Purported line-up for China's supreme leadership body indicates policy continuity and party-conventional constraints on President Xi Jinping

On 22 October, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) published the purported full line-up of the ruling Chinese Communist Party's incoming Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), citing multiple unnamed sources. According to the SCMP report, five out of the seven current PBSC members, including top disciplinary watchdog Wang Qishan, will retire when the Communist Party's 19th Congress – currently under way in Beijing – closes on 24 October, with only President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to remain for another five-year term. The new PBSC will also include Vice-Premier Wang Yang, who is reportedly favoured for promotion to executive vice-premier at the parliamentary session in March 2018; Shanghai Party Secretary Han Zheng; Director of the Party General Office Li Zhanshu; Director of the Party's Central Organisation Department Zhao Leji; and Director of the Party's Central Policy Research Office Wang Huning. Two senior officials widely considered top candidates to succeed Xi – Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua, and Chongqing Party Secretary Chen Min'er – were notably absent from the line-up.

Significance: If the report by SCMP – a reliable source for political leaks in recent years – proves accurate, four major implications follow. First, the new PBSC line-up reflects a surprising adherence to established conventions regarding retirement age and promotion with the party, which will constrain the power of President Xi more than expected (see China: 19 July 2017: Chongqing Party secretary's replacement indicates growing prospect of president seeking third term after 2022). Only one of the new members is a strong Xi ally – although none of the remainder are likely to openly challenge the 'core' president, whose political philosophy is likely to be reflected in the party's constitution. Second, the new PBSC includes no clear successor to Xi, which will maximise the president's options for succession at the end of his second term – including the possibility of a third term. Third, in the absence of Wang Qishan, the anti-corruption campaign is likely to continue but will be much reduced, with fewer Central Committee members likely to be targeted. Fourth, Vice-Premier Wang Yang and Premier Li Keqiang are in broad agreement, underscoring our expectation of continued, gradual liberalisation of the renminbi's trading band, its internationalisation through the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, and reduced incentives for bank funding of heavy industries such as steel manufacturing.