The intensity of Islamist militant attacks has declined over the past year but the drivers of unrest remain.
Outlook and implications |
|
Risks | Terrorism; Property; Death and injury |
Sectors or assets | Expatriates; Security forces; Religious minorities; Industrial |
The counter-terrorism head of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP), Monirul Islam, said on 23 July that only two of the suspected masterminds of the July 2016 attack on the capital's Holey Bakery remain at large. A total of 22 people were killed in the attack in the Gulshan area of the capital: 17 foreigners and five locals. Not only was this the most significant attack by Islamic State-linked militants in Bangladesh, who began a fresh wave of Islamist violence in Bangladesh from late 2015, but it was the most high profile and ambitious Islamist militant attack in the country's history.
The Bangladeshi government denies any direct link between IS core in the Middle East and the group responsible for the Holey Bakery attack. Instead, the police refer to the group as Neo-JMB, a reference to the more established Bangladeshi militant group that was particularly active in the late 2000s. IHS Markit nevertheless has stressed in the past there was at least some communication and direction from the Islamic State core in the run-up to the Holey Bakery attack (see Bangladesh: 19 February 2016: Communication with Islamic State and continued political instability indicate further attacks against foreigners and minorities in Bangladesh).
Declining attacks
Since then, however, the DMP and the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) have aggressively pursued the group's members and sought to dismantle its operational infrastructure. As many as 70 suspected militants – seven of them connected directly to the Holey Bakery attack – have been detained or killed in raids conducted throughout the country since July 2016. Some involved days-long sieges of the hideouts, with many ending with militants detonating suicide vests to avoid capture.
This security forces' push against the Islamic State-linked groups appears to have succeeded in dismantling the group's capability. There has been no Islamist attack in the country since March 2017, when a lone a suicide attacker detonated a suicide vest at a paramilitary compound in Dhaka injuring two RAB soldiers. Moreover, the DMP's counter-terrorism head claims that militants are no longer in the position to replicate an attack similar in scale to the Holey Bakery incident, citing low morale and a lack of resources.
Drivers for Islamist unrest remain
Despite the progress made by security forces, the drivers of Islamist militancy continue to exist. Despite the frequent raids conducted by security forces over the past 12 months, militant groups are unlikely to face any problems in recruitment. This is because the key drivers of militancy and radicalisation in Bangladesh remain in place. These include the government's continued crackdown against Islamist political parties and the opposition, as well as the polarisation of Bangladeshi society between secularists and religious conservatives more broadly.
There are also indications suggesting that Islamist militants in Bangladesh are seeking to re-group and developing strategies to evade enhanced security forces' surveillance. On 19 July, DMP officials admitted that militants were increasingly using constantly changing encryption, code words, and messaging apps to communicate. Moreover, access to weapons and explosives appears to be widespread. For example, AK-series rifles used in the Holey Bakery attack were smuggled from India. This vulnerability appears difficult to contain; in November 2016, the Border Guards Bangladesh reported that illegal weapons smuggling over the border had been increasing for four consecutive years.
Lastly, the government remains entrenched in its position that the Islamic State has no operational presence in the country. This approach will undermine the prospect of security forces fully containing the Islamic State threat going forward as police are actively discouraged from pursuing the foreign element of the militancy. In particular, this politicisation of the militant threat makes it more likely that fighters will be able to return to the country. Domestic reporting suggests that there is no systemic monitoring of Bangladeshi nationals that have travelled to the Middle East to fight for the Islamic State. Moreover, the same reporting claims that the police's belief that only 20 men have joined the Islamic State are underestimated by a half.
Outlook and implications
Although terrorism risks in Bangladesh have fallen, as indicated by the declining number of attacks and increased vigilance of the security forces, we assess that the risk of further attacks remains high in the one-year outlook and beyond. The Holey Bakery incident in particular has effectively set a new marker for Islamist militants in the country. They will probably therefore favour larger, more high-profile attacks going forward rather than risk capture through smaller operations. These are likely to be more ambitious mass-shooting and suicide IED attacks. The militants' target set is likely to be a fusion of international and domestic militant agendas; likely targets include local political leaders, religious minorities, secularists, security forces (particularly the RAB), and foreigners. This threat is likely to be particularly acute in Dhaka. In particular, public entertainment venues, including shopping malls, and non-governmental organisations are likely to be increasingly prioritised targets.
Industrial or other commercial assets are unlikely to be targeted, although there are collateral risks facing office buildings in Dhaka's commercial districts, including Gulshan, where foreigners are known to frequent.

