Risk of Israel-Hizbullah war rising, given high preparedness and risk of unintended escalation, most likely over Syria

In response to Nasrallah's comments, Israel’s Air Force chief Major General Amir Eshel warned that the IAF could now deploy "unimaginable force" against Hizbullah, conducting the same number of air strikes as in the 33-day 2006 war in a matter of days. On 24 June, Israel carried out air strikes against Syrian army positions on the Syrian Golan, reportedly in response to rocket fire striking the Israeli Golan.

Israel's military preparedness

Israel has made good many of the capability gaps identified during the 2006 war. Israel has completed the deployment of the ‘Trophy’ (also known as’ Windbreaker’) active protection system for armoured vehicles. The system can neutralise attacks on tanks by advanced anti-tank missiles like the Russian-manufactured Kornet, Hizbullah’s most effective weapon during the 2006 war. Furthermore, the 'David’s Sling' air defence system, which is designed, among other things, to intercept Hizbullah’s mid-range rockets, is now operational, complementing other defence systems. An Israeli source also said to IHS Markit that Israel either has developed, or is close to developing, a technological breakthrough that would allow it to detect Hizbullah/Hamas ‘attack’ and supply tunnels.

Israel's strategic thinking

Hizbullah militant patrolling along Lebanon-Israel border on 20 April 2017.

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Israel has changed its defence doctrine. Until the 2006 war, Israel focused on waging war on the enemy’s territory at a time of its own choosing. This reflected the conventional inter-state war threat at the time. Israel has since adjusted its military doctrine to counter an asymmetric threat from non-state actors. This has involved avoiding war for as long as possible, in part due to the higher casualty costs imposed by asymmetric warfare, and to these enemies’ inability to threaten the survival of the state of Israel. Israel has chosen to pursue a complex policy, involving preventing its enemies, principally Iran-backed Hizbullah, from acquiring game-changing weapons, building a bank of targets of weapons' storage facilities to be attacked in the event of war. It has also sought to re-establish deterrence against these asymmetric foes by making clear that, in the event of war, it would go after their entire infrastructure, including in civilian areas, with precision munitions. Israel has made clear that when another war with Hizbullah breaks out, it will not repeat the mistake made in 2006 of delaying the commitment of ground forces, seeking to capture territory inside Lebanon and to prevent Hizbullah from declaring a vacuous victory, as it did in 2006.

Despite Hizbullah’s growing power, and the risk of that power growing even greater following increasing Syrian government gains in that country’s civil war, Israel is not likely to seek a war. Rather, Israel probably assesses Hizbullah’s growing military capabilities, with a missile arsenal bigger than many states, and its increasing influence over the governance of Lebanon, makes Hizbullah more like a conventional foe, subject to deterrence and vulnerable to sanctions. That said, it would be surprising if at least elements of the IDF leadership did not, given the perceived inevitability of another war with Hizbullah, assess that it would be in Israel's interest to take Hizbullah on at a time of Israel’s choosing, while Hizbullah is still heavily committed in Syria, and Israel’s missile defence systems are at optimum capability.

Hizbullah’s war preparedness

Israel claims that Hizbullah has acquired SA-17 (42 km range, 25 km altitude) and SA-22 (20 km range, 15 km altitude) anti-aircraft systems, Yakhont anti-ship missiles (120 – 300 km range, 250 kg warhead), as well as having in its possession 150,000 rockets, compared with 14,000 in the 2006 war. The overwhelming majority of its rockets are short range (40 km, with up to 20 kg warheads), although it also has hundreds, if not thousands, of rockets with ranges of more than 200 km, and with warheads weighing up to several hundred kilogrammes. Moreover, Hizbullah has gained significant expertise in the Syrian civil war, and is prepared to infiltrate Israeli territory in raids that would temporarily occupy and take hostage Israeli settlements, forcing Israel to hold back forces to secure its home front. It has also dramatically increased its standing force manpower from a few hundred in 2006 to several thousand fighters today, aside from an estimated 3,000 deployed in Syria. An Israeli contact cited Lebanese sources’ claims that, significantly, Hizbullah has retained its Radwan Special Forces in south Lebanon, despite its commitment to the war in Syria.

Hizbullah’s strategic thinking

Hizbullah is committed to destroying the state of Israel. However, it now prioritises helping Iran achieve its regional ambitions, namely, gaining dominance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, over this objective. Hizbullah probably assesses that its experiences in these wars, and its ability to continue building up military power, would serve its long-term objective, which is shared by Iran. For example, Hizbullah has been using the civil war in Syria as an opportunity to establish a permanent presence on the Golan Heights in Syria, in order to be able to open up a new front in ‘resistance’ against Israel, and engage Israel on multiple fronts in a future war. Hizbullah would be more likely to initiate a war, should it manage to reduce its current force level committed to the Syrian civil war, or should it build up enough power to assess that it can inflict a partial defeat on Israel, as it did in 2006. It would also be more likely to provoke war with Israel if Iran assessed that it needed to use Hizbullah against Israel, in response to a US strike on Iran, or to demonstrate its willingness to escalate its actions in the face of mounting US pressure, for example through sanctions.

Syria’s role

As the Syrian government falls under increasing Iranian influence, due to the latter’s role in propping up Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, it becomes more likely to engage Israel militarily, and to be targeted. The Syrian president has already said that he would work towards establishing a Syrian movement that mirrors Hizbullah. Moreover, with Hizbullah deployed near and on the Golan, Israel is likely to suppress Syrian air defence systems in a future war ahead, or as part, of a campaign targeting Hizbullah’s positions. This would be in line with Israel’s view that the Syrian government is an extension of Iran’s regional hegemony project. Russian political influence over the Syrian government, and over Israel, and the Russian military presence in Syria, is likely to be a mitigating factor on the extent to which the war spreads to Syria.

Outlook and implications

Although neither Israel nor Hizbullah currently sees war as a favourable option, the increased military preparedness of the two sides and the advances of the Iran and Hizbullah–backed Syrian government in the civil war, increase the risk of such a conflict. Specifically, as Israel continues to engage in air strikes targeting Hizbullah weapons depots and convoys, Hizbullah will come under increased pressure to retaliate militarily, and may well miscalculate the extent of Israeli retaliation. A future war would devastate Lebanon’s electricity, water, fuel storage, and road infrastructure. It would also likely destroy most of the southern suburb of Beirut (Dahiyah), as well as southern Lebanese border villages and the Bekaa valley area. Christian coastal areas would probably be the safest during such a war.

In Israel, Hizbullah’s mass salvos of short-range rockets would cause significant damage to northern Israeli towns and villages up to 40 km away from the border. Hizbullah would likely repeatedly target Haifa port, Ben Gurion airport, the Tel Aviv-Yafo coastal strip, as well as main highways, military airports, and troop concentrations. Although Israel’s missile interception capability would significantly mitigate the impact of such attacks, particularly on strategic assets, there is a high risk that these systems would be overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of missiles/rockets fired. This would result in an unprecedented scale of civilian casualties and property damage in relatively unprotected population centres.

Israel would likely be able to destroy most of Hizbullah’s long-range rockets via air strikes during the opening days of a future war. Ships and offshore energy assets within range of Hizbulah’s Yakhont missiles (180 km–300 km) would be at high risk, especially given that the Yakhont automatically acquires a new target if it misses or is diverted from its intended target. Any civil aircraft still overflying Lebanon would also be vulnerable to accidental strikes from Hizbullah’s SA-17 systems, especially in the initial days of a war. This risk would increase further in the currently unlikely event that Syrian air defences became engaged in the war.

IHS Markit has separately noted the increased risk of an Israel – Hamas war (see Israel/PA: 11 May 2017: Domestic pressures on Hamas emanating from tax collection and electricity shortages raise war risks with Israel). Israeli defence planning is likely based on the ‘worst-case’ assumption that a future war with Hizbullah would also involve Hamas in Gaza. We assess, however, that neither Hamas nor Hizbullah would jump to the other’s aid in the event of a war with Israel, unless they assessed that that was the only way to prevent a total Israeli victory.