and the Balhaf LNG terminal, as AQAP has likely retained the capability to re-deploy fighters and weapons from central Yemen. A joint operation conducted by Islamic State and AQAP operatives against UAE-backed forces would be a key indicator of a shift in the strategic direction of the two groups, pointing to a combined effort to stop and disrupt the UAE's increasing influence in southern Yemen.