OVERVIEW
- One or more of the credit ratings referenced within this article was arrived at by deviating from S&P Global Ratings' published criteria (see the AOG Times section for details).
- We took various actions concerning 60 ratings on 23 aircraft and aircraft engine ABS transactions that were previously placed on CreditWatch with negative implications as a result of the anticipated impact of the COVID-19 outbreak.
- We lowered 54 ratings and affirmed six ratings. All 60 ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on March 19, 2020.
- The rating actions primarily reflect the notes' insufficient credit enhancement at their respective current rating levels, based on our assumptions. In our view, the transactions' credit quality has declined due to health and safety fears related to COVID-19.
New York (S&P Global Ratings) Sept. 15, 2020--S&P Global Ratings today took various actions concerning 60 ratings on 23 aircraft and aircraft engine ABS transactions. Of these, 54 ratings were lowered and six ratings were affirmed. All 60 ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on March 19, 2020, as a result of the anticipated impact of the COVID-19 outbreak (see list). For transaction-specific details regarding these rating actions, see "A Deal-By-Deal Look Behind The Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Rating Actions As Of Sept. 15, 2020," to be published on spglobal.com shortly after the release of this report.
The downgrades mainly reflect the notes' insufficient credit enhancement at their previous respective rating levels, based on our assumptions. Additionally, the rating actions also take into account some of the considerations mentioned below:
- A high overall loan-to-value (LTV) ratio;
- The declining credit quality of the lessees;
- Declining lease collections and debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) owing to delayed or deferred rental payments by airlines amid the current challenging environment;
- A higher exposure to wide-body or older aircraft relative to peers, which are subject to comparatively higher stresses in our rating runs due to current challenges for such aircraft;
- A significant portion of collateral that are either off lease now or coming off lease in the next six to 12 months;
- Feedback from lessors regarding plans for off-lease aircraft;
- For notes that are rated 'CCC', we considered the fact that their LTVs were close to or in excess of 100% and continued deferral of interest on the subordinated note is likely to increase the LTV further. We believe that the notes may require favorable business, financial, or economic conditions to resume interest payments under the current environment;
- Structural considerations, including the availability of a third-party provided liquidity facility for most transactions, which typically covers nine months' interest on the senior notes. At the time of review, none of the transactions had drawn upon this facility. The transactions also have a maintenance reserve account to cover for any refurbishments in the coming months;
- For the aircraft engine ABS deals, a high portion of collateral that are either off lease now or expiring in the next 12 months, and continued non-payment of principal on the notes, resulting in increased LTVs; and
- The ongoing uncertainties surrounding airline operations amid the coronavirus pandemic.
Our analysis incorporated additional stresses on aircraft values, time to re-lease, default timing, and retirement age, due to the impact of COVID-19. We also acknowledge the uncertainties around airlines' future fleet size planning and aircraft maintenance projections, which are additional variables in our cash flow model.
We previously placed the 60 ratings on 23 transactions addressed in this report on CreditWatch with negative implications on March 19, 2020, when lockdowns and social distancing measures were introduced to combat the spread of COVID-19. Although these measures are easing up in some places, in 2020, we expect global air passenger traffic to drop by 60%-70% compared with 2019, with only a minimal recovery in 2021. IATA, in its recent forecast, expects air traffic will not return to 2019 levels until 2024. Wide-bodies are expected to have a longer recovery path. Continued decline in air traffic will put more pressure on the airlines' credit quality.
S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until the second half of 2021. We are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic (see our research here: www.spglobal.com/ratings). As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.
Our Observations On The Sector
Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pandemic, S&P Global Ratings has had periodic conversations with lessors of rated aircraft ABS transactions. Lessors generally reported that a majority of lessees have requested rent deferrals, but approval of such deferrals were made on a case-by-case basis to a select few. In more recent conversations, emerging themes include the possible extension of approved deferrals, the continued negotiation of initial deferral requests from February and March, and alternative payment arrangements, such as power-by-the-hour. With supply exceeding demand, it has become a buyer's market. Many lessors are negotiating arrangements to minimize their losses until the impact of COVID-19 subsides.
The impact of the pandemic on the sector is far more severe than both 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. According to Collateral Verifications, at the end of July, 40% of the total aircraft fleet remained in storage. In comparison, the maximum percentage of the total aircraft fleet in storage was only 10.6% during 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. Although the full extent of the impact cannot yet be assessed, aircraft values, lease rates, and time to re-lease have all been adversely affected.
Consumer confidence, a critical component to the recovery of the travel sector, remains low. According to TSA Checkpoint data, air traffic was down approximately 70% year over year on Aug. 17, 2020. A second wave of Coronavirus cases making its way around the globe has also put a damper on recovery in passenger air transportation. In recent weeks, the reinstatement of government-mandated restrictions on international travel and quarantine requirements has hampered air travel. According to recent ISHKA reports, growth in capacity has stalled. We expect a gradual recovery to pre-COVID-19 traffic levels by 2024.
The unprecedented decline in demand has placed downward pressure on aircraft values and lease rates. Avitas estimates a 5%-15% decline in market value for in-production narrow-body aircraft and a 5%-20% decline in market value for in-production wide-body aircraft. Maximum market value declines for out-of-production aircraft are more than double the in-production estimates. Most of the aircraft in S&P Global Ratings-rated ABS portfolios are currently in-production models. Lease rates are also under stress. IBA estimates a 10%-20% decline in lease rates post-COVID-19.
The sharp reduction in demand has prompted many airlines to reconsider their fleet composition. According to IBA, as of July 22, 2020, over 900 aircraft have been identified as subject to exit from their current fleet due to airline failures, Chapter 11 rejections, early lease returns, and accelerated retirements. Wide-bodies have taken the biggest hit because long-haul flights came to a near standstill at one point. Over 40% of the in-service A340-600 and 30% of the in-service B777-200LR fleet have been identified for disposal according to IBA. We believe that certain types of wide-body aircraft will likely fare better than others and that a stronger-credit-quality lessee leasing the aircraft can also make a difference.
Assumptions Used For The Review
Six months into the pandemic, it continues to be difficult to assess the full impact of COVID-19 on U.S. aircraft ABS transactions. However, there is some clarity on how the market is coping under the enormous strain. We have adjusted certain assumptions to address the impact of COVID-19 on transaction cash flows. As more information become available on the size and duration of reductions in transactions' cash flows, we will evaluate whether additional adjustments are appropriate. Changes in these projections could have an impact on our estimates, which, in turn, could affect ratings on the notes.
In our review of the aircraft ABS transactions listed in the ratings list below, we ran our rating runs based on certain adjusted criteria assumptions described in more detail below, including a criteria exception regarding aircraft/engine on ground (AOG) time, and in certain cases, we also ran a management case in which we considered the servicer's future plans for the aircraft in the portfolio.
Collateral value
We typically use the lesser of the mean and median of three appraised values (LMM value) as the starting point in our analysis. We use this value, together with other assumptions, to determine future lease rates and collateral sale values.
For this review, we compared appraised values provided in connection with our June 2020 review and the current review to other third-party values. In most cases, we utilize the third-party-provided appraisals and apply our aircraft-specific depreciation assumptions from the date of the appraisal to the first payment date. In addition, we applied an additional haircut to the starting values for this review. More specifically, we applied 50% of our 'B' lease rate decline stress to haircut the initial portfolio value. We believe this to be appropriate, as our lease rate decline stress considers the type and age of the aircraft, as well as the strength of the servicer. The final haircut to the starting value based on this approach ranged between approximately 10% and 15%, which is within the value-decline ranges estimated by most appraisers. As a starting point, we used a 'B' level stress for our haircut because we believe that the values will recover over a period of time in a base-case scenario. However, in our model, we apply a constant compounding factor each year to depreciate aircraft values and further reduce lease rates and residual values based on our lease rate decline stress. Due to this continuous decline in aircraft values in our model, we believe the 'B' stress level is appropriate.
Lessee default pattern
Typically, we apply defaults evenly over a four-year period during the first recession under our rating runs. For this review, we applied a more front-loaded default pattern (55%/45%) for our first modeled recession that starts from day one, considering that we are slowly recovering from a recessionary period and airline liquidity and overall credit quality have already demonstrated a severely adverse impact at the front end of this recession. Comparatively, we applied a more severe 80%/20% default pattern three months ago as a sensitivity run when we reviewed the transaction for the first time after we placed it on CreditWatch. Consistent with our criteria, we assume a smoothed pattern (30%/40%/20%/10%) for the subsequent recessions.
AOG times
While our criteria allows for analytical judgment and certain adjustments to assumptions regarding collateral value, default patterns, and useful life, it stipulates that we apply three-to-six months outside a recession and six-to-12 months during a recession for the time to release an aircraft (AOG downtime), with no differentiation between narrow-bodies and wide-bodies. However, due to the unprecedented decline in air travel resulting from government-mandated restrictions on travel, low consumer demand and confidence, and general uncertainties of re-leasing markets in the current environment, we believe that AOG downtime could be longer than what our current criteria suggest. For this reason, we have made a criteria exception regarding AOG downtime.
As a result of the criteria exception, we assumed longer AOG times during the first modeled recession for aircraft ABS transactions as detailed in the table below. In addition to longer AOG times for all aircraft types, we have differentiated the AOG time for wide-bodies from narrow-bodies because we believe that wide-bodies will be more vulnerable to lower demand and will likely be subject to longer downtime than narrow-bodies. Pre-COVID-19, we assumed that it would take 12 months to re-lease all types of aircraft under a 'AAA' stress scenario. Comparatively, due to the impact on the sector from COVID-19, we assume that it will take 12 months to re-lease a narrow-body aircraft in an 'A' stress scenario and a wide-body aircraft in a 'B' stress scenario.
Table 1
| AOG (In Months) | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before application of criteria exception | After application of criteria exception | |||||||||
| Stress | All aircraft AOG | Recession 1 NB AOG | Recession 1 WB AOG | Recessions 2 and 3 all aircraft AOG | ||||||
| AA | 11 | 13 | 16 | 11 | ||||||
| A | 10 | 12 | 15 | 10 | ||||||
| BBB | 9 | 11 | 14 | 9 | ||||||
| BB | 8 | 10 | 13 | 8 | ||||||
| B | 7 | 9 | 12 | 7 | ||||||
| AOG--Aircraft on ground. NB--Narrow-body. WB--Wide-body. | ||||||||||
In comparison, when we reviewed the transactions three months ago in connection with the first CreditWatch placement, as part of our sensitivity analysis, we assumed a 15-month AOG time for narrow-body aircraft and a 24-month AOG time for wide-body at the 'A' stress level. We revised these assumptions based on the easing of travel restrictions in many places and certain information from lessors regarding re-leasing expectations.
The criteria exception does not apply to aircraft engine ABS transactions. However, we considered as part of our review the results of the June 2020 COVID-19 sensitivity runs and key credit and portfolio characteristics (see table 2 for the assumptions).
Useful life
While there has been some news about airlines retiring aircraft older than 20 years, there still seems to be some uncertainty around how certain airlines will plan their future fleets. Therefore, we generally assumed a 22-year useful life for all aircraft, except for portfolios with a weighted average age of less than eight years by value, in which case, we assumed a 25-year useful life for all aircraft. We also assumed an early retirement (earlier than 22 or 25 years in some cases) for some of the older aircraft (mainly 19 years or older) upon the end of their current lease. Additionally, for some transactions, we received a fleet plan from the lessors indicating their future strategy (re-lease or sale) upon current lease expiry. For those cases, we ran an additional scenario factoring such plans and adjusting the useful life accordingly.
Summary of assumptions
In connection with our June 2020 review, we considered, as part of our analysis, the results of a COVID-19 sensitivity run. We have revised these assumptions, and they now form the basis of our rating runs. The revision to the underlying assumptions from the June 2020 COVID-19 sensitivity reflect the passage of time from the onset of COVID-19 as well as information from servicers and third-party resources. The below table details our pre- and post-COVID-19 assumptions.
Table 2
| Summary Of Assumptions | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Stress | Pre-COVID-19 Rating Runs | June 2020 COVID-19 Sensitivity Runs | September 2020 Rating Runs |
| Starting values | Aircraft-specific depreciation rates from appraisal date to first payment date | Aircraft-specific depreciation rates from appraisal date to first payment date | Aircraft-specific depreciation rates + 50% 'B' lease rate decline stress from appraisal date to first payment date |
| Recession 1 default pattern (%) | 25/25/25/25 | 80/20 | 55/45 |
| Recession 2 and 3 default pattern (%) | 30/40/20/10 | 30/40/20/10 | 30/40/20/10 |
| Lease rate decline | Lower haircut (e.g. 40%-65% at 'A') during first recession; higher haircut (e.g. 50%-75% at 'A') for subsequent recessions | Higher haircut (e.g. 50%-75% at 'A') for all modelled recessions | Lower haircut (e.g. 40%-65% at 'A') during first recession; higher haircut (e.g. 50%-75% at 'A') for subsequent recessions |
| Lease rate decline magnitude during first recession |
Year 1: 50%; Year 2: 100%; Year 3: 100%; Year 4: 50% |
Years 1, 2, and 3: 100%; Year 4: 50% |
Year 1: 50%; Year 2: 100; Year 3: 100; Year 4: 50% |
| Rent deferrals | None | 50% of lease collections deferred for six months with zero recovery | None |
| Useful life | 25 years | 22 years | 22 years; for portfolio less than eight years, weighted average age of 25 years |
| Aircraft on ground | See table 3 | See table 3 | See table 3 |
Table 3
| AOG Assumptions | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AOG | Pre-COVID-19 rating runs (Before the application of the criteria exception) | June 2020 COVID-19 sensitivity runs | September 2020 rating runs (after the application of the criteria exception) | |||||||||||||
| Rating | All aircraft AOG (mos.) | Recession 1 NB AOG (mos.) | Recession 1 WB AOG (mos.) | Recessions 2 & 3 all aircraft AOG (mos.) | Recession 1 NB AOG (mos.) | Recession 1 WB AOG (mos.) | Recessions 2 and 3 all aircraft AOG (mos.) | |||||||||
| AA | 11 | 18 | 30 | 11 | 13 | 16 | 11 | |||||||||
| A | 10 | 15 | 24 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 10 | |||||||||
| BBB | 9 | 12 | 20 | 9 | 11 | 14 | 9 | |||||||||
| BB | 8 | 11 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 8 | |||||||||
| B | 7 | 10 | 16 | 7 | 9 | 12 | 7 | |||||||||
| AOG--Aircraft on ground. NB--Narrow-body. WB—Wide-body. | ||||||||||||||||
These assumptions may vary or we may stress additional factors going forward, depending on transaction characteristics and the availability of more information on these key variables.
We will continue to review whether the ratings assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to support them and will take further rating actions as we deem necessary.
The below table indicates the ratings movement on S&P Global Ratings-rated aircraft and aircraft engine ABS (including business jets) notes from Dec. 31, 2019, to Sept. 15, 2020.
Table 4
| S&P Global Ratings-Rated Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS (Including Business Jets) Ratings Transition | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec. 31, 2019, to Sep. 15, 2020 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Ratings as of Dec. 31, 2019 | Ratings as of Sept. 15, 2020 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| AA | AA- | A+ | A | A- | BBB+ | BBB | BBB- | BB+ | BB | BB- | B+ | B | B- | CCC | CC | NR | Total | |||||||||||||||||||||
| AA | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| AA- | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| A+ | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| A | 4 | 1 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 26 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| A- | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BBB+ | 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BBB | 3 | 1 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 24 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BBB- | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BB+ | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BB | 4 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 17 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| BB- | 0 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| B+ | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| B | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| B- | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| CC | 3 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Total | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 3 | 12 | 10 | 3 | 10 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 84 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| NR--Not rated. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the rating action:
- Health and safety
Related Criteria
- Criteria | Structured Finance | Legal: U.S. Structured Finance Asset Isolation And Special-Purpose Entity Criteria, May 15, 2019
- Criteria | Structured Finance | General: Counterparty Risk Framework: Methodology And Assumptions, March 8, 2019
- Criteria | Structured Finance | General: Incorporating Sovereign Risk In Rating Structured Finance Securities: Methodology And Assumptions, Jan. 30, 2019
- Legal Criteria: Structured Finance: Asset Isolation And Special-Purpose Entity Methodology, March 29, 2017
- Criteria | Structured Finance | General: Global Framework For Assessing Operational Risk In Structured Finance Transactions, Oct. 9, 2014
- General Criteria: Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings, Oct. 1, 2012
- Criteria | Structured Finance | General: Criteria Methodology Applied To Fees, Expenses, And Indemnifications, July 12, 2012
- General Criteria: Global Investment Criteria For Temporary Investments In Transaction Accounts, May 31, 2012
- Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Revised Cash Flow Assumptions And Stresses For Global Aircraft And Aircraft Engine Lease Securitizations, Aug. 26, 2010
- General Criteria: Use Of CreditWatch And Outlooks, Sept. 14, 2009
- General Criteria: Understanding S&P Global Ratings' Rating Definitions, June 3, 2009
- Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: The Rating Process For Aircraft Portfolio Securitizations, Sept. 1, 2004
- Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: Rating Considerations For Lease Pools, Sept. 1, 2004
- Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: Maintenance And Related Issues, Sept. 1, 2004
Related Research
- A Deal-By-Deal Look Behind The Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Rating Actions As Of Sept. 15, 2020, Sept. 15, 2020
- ECAF I Ltd. Ratings Lowered And Off CreditWatch, Aug. 27, 2020
- Thunderbolt Aircraft Lease Ltd. Ratings Affirmed And Off CreditWatch, Aug. 27, 2020
- From Bad To Worse: Global Air Traffic To Drop 60%-70% in 2020, Aug. 12, 2020
- Various Actions On Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Transaction Ratings Previously Placed On Watch, June 17, 2020
- A Deal-By-Deal Look Behind Today's Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Rating Actions, June 17, 2020
- Ratings On Three Classes From ECAF I Ltd. Lowered And Remain On CreditWatch Negative, May 29, 2020
- Ratings On Three Classes From Thunderbolt Aircraft Lease Ltd. Remain On CreditWatch Negative, May 29, 2020
- 77 Ratings On 32 Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Deals Placed On Watch Negative Over Reduced Travel Due To Coronavirus, March 19, 2020
- COVID-19 Macroeconomic Update: The Global Recession Is Here And Now, March 17, 2020
- A U.S. Recession Takes Hold As Fallout From The Coronavirus Spreads, March 17, 2020
- COVID-19 Credit Update: The Sudden Economic Stop Will Bring Intense Credit Pressure, March 17, 2020
- Coronavirus' Global Spread Poses More Serious Challenges For Airlines, March 12, 2020
- Global Structured Finance Scenario And Sensitivity Analysis 2016: The Effects Of The Top Five Macroeconomic Factors, Dec. 16, 2016
| Ratings List | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rating | ||||
| Issuer | Series | Class | To | From |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1 |
2016-1 | A loans | A (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1 |
2016-1 | B loans | BBB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1 |
2016-1 | C loans | BB (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1 |
2017-1 | A loans | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1 |
2017-1 | B loans | BB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1 |
2017-1 | C loans | B (sf) | BB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
DCAL Aviation Finance Ltd. |
2015 | A-1 | BB- (sf) | BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
DCAL Aviation Finance Ltd. |
2015 | B-1 | B- (sf) | BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
DCAL Aviation Finance Ltd. |
2015 | C-1 | CCC (sf) | B+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Falcon Aerospace Ltd. |
A | A- (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Falcon Aerospace Ltd. |
B | BBB- (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Falcon Aerospace Ltd. |
C | BB (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
FAN Engine Securitization Ltd. |
2013-1 | A | B+ (sf) | BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Harbour Aircraft Investments Ltd. |
2017 | A loans | BB+ (sf) | BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Harbour Aircraft Investments Ltd. |
2017 | B loans | BB- (sf) | BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Harbour Aircraft Investments Ltd. |
2017 | C loans | CCC (sf) | B- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
JOL Air 2019-1 |
2019-1 | A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
JOL Air 2019-1 |
2019-1 | B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Ltd. |
2017-1 | A | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Ltd. |
2017-1 | B | BB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Ltd. |
2017-1 | C | B+ (sf) | BB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Labrador Aviation Finance Ltd. |
2016 | A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Labrador Aviation Finance Ltd. |
2016 | B | BB+ (sf) | BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
MAPS 2018-1 Ltd. |
A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
MAPS 2018-1 Ltd. |
B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
MAPS 2018-1 Ltd. |
C | B+ (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
MAPS 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019-1 | A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
MAPS 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019-1 | B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
MAPS 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019-1 | C | B+ (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC |
2016-1 | A | BBB+ (sf) | A- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC |
2016-1 | B | BB+ (sf) | BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC |
2016-1 | C | B+ (sf) | B+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Raptor Aircraft Finance I Ltd. |
A | BB+ (sf) | A- (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Raptor Aircraft Finance I Ltd. |
B | B+ (sf) | BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Raptor Aircraft Finance I Ltd. |
C | CCC (sf) | B+ (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Rotor Engines Securitization Ltd. |
2011-1 | A | B+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Rotor Engines Securitization Ltd. |
2011-1 | B | B- (sf) | BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Shenton Aircraft Investment I Ltd |
2015-1A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Shenton Aircraft Investment I Ltd |
2015-1B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
S-JETS 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | A | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
S-JETS 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | B | BB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
S-JETS 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | C | B (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Sprite 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | A | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Sprite 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | B | BB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Sprite 2017-1 Ltd. |
2017-1 | C | B+ (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
START Ltd. |
A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
START Ltd. |
B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
START Ltd. |
C | B+ (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg | |
|
Tailwind 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019 | A | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Tailwind 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019 | B | BB (sf) | BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Tailwind 2019-1 Ltd. |
2019 | C | B- (sf) | BB- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Turbine Engines Securitization Ltd. |
2013-1 | 2013-1A | BBB+ (sf) | A- (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Turbine Engines Securitization Ltd. |
2013-1 | 2013-1B | BB+ (sf) | BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2017-1 LLC |
2017-1 | A | BBB (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2017-1 LLC |
2017-1 | B | BB (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2017-1 LLC |
2017-1 | C | B (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2019-1 LLC |
2019-1 | A | BBB+ (sf) | A (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2019-1 LLC |
2019-1 | B | BB+ (sf) | BBB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
WAVE 2019-1 LLC |
2019-1 | C | B (sf) | BB (sf)/Watch Neg |
|
Zephyrus Capital Aviation Partners 2018-1 Ltd. |
2018-1 | A loans | BBB- (sf) | A- (sf) /Watch Neg |
| Primary Credit Analysts: | Deborah L Newman, New York (1) 212-438-4451; deborah.newman@spglobal.com |
| Rajesh Subramanian, Centennial (1) 303-721-4241; rajesh.subramanian@spglobal.com | |
| Sector Lead: | Belinda Ghetti, New York (1) 212-438-1595; belinda.ghetti@spglobal.com |
| Analytical Manager: | Ildiko Szilank, New York (1) 212-438-2614; ildiko.szilank@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Jie Liang, CFA, New York (1) 212-438-8654; jie.liang@spglobal.com |
| Maxym Rumyantsev, New York + 1 (212) 438 0302; maxym.rumyantsev@spglobal.com | |
| Peter J Lorbiecki, Centennial (1) 303-721-4992; peter.lorbiecki@spglobal.com | |
| Craig J Nelson, New York + 1 (212) 438 8124; craig.nelson@spglobal.com | |
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