Third attack in the UK in under three months indicates intensification of terrorism threat

Armed police near the scene of terrorist incident at Borough Market, London, on 4 June 2017

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On 3 June, three suspected Islamist militants used a vehicle to drive into pedestrians on London Bridge in the UK capital London, before dismounting and indiscriminately stabbing people in the nearby Borough Market area, a location filled with busy restaurants and bars. The three attackers, who were shot dead by armed police, murdered at least seven people and wounded around 48 others. On 4 June, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.

The incident is part of an emerging trend, as it is the third Islamist militant attack in the United Kingdom claimed by the Islamic State in less than three months (see United Kingdom: 23 March 2017: London terrorist attack highlights vehicle-impact as most likely lone-actor tactic for mass-casualty attacks in UK and United Kingdom: 23 March 2017: Sophistication of Manchester attack suggests wider support network than previously seen in UK). The three attacks have resulted in 34 fatalities and more than 200 wounded.

The increased frequency and intensity of Islamist attacks likely indicates a substantial expansion of the pool of potential attackers, in part inspired by others' examples, straining security forces' ability to identify and monitor high-risk suspects and networks effectively. The Islamic State's emergence as a global militant Islamist group has been responsible for a surge in radicalised individuals who have joined their armed campaign and answered the call to conduct attacks in the West in the name of the group, without necessarily having formal organisational and operational links.

Tactics and timing

The London Bridge attack was notable for being conducted by a group of three, while both the Westminster and Manchester attacks were conducted by a single individual. Investigations are ongoing and it remains unclear at the time of writing whether the attackers were part of a larger network and received external support or were in communication with known militant groups. However, the number of attackers suggests a certain degree of organisation, co-ordination, and planning. It is as yet unclear whether 12 suspects detained in two raids in the East London suburbs of Newham and Barking were involved.

Like the Westminster attack, the latest incident combined the use of a vehicle and knives. These are likely to remain the tactics of choice in the United Kingdom, alongside rarer cases of IED attacks, in part because of the difficulty of acquiring firearms. The decision to launch the attack on London Bridge may well have been inspired by the Westminster attack. Bridges offer few options for victims to escape, and the vehicle is less likely to be impeded by parked cars and other obstacles, enabling the driver to reach a higher speed. Greater security measures, such as bollards, are now being installed on London bridges. Bars and restaurants are likely to remain preferred targets, given would-be jihadists' opposition to "un-Islamic" free association between the sexes and the consumption of alcohol. Other soft targets such as public transport, symbolic tourist sites, sport and music venues, or shopping areas are exposed to equally high risk levels.

In a feature not seen previously in attacks in the United Kingdom, the attackers wore hoax suicide belts. We assess that this was likely an attempt to spread panic, to dissuade onlookers from attempting to subdue the attackers, and to increase the perpetrators' likelihood of being shot dead and thereby acheiving "martyrdom".

In terms of timing, the attack took place during Ramadan, a period which has previously seen spikes in Islamist terrorist attacks in Western Europe and across the Middle East, reflecting the jihadist belief that martyrdom in Ramadan is of particular virtue. In the Ramadan issue of Islamic State's Rumiyah magazine, the group called for "all-out war" on the West. Further attack attempts in Western Europe are likely before the Muslim holy month draws to a close on 24 June.

Outlook and implications

The armed police response to the attack has been widely praised. Officers arrived at the scene, identified the attackers, and shot them dead within eight minutes of the first emergency call being received. An estimated "unprecedented" 50 rounds were discharged, with one civilian being injured in the crossfire. The level of preparedness for major incident responses in the capital is considerably higher than in most of the rest of the United Kingdom, with the response and co-ordination between emergency services being tested in regular exercises. On the basis of the rapid police response in London, locations outside the capital and other major cities are likely to become more attractive targets for Islamist militants over the coming months. This geographical dispersion of the terrorist risk has been experienced in both Germany and France, where attacks have not been focused exclusively on major urban centres but have also affected rural areas. Police forces in smaller UK cities and towns do not have the same resources or level of preparedness, and there is a national shortage of armed officers. This can in part be attributed to government cuts to police budgets over recent years, many of which were implemented by current Prime Minister Theresa May during her time as home secretary.

The prime minister's public response to the latest attack has been more forceful than after the two other recent incidents. Mrs May laid out a four-point plan to tackle the current increase in the terrorist threat, with reference to defeating the ideology, regulating cyberspace, eradicating extremism, and introducing new counter-terrorism legislation. The most likely policy outcomes, in the event of a Conservative victory in the 8 June snap election (see United Kingdom: 1 June 2017: The UK snap election: Three potential scenarios), would concern sentencing and the United Kingdom's counter-radicalisation strategy. The government would likely seek an increase in the maximum length of pre-charge detention in terrorism cases from the current 14 days, potentially back to the 28-day limit in place until January 2011. Custodial sentences for terrorism-related offences might well also be increased. The most contentious area is likely to be a review of, and increased spending on, the Prevent strategy, the United Kingdom's programme aimed at stopping vulnerable people becoming radicalised, which is increasingly perceived as having failed.