Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric, Hamas’ weakness limits military options and means it cannot abandon reconciliation with Fatah

The deadline for the transfer of power to the PA had already been extended by 10 days on 1 December as the two parties were unable to resolve outstanding disputes over security control within Gaza and the merging of two separate and competing civic administrations. At the time of writing, a key indicator for a successful transfer – the replacement of Hamas security force patrols with those of the PA – has not taken place.

Lack of support limits avenues for escalation

Despite their failure to meet the deadline, the current process of reconciliation is unlikely to be abandoned by Hamas. The group remains dependent on limited access to the Rafah border crossing, controlled by Egypt – the most visible external broker of the current process. Rejecting the process of negotiation with the PA would almost certainly cause Egypt to end the currently intermittent flow of basic commodities, diesel and electricity into Gaza at a time when the Hamas administration is experiencing an unprecedented economic crisis (see Palestinian Territory, Occupied: 13 October: Palestinian Authority-Hamas reconciliation reduces civil, inter-state conflict but uncertainty over security arrangements undermines viability).

The capacity of the group to secure external funding has been reduced in 2017 as a result of Gulf Arab and US pressure, and a convergence of external factors indicates that funding will be further constrained. The United States Congress passed the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act in November, which is intended to limit the ability of foreign governments, particularly Qatar, from providing financial assistance to Hamas. Qatari aid was an essential factor in Hamas rebuilding stabilisation following all of the last three conflicts with Israel. In tandem, Congress passed the Taylor Force Act, which will cut US aid, currently worth USD300 million, from the PA’s budget if it continues to provide financial support to the families of ‘martyrs’ and those imprisoned in Israel for alleged terrorist acts. Both bills are expected to pass in the Senate within the one-year outlook.

Absence of escalation pathways

Residents of Gaza protest at the border barrier with Israel on 15 December 2017.

NurPhoto/Getty Images: 893626344

Hamas’ reaction to US President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has been predictably heavy on rhetoric but its political vulnerability makes the deliberate initiation of sustained military action against Israel an unattractive option to use force (see Palestinian Territory, Occupied: 7 December 2017: US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital weakens PA’s authority and increases protest and terrorism risks). Hamas’s politburo head, Ismail Haniyeh, on 7 December called for the start of a third ‘intifada’ (uprising) by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. Despite this, key indicators that would indicate a more significant escalation was imminent, such as the withdrawal of Hamas border patrols, have not taken place. Hamas’ prevention of smaller jihadist groups from launching attacks is a key indicator for Israeli willingness to escalate the intensity of airstrikes (see Palestinian Territory, Occupied: 1 November 2017: Destruction of Gaza tunnel by Israel unlikely to provoke wider conflict, but elevates risk of retaliatory fire). The PA initially joined Hamas in calls for protest, but it did not freeze security co-operation with Israel in the West Bank and its dominant party, Fatah, has moderated its calls for ‘angry’, rather than ‘violent’ protests with Israeli security forces.

Hamas is isolated in calling for violent protest, and since the 8 December ‘day of rage’ protests, has not escalated violence from Gaza beyond occasional rocket fire that it has not claimed for itself. In the 10 days following Trump’s announcement 19 rockets were fired from Gaza, landing around the urban areas of Sderot and Ashkelon. One of the rockets was intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defence system, but at least two have passed through and caused superficial damage to buildings without exploding.

Israeli response to the rocket fire has been to launch airstrikes on Hamas training facilities and alleged weapons production workshops in Gaza. Hamas did not claim responsibility for the rocket attacks but Israeli policy is to hold Hamas responsible for any attacks on Israel that originate in Gaza. A Salafist group, Salahedin Brigades, claimed responsibility for one of the attacks and it is likely that most of the rockets fired originated from similar smaller groups active in Gaza, seeking to discredit Hamas while also providing the group with deniable responsibility.

On 10 December, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reported that it had located and destroyed a Hamas tunnel extending from Khan Younis in Gaza into Israeli territory. This was the second tunnel to be detected and destroyed by the IDF in six weeks. New technologies, deployed as part of Israel’s anti-tunnel barrier around Gaza, will prevent Hamas or rival militant groups from launching tunnel raids on Israel preceding or during a conflict, as they did during the 2014 Protective Edge campaign. The barrier is scheduled to be completed by mid-2018, after which point the attack options of assault for militant groups based in Gaza will be significantly reduced.

Outlook and implications

Hamas’ appeal for a wider popular uprising in Gaza or the West Bank is unlikely to succeed, and it likely calculates that the imperative of addressing its immediate economic interests is best served by the promotion of unity with Fatah. Hamas’ senior leadership is probably unwilling to be publicly seen as undermining the reconciliation process as long as it provides a political alternative to conflict. The current offensive capabilities of the group are constrained by advances in Israeli tunnel defences and the deterioration in the Gazan economic situation. A prolonged escalation from Hamas would exacerbate the current economic crisis in Gaza, where, despite the ongoing reconciliation process with the PA, basic provision of services is at unprecedented levels of dysfunction. The group is likely to continue to hold demonstrations in protest at US policy into 2018, including mobilising protests on the Gaza border. These protests are unlikely to involve more than the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF forces deployed at the separation barrier, but are likely to result in Israeli forces using lethal force in response.

Israel is likely to respond to further rocket attacks by the present level of airstrikes on Hamas targets, and only step up their intensity if rockets cause Israeli civilian casualties. In this situation, elements at least of the Hamas leadership in Gaza may well judge that the attack tunnel option should be taken before it is closed off in mid-2018 by completion of Israeli barrier.

Rocket fire from the minority jihadist groups in Gaza is likely to continue over the next four weeks, particularly as Israel has been clear that any response will be directed against Hamas facilities in Gaza. Although the Iron Dome defence system has intercepted many rockets launched since 6 December, it is not 100% effective, and there is a high risk that rockets will land on residential targets with a 10 km radius of the Gaza border. The highest risk to civilian buildings and residential areas is to Ashkelon and Sderot, and all settlements neighbouring the Gaza border, such as Alumim and Kibbutz Kissufim. Minor property damage, or even a few Israeli civilian casualties, would be likely to incur an intensification of Israeli air strikes, and increased militant and civilian casualties, in an escalatory spiral of incidents, although Israel will seek to avoid deliberate escalation involving another ground operation into Gaza.