Egyptian air strikes in Libya unlikely to affect infiltration of Islamic State jihadists into Egypt's Western Desert

Egyptian security forces inspect one of the buses attacked by the Islamic State on 26 May 2017.

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Two buses carrying a group of Coptic Christians, and a truck carrying labourers, were attacked on the desert road en route to Anba Samuel Monastery, in Minya governorate, south of Cairo. According to Egyptian media, 10 masked gunmen wearing military uniform forced the buses to stop, separated the men, women, and children, and opened fire after forcing the men to recite the Islamic declaration of faith. The attackers reportedly fled when cars were seen to be approaching. The Islamic State claimed the attack on 27 May through its official media agency, Amaq News Agency.

The attack was in line with the sustained campaign of propaganda and violence that the Islamic State is directing against Egypt's Coptic community, including the two suicide attacks on St George's Church in Tanta, Gharbiya governorate, and St Mark's Cathedral in Alexandria during Palm Sunday celebrations on 9 April (see Egypt: 10 April 2017: Islamic State bombing of Egyptian Coptic churches indicates intent to provoke sectarian conflict and state security shortcomings).

This latest attack also comes after a senior leader of the Islamic State in Egypt provided a religious justification for attacks on Christians, even Christian women and children, in the last issue of the Islamic State English magazine ‘Rumiyah’, published on 4 May.

Influx of foreign fighters

We assess that the Islamic State in Egypt has in recent months incorporated a new cadre of hard-line militants fleeing from Iraq, Libya, and Syria bringing with them the aggressive tactics of the Islamic State, which would account for the intensification and the growing brutality of its operations in Egypt (see Egypt: 19 January 2017: Displacement of jihadists from Libya will likely lead to consolidation of the Islamic State in Egypt’s Western Desert).

On 29 May, Egyptian security officers quoted by local media stated they received intelligence on militants fleeing the Islamic State Caliphate in Iraq and Syria,and the group's former stronghold in Libya, attempting to join its Egyptian group. Since January 2017, IHS Markit data also showed an increasing number of attempts to smuggle weapons and militants from Libya into Egypt, probably in support of Islamic State cells in the Western Desert. On 9 May 2017, the Egyptian air force destroyed 15 vehicles carrying arms and ammunitions from Libya along the border. On 31 May, the army intercepted a vehicle with large quantities of IED-making material at the Ahmed Hamdi tunnel, north of Suez, connecting the mainland to the Sinai. Also on 31 May, a security forces’ raid on an alleged Islamic State cell in the Bahariya Oasis, approximately 160 km from Minya, underlined the ongoing expansion of the group’s operational footprint in the Western Desert.

We assess that this new influx of manpower has enabled the Islamic State to reinforce its second front in Egypt’s mainland, west of the Canal, where an unofficial wilaya (province) of the Caliphate has been established since 2015. This group has increasingly taken on responsibility for operations against Christians, and is opening a second front against Egyptian security forces flanking the wilaya in the Sinai Peninsula, the historical stronghold of the group (see Egypt: 22 February 2017: New Islamic State command in Egypt likely to target Coptic commercial assets and civil aviation).

Egypt airstrikes in Libya

The Egyptian air force carried out strikes on alleged Islamist militant training camps and ammunition stores in Libya on 26, 27, and 28 May, ostensibly in response to the 26 May attack. The airstrikes targeted the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) around the eastern Libyan city of Derna; President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi claimed that the group’s fighters had trained and supplied the perpetrators of the Libya attack, however, this is scarcely credible. The MSC in Derna denied any responsibility for the Minya shootings. Derna was previously bombed by the Egyptian air force in February 2015, in response to Islamic State’s execution of 21 Egyptian Coptic migrant workers there. However, the Islamic State was expelled from Derna in April 2016 and the MSC has been in control of the city since then.

Given the ideological rivalry between the MSC and the Islamic State, the airstrikes on the MSC do not in reality represent retaliation against Islamic State, but rather serve President Sisi’s political need to be seen to be taking action to counteract the attacks on Copts, and to divert popular attention away from the state’s security failings.

The underlying reason for the airstrikes is that the MSC is currently in opposition to the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which is supported by Egypt. Hitting MSC positions in Derna is a likely prelude to an attack by the LNA on MSC positions; the Libyan Air Force Facebook page posted a statement on 26 May that the bombings on Derna were the prelude for greater co-operation between Haftar’s forces and the Egyptian military in taking control of the city from Islamist militias. The lack of the airstrikes’ connection with the Islamic State has since been confirmed by social media reporting that the Egyptian Air Force also hit Jufra, Waddan, and Hun – places where the Islamic State has no presence.

Outlook and implications

The airstrikes on Derna are unlikely to affect Islamic State fighters infiltrating Egypt from Libya, which has become the mounting base for the group’s operations in Egypt and Europe (see Libya: 25 May 2017: Arrest of Manchester attacker’s brother in Tripoli confirms Libya’s role as a hub for Islamic State’s external operations). Despite the additional powers granted to the Egyptian security forces under the state of emergency in effect since 9 April, the attack in Minya indicates that the state is unable to effectively check the spread of the jihadist insurgency west of the Suez Canal, in particular the flow of jihadists and weapons from eastern Libya.

If, as is likely, Sisi is unable to assure the security of the Coptic minority, he risks provoking widespread anti-government demonstrations from the Coptic population, with a corresponding likelihood of inter-communal violence between them and Egypt’s Muslims. This is in line with the Islamic State’s strategy of exploiting religious and sectarian divides and would severely test the limits of the military to maintain order. In the meantime, attacks by the Islamic State are likely to continue and increase in frequency, particularly during the month of Ramadan (26 May–24 June). Additionally, the Egyptian airstrikes against Al-Qaeda-affiliated militias in Libya are likely to trigger retaliatory attacks by Al-Qaeda cells in Egypt, with security assets probably a priority target for the group.