Incumbent likely to win Russia's 2018 presidential election, extending term to 2024; policy direction will reflect PM selection

In July 2013 Alexei Navalny, a vocal critic of Putin and an established leader of the liberal, pro-Western opposition in Russia, received a five-year prison term for theft of property in the Kirovles case. In October 2013 a regional court in Kirov changed the conviction to a suspended sentence. In February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the initial court hearing failed to respect the defendant's rights and ordered Russia to pay compensation to Navalny. This caused a re-run of the Kirovles court case: in February 2017 a court in Kirov once again convicted Navalny and sentenced him to a five-year suspended sentence. According to Russian legislation, individuals with unspent criminal sentences for serious offences are prevented from running for office: Navalny's sentence currently disqualifies him from the 2018 presidential race.

Election scenarios

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu attend a ship parade marking Russian Navy Day in St. Petersburg, Russia on 30 July 2017.

Sergey Mihailicenko/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images: 824439842

IHS Markit assesses that Pamfilova's statement indicates that the Kremlin has not reached a final decision on the preferred scenario for the 2018 presidential election. The election will determine Russia's head of state for the next six-year term.

In May 2017 the State Duma, the Russian parliament's lower chamber, moved the election's date to 18 March 2018, coinciding with the fourth anniversary of Crimea's annexation from Ukraine. This is likely to be a deliberate move to boost turnout and support for the Kremlin's chosen candidate.

In our assessment, there are three possible scenarios for the 2018 presidential election:

• Controlled election with the incumbent running. This is our core scenario, with a 70–80% probability: although President Vladimir Putin has not announced his intention to run for re-election, there have been no indicators that he will not. Under this scenario Putin would run against "political stand-ins", representing parliamentary parties that are nominally in opposition but in reality are loyal to the Kremlin, such as LDPR or the Communists. Putin would be very likely to achieve a strong result under these circumstances with some 70-80% of the vote, but turnout could potentially be subdued given voter apathy over the lack of genuine political competition. This would be counterproductive to the Kremlin's strategy of legitimising Putin's next term through a visibly open election with high popular involvement. In November 2016 credible Russian media reported that the Kremlin's preferred outcome for the 2018 election would entail Putin achieving 70% of the vote, with a turnout also around 70%.
• Controlled election with a chosen successor running. We assign this some 10-15% probability. Several Russian media have reported that Putin was considering selecting a successor for the 2018 election and would step aside from politics after the election. Such a candidate is most likely to be a trusted individual from Putin's inner circle. Several IHS Markit sources in Moscow indicated that Alexei Dyumin, a former bodyguard for Putin and the governor of Tula region since February 2016, or a similar candidate, would be best-placed. However, there have been no indications that the Kremlin is preparing a successor for 2018. With just over six months until the election it would be challenging to propel a little-known candidate to a guaranteed electoral victory in March 2018.
• Competitive election. We assign this scenario a 10-15% probability. The potential nomination of Alexei Navalny, who announced his intention to stand in December 2016. This should boost turnout by introducing genuine political competition and grassroots campaigning into the election (see Russia: 15 December 2016: Potential nomination of anti-corruption activist to start first competitive presidential campaign in Russia since 1996). A competitive poll could serve to legitimise the election results both domestically and internationally. Under this scenario Putin would still be likely to win, although with a somewhat lower majority. Since the start of his presidential bid, Navalny has mobilised a large grassroots campaign with over 140,000 volunteers and 74 campaign offices across Russia. As Navalny's campaign would criticise Putin and his policies, this would be likely to dampen Putin's electoral support. A competitive election could result in a second round of voting if nobody wins 50% of the vote in the first round; however, Navalny himself would most probably not reach the second round. A poor result for Navalny in the 2018 election subsequently could be used by the Kremlin to damage his longer-term political prospects, including potential involvement in the 2024 presidential election.

Outlook and implications

IHS Markit assesses that the most likely scenario in 2018 is a controlled election with Vladimir Putin running against carefully selected "safe" candidates, and winning another six-year term comfortably. Alternative scenarios are substantially less likely.

Putin's re-election in 2018 should provide for policy continuity. Decision-making, including setting foreign and economic policy, is likely to remain driven by the Kremlin, rather than set by the cabinet, and is likely to continue prioritising perceived security considerations over economic interests. Following the election, a cabinet reshuffle is likely, with the current Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who has become increasingly unpopular, likely to step down. The choice of his successor will indicate both the direction of economic policy and a potential successor to Putin as president in 2024. A representative of the "siloviki" (individuals with a security service or military background) is more likely to be chosen as the new Prime Minister than a member of the "liberal" wing of the Kremlin. Alexei Dyumin, the Tula regional governor and Putin's trusted associate, has been cited by several IHS Markit sources in Moscow as a likely candidate for the prime ministerial role. A "siloviki" appointee would be likely to shift economic policy towards a more dirigiste style than at present.