Attacks in northern Mozambique indicate expanding target set to include publicly accessible economic locations, but not capability

Soldiers patrolling an area in Gorongosa, central Mozambique, on 17 October 2013. Mining assets in central Mozambican provinces are unlikely to be affected by the recent jihadist threat.

Maria Celeste MacArthur/AFP/Getty Images: 185845386

The Mozambican government in October 2017 launched a security operation in Cabo Delgado province, the country's northern-most province bordering Tanzania, targeting suspected Islamist militants. This was in response to a co-ordinated attack by at least 30 unidentified gunmen that targeted three police stations in the town of Mocímboa da Praia on 5 October 2017, during which two police officers were shot dead. Two AK-series assault rifles and over 100 rounds of ammunition were stolen by the group during the attack.

Mozambican police general command spokesperson Inacio Dina stated at a press conference that 14 of the gunmen were killed, and 10 other suspects were arrested by security forces during a counter-terrorism operation following the attack. Although the origins and exact motivations of the group are yet to be established, locals have referred to the group as "Al-Shabaab" – in reference to Al-Qaeda's Somalia-based affiliate Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, a transnational Sunni Islamist group. It is possible that some of the group's members have received training in Somalia or are returning former Al-Shabaab fighters, and have been inspired to start an armed insurgency in northern Mozambique. IHS Markit has not come across any evidence confirming such a connection. A step up in attack capability or significantly improving sophistication of tactics employed in the coming year would indicate growing external support or direct capability transfer from more established jihadist groups.

Changing NSAG activity

Non-state armed group (NSAG) attacks in Mozambique have typically involved extremely limited capabilities, in which militants typically armed with sticks, machetes, and small-calibre rifles attempt to target government sites and personnel. Since the 5 October 2017 attack, a further three have taken place in Cabo Delgado province: on 13 October, 19 December, and 15 January 2018. The January 2018 attack, which involved burning a marketplace in Olumbi, Palma district, and the offices of the Environmental Association of Cabo Delgado, a non-governmental organisation involved in the resettlement of local populations affected by oil exploration, marked an expansion in target set to include commercial assets capable of undermining economic activity.

Recent NSAG attacks and associated videos are likely aimed at recruiting new members from Cabo Delgado's sizeable Muslim population. The Muslim minority in Cabo Delgado province has long complained of perceived marginalisation by the governing Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: FRELIMO), which has historically been dominated by the southern elite from the capital, Maputo. More than 80% of Cabo Delgado's 2.3 million population is Muslim, with strong cultural and religious connections to neighbouring Tanzania.

Government response

General Commander of the Police Bernadino Rafael issued a public ultimatum and a seven-day deadline for militants to surrender and hand over their weapons to authorities in exchange for a pardon. Twenty-four people were arrested by police during the course of a counter-terrorism operation in Ouasse, 60 kilometres from Mocimboa da Praia, which started on 3 January, on suspicion of affiliations to an Islamist NSAG operating in Cabo Delgado province. In addition, the government has ordered the closure of three mosques in the provincial capital, Pemba, suspected of facilitating activity of jihadist-sympathetic Islamist groups. Historically, Islam in northern Mozambique has been of a liberal brand and has cohabited for centuries alongside other religions and traditional beliefs, and an expansion in government monitoring and interference in the activity of mosques and other religious organisations is likely to grow to counter Islamic radicalisation and disrupt any emergent local support networks for jihadist or other Islamist NSAGs.

There are reports of an offensive including shelling suspected militant hideout positions, although IHS Markit could not independently corroborate such an offensive. We note that jihadist militants' capability in Mozambique remains quite limited and they have generally opted to retreat into small border communities along the Mozambique–Tanzania border, rather than engage security forces. If confirmed, indiscriminate bombardment of small villages, particularly if no financial compensation or other provisions were forthcoming, would probably support NSAG recruitment efforts, given the potential to turn local communities against the state.

Outlook and implications

Islamist NSAG attacks on remotely located administrative buildings and security forces checkpoints in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province will probably persist in the six-month outlook. However, they are likely to be limited to lightly armed fighters engaging in small-scale hit-and-run attacks on remote police or administrative outposts and security checkpoints, before the attackers retreat into the surrounding forest.

Given the increase in security in larger towns of Cabo Delgado, militants are unlikely to take on well-guarded administrative buildings, police stations, or major oil and gas installations. Key oil and gas installations such as the Afungi liquefied natural gas (LNG) industrial park, next to the town of Palma, are unlikely to be attacked due to the security that the government provides, but they are likely aspirational targets, as are Western organisations and companies. Mining assets in central Mozambican provinces such as Tete are unlikely to be affected due to their distance from the border areas in Cabo Delgado province, where all previous attacks have taken place and where the militants' networks are likely to be strongest.

The government is likely to step up its efforts to close mosques associated with hardline clerics or promoting radical ideology sympathetic to transnational jihadist groups. However, larger mosques that co-operate with the government are unlikely to be affected. Given a prospective peace agreement between the government and the armed opposition Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana: RENAMO) (see Mozambique: 9 February 2017: Mozambican constitutional amendment allowing regional government would indicate imminent peace accord; agreement over revenue partition is unlikely), it is likely that the government will have more resources at its disposal to respond to the Islamist militant threat and maintain the momentum of security operations. Redeployment of some government assets to improve border security with Tanzania would likely further disrupt NSAG efforts to establish sanctuary and expand its operational reach beyond Cabo Delgado.