Catalonia's unilateral declaration of independence referendum to escalate political conflict with Spain's central government in coming months

Under continued pressure from civil society groups, as well as from within the ruling coalition and allies from the radical Popular Unity Candidacy party (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular: CUP), regional government president Carles Puigdemont has announced that Catalonia intends unilaterally to hold a popular vote on 1 October in which local residents will be asked: "Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state, in the form of a republic?".

In calling the ballot, Puigdemont has veered away from a softer strategy, previously employed in the region, of holding new regional elections in Catalonia and presenting these as referenda, of sorts, on independence. However, he has also avoided formally ratifying the planned consultation, in contrast to the 2014 non-binding vote on the same issue, for which then-president Artur Mas gave immediate signed confirmation.

Opposition from Madrid…

The revived efforts for a new independence vote in Catalonia started in October 2016 when the regional government approved a resolution to hold what it described as a binding referendum on the issue. Since then, Puigdemont has made repeated informal calls to Spain’s central government to consent to the region holding a legal, popular vote on the independence question. Such entreaties have, however, been resoundingly rebuffed by the national administration of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy on the basis that any such vote is illegal under Spain's constitution. As drafted, the constitution sets out clearly that any change to Spain’s national configuration would require a two-thirds majority in the national Congress, followed by nationwide popular approval in a referendum. The constitution was passed in 1978 with Catalan regional approval.

Given the unconstitutional nature of a unilateral regional referendum, Rajoy has pledged to prevent the October ballot from taking place. He will most likely do this by involving Spain's Constitutional Court to block any Catalan regional actions that legislate for or regulate the planned referendum. Such challenges are almost certain to be successful given this judicial body’s past rulings, and the subsequent conviction of Catalan officials over the November 2014 consultation. In December 2016, the court issued a resolution warning Puigdemont and Carme Forcadell, head of the Catalan regional parliament, that they would breach Spanish law if they sought to pursue a nationwide referendum outside the constitutional framework.

Under Spanish law, failure to respect such judgments would leave any public official assisting in the implementation of an independence ballot vulnerable to disbarment from office or even potentially to criminal charges. Legal proceedings of this type already have a precedent in Catalonia. Artur Mas, for instance, who was Puigdemont’s predecessor and oversaw a non-binding ballot on independence in November 2014, was barred from holding public office for two years by a Barcelona court in March 2017 (see Spain: 15 March 2017: Criminal conviction against Catalonia's ex-president unlikely to derail independence initiatives; region faces growing political instability).

…is coupled with falling local support

A pro-independence rally in Barcelona, Spain, 11 June 2017.

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The Catalan government’s renewed efforts to secure independence do not appear to enjoy majority support even within the region itself. The independence project has lost some of the popular momentum it enjoyed prior to the November 2014 vote, when 80% of those who participated backed secession. However, the actual percentage of support for independence at that time was much lower as both the People's Party (Partido Popular: PP) and the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya: PSC), the region's wing of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español: PSOE), boycotted the vote after it had been ruled illegal by Spain's Constitutional Court. Moreover, whereas previous pro-independence marches had attracted hundreds of thousands of participants or more, the latest such rally in Barcelona on 11 June featured a comparatively small number of around 30,000 participants. Recent poll ratings on the independence issue have been similarly unfavourable for the secessionists; the latest survey, published by Metroscopia in late May, showed 49% of those questioned against independence, versus 42% in favour. This represents a notable change from the position even in December 2016, when the percentages were 47% and 45%, respectively.

Outlook and implications

Despite the unconstitutional nature of any potential unilateral vote, Puigdemont faces pressure from regional political parties to proceed with the referendum. This will escalate political conflict with the central government as well as political instability in Catalonia in the coming months. Striking down Catalan independence-related legislation and threats of individual prosecutions of Catalan officials are likely to constitute the main thrust of Madrid's legal efforts to block the referendum. If the referendum goes ahead, the central government could also invoke Article 155 of the constitution – at least on a very limited scale – and suspend regional government powers. This would give Madrid direct powers to order the closure of schools and other public buildings that could be used as polling stations and to assume temporary control of Catalonia's police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra. If the latter's loyalty to the Spanish state were deemed to be in doubt, it is likely that national police would be used to ensure the closure of potential voting stations.

An extreme scenario would see the Catalan parliament making a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); indeed, in May, Spanish daily El Pais published details of draft legislation reportedly designed to serve as a temporary Catalan constitution to be triggered immediately should the "Spanish State effectively prevent the holding of a referendum". In such a case, Catalonia's regional government would be very likely to be displaced fully under Article 155, with the central government most probably deploying riot police, and even the military, to maintain order. A far less likely outcome is that Spain would step back from conflict but seek to penalise the region by imposing customs barriers and opposing its entry to the EU, with Catalonia using its indebtedness to Spain and its "share" of Spain's national debt as leverage in the opposite direction.

Overall, it is hard to envisage how Catalonia can gain independence under the current scenarios – or how the issue will go away. It is more likely – in the future – to gain some of its fiscal objectives, such as a cap on the share of its fiscal transfers to other regions, and possibly more flexibility in other areas, especially if in the future Spain's PSOE opposition were to take power. Under its current leader, Pedro Sánchez, the PSOE has voted to seek constitutional reform that establishes Spain as a "plurality of nations", even if this requires formal constitutional change. Under this approach, regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country would be treated as "countries within a country", with a higher degree of fiscal and political autonomy