EU disengagement in Western Balkans increases risk of localised violence, but war risks remain low

During a summit in Sarajevo on 16 March, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn reiterated his support for the creation of a common market for the Western Balkans, citing the need to "remove barriers" and "create a single space for economic development". However, it is likely that the principal objective of the move is to keep the Western Balkans engaged in light of the current enlargement fatigue within the EU. The proposal failed to generate much enthusiasm among the governments of the region, who fear that this is a sign of growing EU disengagement.

Resurging nationalism

The shift in the EU's approach to its southeastern expansion was first signalled in 2014, when the then newly elected President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker introduced a moratorium on enlargement until the end of his mandate in 2020. The shift comes at a time of resurgent nationalism, civil unrest and bellicose rhetoric across the region. Recent examples include the deterioration in bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia (see Kosovo: 16 January 2017: Serbian provocation over Kosovo primarily "sabre rattling" but regional instability likely to increase, given Russian backing), attempts by both the Bosnian Serbs and Croats to weaken central institutions as a means of expanding their own autonomy (see Bosnia and Herzegovina: 23 December 2016: Bosnian Serb and Croat challenges to the Constitutional Court driven by growing demands for more autonomy), as well as growing inter-ethnic animosity in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) Macedonia following the general election (see FYR Macedonia: 3 March 2017: FYR Macedonia's inability to form a government increases risk of violent protests and early election in May).

Tens of thousands of Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka rallying in favour of and against the Bosnian Serb government in separate rallies in May 2016.

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The resurgence of wartime discourse can be attributed to a poor socioeconomic outlook, characterised by high unemployment and widespread poverty. Policy failures and the vanishing prospect of a fast-tracked EU integration have prompted the local political elite to employ nationalism as a tool of electoral campaign. This trend has been compounded by the EU's diminishing influence and growing Russian engagement in the region. Russia's historical and religious ties to the Serbs in particular provide a useful channel of influence. Serbia has often been reprimanded by the EU for its failure to align its foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia with that of the EU. In Bosnia, Russian support was likely key to Dodik's decision to organise a controversial referendum on statehood day despite objections from the EU (see Bosnia and Herzegovina: 26 September 2016: Contentious referendum result in Bosnian Serb entity set to increase political instability and civil unrest in Bosnia). The risk is that Russia will encourage a similar referendum on independence for the Bosnian Serb entity in 2018. In Montenegro the government has accused the pro-Russian opposition of involvement in a botched coup in October 2016 (see Montenegro: 17 November 2016: Alleged coup attempt likely to result in government clampdown on opposition and ensure Montenegro's NATO membership).

However, although the EU's own economic and political crisis has facilitated the growing influence of other actors in the region, notably Russia, it remains unrivalled as a source of foreign direct investment and financial aid. This serves as a significant deterrent to secessionist movements, in particular Bosnian Serb ambitions to secede from Bosnia. Local authorities remain dependent on EU funding and IMF loans to pay public sector salaries and pensions. Two additional factors of deterrence remain in place, namely the presence of international peace-keeping troops and the commitment of Serbia to respect Bosnia's territorial sovereignty. The presence of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) also makes any Serbian intervention in Northern Kosovo highly unlikely despite Serbian threats to intervene militarily and protect the Kosovo Serb minority.

The recent discourse of local leaders should be seen in this context, namely as a means of shoring up electoral support rather than as statements containing much substance. Serbia, which would have to support the Kosovo and Bosnian Serbs to make any secession viable, is firmly committed to EU integration. Its leadership is aware of current geopolitical realities and the near impossibility of shifting existing borders without jeopardising its ambitions to join the EU. The same constraints apply throughout the region. However, the re-popularised wartime discourse still carries significant risks of producing unintended localised violence.

Unintended escalation

The surge in nationalism carries the risk of uncalculated escalation. In Kosovo, continued provocations from the Serbian side would likely prompt a police intervention akin to what occurred in 2011, triggering local violence and roadblocks (see Kosovo: 10 August 2011: Kosovo Serbs Keep Roadblocks in Defiance of NATO-Serbian Deal). In Bosnia, Dodik's increased reliance on the referendum card to win elections might force him to make reality of his threats, likely triggering a military response from Sarajevo. The region remains awash in illegal firearms – a wartime legacy – that can easily facilitate the emergence of paramilitary groups with nationalist agendas. Such movements could be politically useful to an increasingly discredited political class as a distraction from pressing economic issues. However, any violent outbreak would likely be localised in specific pockets rather than erupt into full-blown war because of limited external support for secessionist groups.

Outlook and implications

The geopolitical reality in the Western Balkans is significantly different from the 1990s. The EU and NATO continue to have a vital presence in the region, rendering low the risk of full-blown war. The countries also remain dependent on funding from organisations based in the West, in particular the EU and the IMF. Russia, which would be served by destabilising Montenegro, Bosnia and FYR Macedonia, is unable to act as a financial and economic substitute to the EU, limiting therefore its reach in the region. However, although the resurgent nationalist rhetoric is mainly a means of winning votes, there is a risk that the stoking of nationalist sentiments could produce unintended consequences, which would most likely manifest itself in the form of localised civil unrest as well as shootouts between police and paramilitary groups. The risk is particularly acute in the run-up to elections, such as upcoming elections in Bosnia in 2018. This is likely to become a recurrent trend for as long as the EU does not revaluate its approach to the Western Balkans, in particular by forging a common foreign policy line considering that the Commission's position is frequently undermined by individual member states. This, however, is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.