Key Takeaways
- U.S. export restrictions on semiconductors to China come amid a potential recession, high inflation, lingering supply chain constraints, and cyclical industry decline.
- The impact will depend on how tightly they are enforced, including beyond semiconductor and technology into sectors such as auto, aerospace and defense, and energy.
- It is difficult for the U.S. to narrowly identify technologies or entities that pose the greatest national security concern given China's blend of military and civil technology research strategy; as such, we expect any effective controls imposed by the U.S. to be harmful to their own semiconductor or technology firms.
- Our near-term ratings outlook for the U.S. semiconductor firms are stable, benefitting from strong balance sheets and ratings already incorporating volatility through normal industry cycles. Macroeconomic challenges to watch include supply chain constraints, aggressive rate hikes, energy shortfall in Europe and COVID-zero policy in China.
The recently announced U.S. Department of Commerce export controls restrictions, including the sale of semiconductors to limit China's ability to purchase and manufacture advanced chips used in military applications, came at an inopportune time for U.S. chipmakers. The industry faces a global economy contending with a potential recession, high inflation, lingering supply chain concerns, and a cyclical decline that appears to be broadening beyond consumer end markets and into enterprise and data centers.
While the development is clearly negative for the U.S. semiconductor industry, the extent will only be clear when more details and clarification of the restrictions become available. Trailing edge nodes, which make up most global semiconductor production such as microchips, analog, or lower-grade graphics processing units, are not within the scope of the restrictions. Similar to prior trade and export restrictions, its impact on the business performance of U.S. semiconductor firms will depend on the tightness of enforcement efforts. Based on how broadly the U.S. enforces the restrictions, the impact could over time extend beyond semiconductor and technology into sectors such as auto, aerospace and defense, energy, and others.
Breaking Down The Impact
Here is what we know:
Notable U.S. export control restrictions
- New license requirements for certain advanced and high-performance computing chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment destined for supercomputer or semiconductor development or production end use in China;
- Imposed on shipments of advanced computing chips with relevant thresholds:
- --Logic chips with nonplanar transistor architectures of 16 nanometers (nm), 14 nm, or below;
- --DRAM memory chips of 18 nm half-pitch or less;
- --NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more; and
- Restricts Americans' ability to support the development or production of semiconductors at certain China locations without a license.
Effect on select semiconductor firms
Semiconductor capital equipment manufacturers:
- Applied Materials Inc. estimates the regulations will reduce its fourth quarter (October fiscal year-end) net sales by about $400 million, plus or minus $150 million. It expects fourth-quarter net sales will be approximately $6.4 billion, plus or minus $250 million.
- Lam Research Corp. has removed American engineers from its operations in China, according to South China Morning Post, and asked its U.S. employees to refrain from serving customers in China until further notice.
- KLA Corp. stopped offering services for China-based manufacturing lines producing advanced chips.
U.S. chipmakers:
- Intel Corp. received a one-year authorization to continue its NAND memory chip operations in Dalian, China. On Oct. 19, 2022, Intel agreed to sell its NAND and solid-state drive business and the Dalian NAND memory manufacturing facility in China to SK Hynix Inc. for $7 billion. The first phase was completed in December 2021. Intel will continue to manufacture NAND wafers at SK Hynix's Dalian memory manufacturing facility until the transaction closes in March 2025, when SK Hynix will acquire the remaining NAND business assets for $2 billion.
- Nvidia Corp. on Aug. 26, 2022, was notified by the U.S. government that a new license requirement was effective immediately for any export to China and Russia of its A100 and H100 chips. However, Nvidia is authorized to perform exports needed to provide support for U.S. customers of A100 through March 1, 2023. Nvidia is engaging with customers in China and seeking to satisfy their future purchases of its data center products that are not subject to the new license requirements. Nvidia provided its fiscal third-quarter outlook (ending in October) that included about $400 million in potential sales to China that may be subject to the new license requirement if customers do not want to purchase its alternative products. Nvidia expects fiscal third-quarter 2022 revenue to be $5.9 billion, plus or minus 2%.
- Advanced Micro Devices Inc. said U.S. officials have asked it to stop exporting its Instinct MI250 artificial intelligence accelerator chip to China. The company said it does not believe the new rules will have a substantial impact on its business.
Foreign chipmakers:
- Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSMC), the world's largest contract chip manufacturer, had received a one-year exemption for its Nanjing fab.
- Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. and SK Hynix, South Korean memory chipmakers, received a one-year grace period that would allow their China-based chip plants to continue to import U.S. chipmaking tools without the licensing requirement. Samsung operates its China plant in Xi'an and SK Hynix in Wuxi.
Why U.S. Semiconductor Export Restrictions Could Further Expand
China's ambition to vastly increase its domestic semiconductor production was well telegraphed in its "Made in China 2025" strategy initiated in 2015. The country's desire to improve its material and technological foundations and achieve its modernization goals was also emphasized at China's 20th National Congress on Oct. 17, 2022. President Xi Jinping affirmed the country's recent shift from rapid growth and greater focus on national self-sufficiency, especially in technology. This is a direct aim at U.S. major semiconductor suppliers to the Chinese economy, in our view.
While China's tech firms have yet to close the technology gap against their U.S. counterparts, significant progress has been by their "national champions" such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., a partially state-owned foundry (contract manufacturer); Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. Ltd., a state-owned NAND flash memory chipmaker, and ChangXin Memory Technologies, partially state-owned DRAM flash memory chipmaker.
Additionally, China's blend of military and civil technology research strategy makes it difficult for the U.S. to narrowly identify technologies or entities that pose the greatest national security concern when designing its own protective measures. As a result, we anticipate future U.S. export control restrictions would be harmful to U.S. semiconductor or technology firms, regardless of whether these companies have direct sales to the China military that may pose national security concerns to the U.S.
Evolving U.S. And China Economic Policies Will Determine Longer-Term Path For Tech Firms
The Biden administration's expanded export control restrictions added tension to the already strained relationship between the world's two largest economies. We believe China's resolve in building a domestic chip industry has only strengthened following the U.S.-China trade spat during the Trump administration and the latest expanded export control restrictions. While we cannot rule out any retaliatory efforts by the Chinese government or consumers on the U.S. tech sector, we do not consider that a high probability event over the near term. This is given the importance of U.S. technology access to China's advancement in its economic and technology roadmaps. Longer term, however, we anticipate China will be more aggressive in encouraging the sourcing of domestic chips and technology products to satisfy its needs, rather than sourcing externally, ultimately hurting U.S. semiconductor and technology firms.
We believe the U.S. government will also be increasingly protective of the domestic chip industry, especially manufacturing. After years of outsourcing semiconductor manufacturing to foreign countries, reducing share of global manufacturing capacity in the U.S. to 12% from about 37% in 1990, we believe the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) Act is an important first step in attracting U.S. and foreign-owned semiconductor firms to add manufacturing capacity in America. Congress passed the legislation in July 2022 to provide $52 billion of subsidies and tax incentives to strengthen domestic semiconductor manufacturing, design, and research. Beneficiaries will likely include Intel, Micron, and GlobalFoundries Inc..
As geopolitical tension continues to rise between the two major economies, we expect U.S. tech firms to gradually broaden their manufacturing footprint and seek to become less reliant on China. It will be easier said than done given the decades spent to create complex global tech supply chains with China at the center. U.S. tech firms will also have to tread carefully while shifting or adding manufacturing presence outside of China so as to not alienate its China customer base.
Ratings On U.S. Semiconductor Firms Are Intact Despite Near-Term Constraints
There is no immediate rating impact on U.S. semiconductor firms that we rate based on preliminary findings of the recent export control restrictions. Many have strong balance sheets, and our ratings incorporate volatility through normal industry cycles. Our near-term ratings outlook is more sensitive to macroeconomic challenges such as significant inflationary pressure, supply chain constraints, and aggressive rate hikes in North America; an energy shortfall in Europe; and the COVID-zero policy and weak consumer spending in China. PC and smartphone sales have been weak since early 2022, but enterprise and data center information technology spending have only started showing signs of softness since August. Tech bellwethers TSMC, Intel, Micron, Samsung, and SK Hynix have all indicated capital expenditure cuts on softening demand and desire to manage inventory. We expect the Russia-Ukraine conflict, global inflationary pressure, China's COVID-19 response, and financial market stability to be important factors in determining business and consumer confidence, the trajectory of macroeconomic growth, and information technology spending.
Longer term, we continue to view favorably the growth path of the semiconductor industry, which benefits from increasing electronic content by the digitization of the global economies. SEMI, a global industry association representing the electronics manufacturing and design supply chain, estimates the semiconductor industry will reach $1 trillion in sales by 2030, up from $556 billion in 2021.
Table 1
Latest Views On Select U.S. Semiconductor Firms | ||
---|---|---|
Issuer Name | Ratings | Comments |
Intel Corp. |
A+/Negative | Intel's second-quarter 2022 financial results were well short of our expectations due to weakening PC demand, inventory corrections across client and server end markets, and execution missteps with Sapphire Rapids. While we expect leverage to be near 0.7x by year-end 2022, anticipated market share losses in client and sercentral processing units as well as significant capital expenditure to increase manufacturing capacity over the next few years will likely lead to leverage closer to our downgrade threshold of 1.5x in 2024. |
NVIDIA Corp. |
A/Stable | While it is too early to predict the overall impact, if Nvidia cannot receive licenses from the U.S. Commerce Department to export data center graphics processing units to China, it could have a $400 million impact to the top line, or roughly 7% of total sales, on a quarterly basis over the near term. This comes on top of an already weak gaming market, disappearing cryptocurrency demand, and likely slowdown in data center demand due to macroeconomic constraints. At the same time, we believe Nvidia's long-term growth prospects remain intact, especially with its artificial intelligence chips, which are still in early stages of data center adoption. We expect strong revenue acceleration in fiscal 2024 and beyond as recession pressure recedes, supporting our view of the rating. |
Applied Materials Inc. |
A/Stable | Applied Materials revised its fourth-quarter guidance following the announcement of new export restrictions, citing an estimate that they will reduce net sales about $400 million. Applied's new guidance is about 6% lower than the previous range, and we think the impact will likely be similar in scale at the other two players, although they haven't announced an impact yet. Further into 2023, we don't think this will have a major effect on total wafer fab equipment spending as the industry remains highly capacity constrained and can reallocate capacity to other customers. |
Lam Research Corp. |
A-/Stable | See Applied Materials. |
KLA Corp. |
A-/Stable | See Applied Materials. |
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. |
A-/Stable | AMD pre-announced third-quarter 2022 financial results on Oct. 6 indicating revenue will be lower than the prior outlook due to much weaker than expected client segment revenue. Other segments (data center, gaming, and embedded) increased significantly year over year and in line with the company's expectations. Export restrictions on its MI250 chips will not have a significant impact on its business. AMD is in a net cash position and has sufficient cushion within rating absorb near term macro and business headwinds, in our view. |
Cadence Design Systems Inc. |
BBB+/Stable | The company's revenues are tied to semiconductor company research and development budgets, which tend to hold up well when revenues are down. Chipmakers are loath to compromise their product roadmaps even during downturns. With a net cash position, 1.5x leverage downgrade threshold, and revenue from China accounting for only about 13% of revenues in 2021, we believe Cadence has cushion within the rating to absorb the China export restrictions. |
Micron Technology Inc. |
BBB-/Positive | Micron faces significant headwinds due to weakening demand across most end markets and ongoing inventory correction affecting average selling price for both DRAM and NAND. Micron is aggressively cutting fiscal 2023 capital expenditure and lowering utilization in response. Still, we believe its FOCF will be modestly negative over the near term. Additional export control on Chinese NAND provider, YMTC, should modestly benefit other NAND suppliers as it will restrict YMTC's ability to accelerate its technology roadmap. We will watch whether our rating upgrade triggers, including improving operating performance through a downcycle, will be met through the current downturn. |
Broadcom Corp. |
BBB-/Watch Positive | While some of Broadcom's networking and broadband products could fall under these restrictions, a sizable share of revenue from analog, mixed-signal chips, and software outside of the scope of these restrictions will moderate the financial impact. |
Marvell Technology Inc. |
BBB-/Stable | Marvell doesn't seem to be in the crosshairs of the new export control restrictions. We believe it will continue to execute well despite the challenging environment, benefitting from growth in data center optical connectivity and 5G infrastructure end markets. Leverage is about 1.9x, down from the low- to mid-3x range pro forma for the Inphi acquisition. Further growth should support steady deleveraging to below 1.5x by the end of fiscal year-end January 2023. We incorporate expectation for some share repurchases as well. |
Western Digital Corp. |
BB+/Stable | Western Digital had leverage of 1.9x as of June 2022 that we expect to reach 4x on a quarterly annualized basis next quarter due to a pause in hyperscale data center spending and weakening PC sales. These affect both its hard disk and flash memory segments, as well as weak mobile handset demand (flash). We anticipate this weakness to persist through at least the March 2023 quarter, and maybe even June. Free cash flows will be negative, followed by a rebound in hyperscale customer demand in subsequent quarters. Western Digital has been prioritizing debt repayment, which we believe will return leverage below our 3x downgrade threshold in the fiscal year ending in June 2024. We could consider a negative rating action if weakness persists into 2024. Export controls on YMTC will slow the growth of YMTC's NAND market share and should be positive for NAND market pricing. |
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analyst: | David T Tsui, CFA, CPA, San Francisco + 1 415-371-5063; david.tsui@spglobal.com |
Secondary Contacts: | Andrew Chang, San Francisco + 1 (415) 371 5043; andrew.chang@spglobal.com |
James W Thomas, New York + (212) 438-0181; james.w.thomas@spglobal.com |
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