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Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Monitor 2Q 2021: Views From The Bottom Of The U


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Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Monitor 2Q 2021: Views From The Bottom Of The U

Credit conditions have improved for Asia-Pacific banks over the past quarter. Economies are recovering smartly, countries are rolling out vaccinations, and regional financing circumstances remain supportive. And yet, the pandemic has so seriously set back the finances of households and corporates, with deeply negative effects on lenders, S&P Global Ratings expects banks may need years to fully recover.

Public authorities across Asia-Pacific have blunted the economic effects of COVID-19. This includes an unprecedented level of fiscal and monetary policy support for households and corporates, and measures to encourage banks to lend and to show forbearance toward stressed borrowers. But for this support, the hit on the Asia-Pacific financial institutions sector would have been much more significant. Our outlooks on the ratings on about 18% of financial institutions in Asia-Pacific were negative as of end-March 2021.

Should the effect of COVID-19 on Asia-Pacific financial institutions become worse or last longer than we now assume, then this could lead to more rating downgrades. Were a sustainable recovery to take hold, however, we could eventually revise many of the outlooks on bank ratings back to stable.

Public authorities will likely continue to have a key effect on banking sector creditworthiness over the next six to 18 months. They must maintain a delicate balancing act of not withdrawing support too early or, alternatively, not overshooting.

Among many challenges, financial institutions must reckon with the eventual end of support by public authorities (for more discussion see also "How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings: March 2021 Update," published March 11, 2021, on RatingsDirect).

On the economic front, the scenario in Asia-Pacific has improved over the past quarter. We upgraded our growth forecasts for Asia-Pacific to 7.3% for 2021, from 6.8% previously. A faster-than-expected global vaccine rollout, a large dose of U.S. stimulus, and upside surprises in trade and manufacturing have pushed our forecasts higher and offset recent weakness in household spending.

Chinese GDP should grow 8% in 2021 (up from our previous forecast of 7%) on stronger trade and real estate activity. Our latest forecast has Indian GDP expanding 11% (up from 10%), due to a fast economic reopening and fiscal stimulus. Japan stays at 2.7% in 2021, but exports may present upside risks (see table 1).

Our forecast growth of 11% for India in 2021 is followed by a 6.1%-6.4% forecast increase for the next couple of years. The control of COVID-19 remains a key risk for the economy. New infections have spiked in recent weeks and the country is in the middle of a second pandemic wave. Some targeted lockdowns have already been implemented and more will likely be needed. The impact of broader lockdowns on the economy could be substantial, depending on their length and scope.

In Asia-Pacific, the recovery will likely be uneven, and the climb back steeper for some. We revised emerging market growth lower on a delayed but not necessarily derailed recovery. Regionally, the pandemic and higher real bond yields present downside risks. Improving external demand, a domestic consumption boom, and productivity gains count for the upside risks (see "Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q2 2021: Three-Speed Recovery Will Benefit From Faster Global Growth," March 25, 2021).

Credit conditions across Asia-Pacific are strengthening with the upgraded economic backdrop and COVID-19 situations. However, this improvement is uneven across sectors and borrower profiles. Geographically, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand are lagging (see "Credit Conditions Asia-Pacific Q2 2021: Uneven Recovery," March 30, 2021, and "Sector Roundup Asia-Pacific Q2 2021: The Climb Back Is Steeper For Some," April 12, 2021).

Effective Risk Management Is Integral To Financial Strength

Notwithstanding an economic turnaround in some jurisdictions from COVID-19-induced slumps, some prominent risk management problems have emerged in the quarter. These highlighted the critical importance of effective risk management when assessing financial strength, regardless of what stage we are at in an economic cycle.

Toward the end of the first quarter of 2021, Archegos Capital Management came under pressure after some of its concentrated long positions declined precipitously. The price effects prompted the banks financing those positions through their prime brokerages to require additional margin. When the family office could no longer make margin calls, some of the banks closed out their positions, liquidating collateral and hedges, further pressuring the price of the stocks involved.

Although it's unclear whether all of the banks' collateral and hedges have been liquidated at this juncture, according to press and company announcements, at least two of the banks that helped facilitate these trades--Credit Suisse Group AG (A+/Negative/A-1) and Nomura Holdings Inc. (BBB+/Stable/A-2)--are facing significant losses on the sale of their collateral (see "Capital Markets Revenue Should Remain Robust For Global Banks In 2021 Despite Risks," April 8, 2021).

Our negative outlook on our ratings on Credit Suisse reflect our view that potential material losses may stem from deficiencies in the group's risk management system or risk appetite that are not reflected in the current ratings. (see "Research Update: Credit Suisse Outlook Revised To Negative On Concerns About The Group's Risk Management," March 30, 2021, and "Bulletin: Outsized Hedge Fund Exposure Pushes Credit Suisse To A First-Quarter Loss," April 6, 2021).

The loss has not immediately affected our outlook or ratings on Nomura, whose stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and operating company rating is lower than our rating on Credit Suisse. Nomura likely has enough earnings and capital to absorb losses related to Archegos at the current rating level. This assumption incorporates an expectation of some earnings volatility (see "Bulletin: Nomura Can Absorb $2 Billion Shock," March 29, 2021).

Uncertainties over the core credit metrics on China Huarong Asset Management Co. Ltd.'s (CHAMC; BBB+/WatchNeg/A-2) caused by a delay in release of its 2020 earnings led us to place the issuer credit ratings on CHAMC and its subsidiaries on CreditWatch with negative implications. The company announced on March 31, 2021, that the delay was because the auditor needed more time and information to finalize its review of a transaction (see "Huarong Flags China Transparency And State Support Risks," April 21, 2021.

CHAMC has yet to officially release further details on the transaction, or on the expected date for completion of the audit. While the transaction could enhance CHAMC's credit metrics, on balance, the downside risk is likely higher. This is because the company's operating performance and asset quality were weaker than that of peers' in recent years, largely due to legacy exposures associated with its ex-chairman.

We continue to view CHAMC as a government-related entity with a very high likelihood of extraordinary government support. In addition, the government will likely step in if the SACP of CHAMC significantly worsens, particularly if it hits market confidence. However, uncertainties remain regarding on the manner, timeliness, or extent to which the government may provide support under such scenarios.

We should resolve the CreditWatch once there is greater clarity on CHAMC's financial ratios and credit risk metrics (see "Research Update: China Huarong Asset Management, Subsidiaries Placed On CreditWatch Negative Following Delayed Results," April 9, 2021).

An instance of regulatory action based on historical breaches of prudential and reporting standards have surfaced for Australia-based Macquarie Bank Ltd. (MBL; A+/Negative/A-1). In response, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) increased liquidity and operational risk capital requirements for MBL.

In our view, MBL has the capital and liquidity to comply with the increased regulatory requirement. APRA has stated that the historical breaches do not affect the soundness of Macquarie Group Ltd.'s capital or liquidity. We expect MBL to remain strongly capitalized, maintaining a risk-adjusted capital ratio well above 10% (based on S&P Global Ratings' framework) (see "Bulletin: Macquarie Has Financial Capacity To Comply With Regulatory Breaches," April 1, 2021).

Australian Banks Are Ready To Leave LIBOR

Australia's banks are on track for a smooth shift away from interbank offered rates (IBOR) to alternative risk-free reference rates. Like their international counterparts, the move poses challenges for Australia's lenders, but the availability of a well-trusted local benchmark tempers the risks, in our view.

Unlike in the U.S. and Europe, Australia's regulators are not proposing a wholesale shift to referencing an alternative risk-free rate. This is because the Bank Bill Swap Rate (BBSW)--the Australian IBOR benchmark--remains robust.

The key difference between Australia and other IBOR jurisdictions is that Australia's active bank bill market means daily transaction volumes are high enough to calculate a meaningful interest-rate benchmark. Past concerns over rate manipulation has led to considerable improvements in the calculation methodology for BBSW in recent years. ASX Ltd., which operates Australia's dominant securities exchange, now independently calculates BBSW, referencing realized spreads in the Australian interbank market.

Australia's major banks have established transition programs, have dedicated teams in place, and are on track to manage the IBOR handoff by Dec. 31, 2021. They have identified IBOR exposures, put mitigation strategies in place, and set concrete timelines for migration milestones.

Smaller banks are likely not as advanced, but they also have significantly smaller IBOR exposure. As such, the risk of a disorderly transition is remote. It should have no effect on the funding, competitive dynamics, or institutional framework settings of the Australian banking system (see "Losing LIBOR: Australia Banks On A Smooth Transition," Feb. 24, 2021).

Traditional Banks Turn Up The Heat In The Digitalization Drive

COVID-19 has shifted customer preferences toward digital offerings. This made it more urgent for traditional banks to launch their own virtual operations, or strengthen their existing digital capabilities. During the pandemic, traditional lenders widened their digital offerings, rationalized their branch networks, integrated their service offerings into the customer ecosystems and increased their focus on cost efficiencies.

In contrast, what was shaping up pre-COVID-19 as a moment of glory for virtual banks is turning into an ordeal for some. The economic malaise has hit many lenders, but the less established institutions are often more vulnerable. The virtual-only banks have a low market share relative to traditional banks. In many cases, virtual banks have highly concentrated business profiles. They often need to pay higher interest rates to attract deposits, and have small, unseasoned lending books.

The outbreak has exposed gaps in the business model of some virtual-only banks. Many will likely need to revamp their strategies or find a stronger partner with which to merge. Traditional banks are likely to set up, buy or otherwise partner with pure virtual banks to jumpstart their digital banking operations.

The health crisis has likely reset the digital competition, with the new entrants under strain at a vulnerable moment, and with traditional players aiming vast resources at digital services (see "The Future Of Banking: The Incumbents Strike Back," March 16, 2021).

Westpac Is Contemplating A Demerger Of New Zealand Subsidiary

Australian major bank Westpac Banking Corp. (Westpac) is considering a demerger of its wholly owned New Zealand banking subsidiary, Westpac New Zealand Ltd. (WNZL). This is part of its strategy to simplify its business. We believe that WNZL will likely remain a part of the Westpac group in the next two years. Even if Westpac proceeds with the demerger, its creditworthiness should remain unchanged.

In our opinion, Westpac should continue to offer extraordinary financial support to WNZL, if needed. Nevertheless, the possibility of a reduced strategic importance of WNZL to the Westpac group has increased the downside risks to our ratings on WNZL. We affirmed our 'AA-/A-1+' long- and short-term issuer credit ratings on Westpac and its core subsidiaries, including WNZL.

The outlook on the ratings on Westpac is negative, reflecting a one-in-three likelihood that we will lower our long- and short-term ratings on the bank in the next two years. The negative outlook on our ratings on WNZL reflects the negative outlook on our ratings on Westpac. It also reflects the downside risk of a possible reduction in WNZL's strategic importance to its parent (see "Research Update: Australia's Westpac Banking Group 'AA-' Ratings Affirmed Despite Possible Westpac New Zealand Demerger; Outlook Negative," March 30, 2021).

Economic Recovery In China Ease Profit Strains

The profit growth of China's major banks should recover in the next two years even as COVID-19 related challenges linger for some. Reported nonperforming loans and special mention loan ratios are likely to rise slightly this year as moratorium policies end. (For detailed coverage on bank earnings see entity specific bulletins see Banking Sector Research in this edition of the Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Monitor).

As vaccine rollouts in several countries continue, S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its economic effects. Widespread immunization, which certain countries might achieve by midyear, will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social and economic activity. We use this assumption about vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic (see our research here: As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.

Table 1

The Region's Real GDP Is Rebounding Smartly In 2021
Percentage change, year over year
Change from November 2020 forecast (%)
2020 2021e 2022e 2023e 2024e 2021e 2022e 2023e
Australia (2.4) 4.0 3.3 2.6 2.5 0.0 0.1 0.0
China 2.3 8.0 5.1 5.0 4.8 1.0 0.1 0.0
Hong Kong (6.1) 4.2 3.6 2.0 1.9 (0.6) 0.7 (0.2)
India (8.0) 11.0 6.1 6.3 6.4 1.0 0.1 0.1
Indonesia (2.1) 4.5 5.4 5.1 5.1 (0.9) 0.2 0.0
Japan (4.9) 2.7 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.1
Malaysia (5.6) 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.8 (1.3) 0.4 0.4
New Zealand (1.2) 4.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 (0.1) 0.1 0.0
Philippines (9.5) 7.9 7.2 7.2 7.1 (1.7) (0.4) (0.3)
Singapore (5.4) 5.8 3.7 2.8 2.8 (0.2) 0.7 0.3
South Korea (0.9) 3.6 3.1 2.5 2.5 0.0 (0.1) (0.1)
Taiwan 3.1 4.2 2.7 2.4 2.5 1.3 0.2 0.0
Thailand (6.1) 4.2 4.5 3.6 3.7 (0.8) 0.6 0.0
Vietnam 2.9 8.5 7.2 6.9 6.5 (2.4) 0.4 0.1
Asia Pacific (1.6) 7.3 4.9 4.6 4.5 0.5 0.2 0.0
Note: For India, the year runs April to the following March, e.g., 2020 refers to fiscal 2020/2021, e--Estimate. ending March 31, 2021. ppt--percentage point. Source: "Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q2 2021: Three-Speed Recovery Will Benefit From Faster Global Growth," published by S&P Global Ratings on March 25, 2021.

Related Research

Banking Sector Research

Economic, Sovereign, And Other Research

Ratings Methodology News

Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights

In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on

  • Malaysian Banking Sector Update: A Delayed Asset Quality Recovery Beyond 2021, April 14, 2021
  • Taiwan Banks And Securities Brokers Have Solid Capitalization To Cushion Pandemic Stress, March 31, 2021
  • What's New In Asia-Pacific For Virtual Banking And Fintech?, March 17, 2021
  • Monthly Asia-Pacific Credit Focus: Shape of Recovery - March 2, 2021
  • The Climb Out Of COVID-19 Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Outlook - Q1 2021 Update, Feb. 10, 2021

BICRA Changes

Over the past quarter, we have made no changes to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs)in the Asia-Pacific region.

Table 2


Chart 1


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Chart 3


Table 3

Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks
Institution Opco L-T ICR/outlook Anchor Business position Capital and earnings Risk position Funding and liquidity SACP or Group SACP Type of support No. of notches of support Additional factor adjustment
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. AA-/Negative bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Commonwealth Bank of Australia AA-/Negative bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Macquarie Bank Ltd. A+/Negative bbb+ Adequate Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
National Australia Bank Ltd. AA-/Negative bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Westpac Banking Corp. AA-/Negative bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong bbb+ GRE 2 0
Bank of China Ltd. A/Stable bbb- Very Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a- GRE 1 0
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd. A-/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Adequate bbb- GRE 3 0
China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd. BBB+/Stable bb+ Adequate Weak Adequate Avg/Adequate bb Group 4 0
China Construction Bank Corp. A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong bbb+ GRE 2 0
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. BBB+/Stable bb+ Strong Moderate Strong Above Avg/Adequate bbb Sys. Imp. 1 0
China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. BBB-/Stable bb+ Adequate Weak Adequate Avg/Adequate bb Sys. Imp. 2 0
Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd. BBB-/Stable bb+ Adequate Moderate Moderate Avg/Adequate bb GRE 2 0
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong bbb+ GRE 2 0
Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd. A/Stable bb+ Strong Moderate Adequate Above Avg/Strong bbb GRE 3 0
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd. BBB/Stable bb+ Adequate Weak Adequate Avg/Adequate bb GRE 3 0
Hong Kong
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Above Avg/Strong a+ Sys. Imp. 1 (1)
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. A+/Stable bbb+ Adequate Strong Adequate Above Avg/Strong a Sys. Imp. 1 0
The Bank of East Asia Ltd. A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate bbb+ Sys. Imp. 1 0
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Above Avg/Strong a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0
Axis Bank Ltd. BB+/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Moderate Avg/Adequate bb+ None 0 0
Bank of India BB+/Stable bb+ Adequate Moderate Weak Above Avg/Strong bb GRE 1 0
HDFC Bank Ltd. BBB-/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Strong Above Avg/Strong bbb+ None 0 (2)
ICICI Bank Ltd. § BBB-/Negative bb+ Strong Strong Moderate Avg/Adequate bbb- None 0 0
State Bank of India BBB-/Stable bb+ Strong Moderate Moderate Above Avg/Strong bbb- None 0 0
PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) BBB-/Negative bb+ Strong Strong Moderate Avg/Strong bbb- None 0 0
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. BBB-/Negative bb+ Strong Strong Moderate Avg/Strong bbb- None 0 0
Chiba Bank Ltd. A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Strong Avg/Strong a- None 0 0
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.* A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a None 0 0
Mizuho Financial Group Inc.* A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a None 0 0
Nomura Holdings Inc.* A-/Stable bbb+ Moderate Strong Moderate Avg/Adequate bbb Sys. Imp. 2 0
Norinchukin Bank A/Negative bbb+ Adequate Adequate Moderate Above Avg/Strong bbb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0
Resona Holdings* A/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a- Sys. Imp. 1 0
Shinkin Central Bank A/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Avg/Strong bbb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0
Shizuoka Bank Ltd. A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Strong Adequate Avg/Strong a- None 0 0
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.* A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a None 0 0
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings* A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Strong a- Sys. Imp. 1 0
Industrial Bank of Korea AA-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate bbb+ GRE 4 0
KEB Hana Bank A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Kookmin Bank A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Korea Development Bank§ AA/Stable bbb+ Moderate Moderate Weak Below Avg/Adequate bb- GRE 10 0
Nonghyup Bank A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Moderate Above Avg/Adequate bbb+ GRE 3 0
Shinhan Bank A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Woori Bank A/Positive bbb+ Strong Adequate Moderate Avg/Adequate bbb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0
Public Bank Bhd. A-/Negative bbb Strong Adequate Strong Above Avg/Strong a None 0 (1)
Malayan Banking Bhd. A-/Negative bbb Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a- None 0 0
CIMB Bank Bhd. A-/Negative bbb Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a- None 0 0
New Zealand
ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. AA-/Negative bbb Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Group 3 0
ASB Bank Ltd. AA-/Negative bbb Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Group 3 0
Bank of New Zealand AA-/Negative bbb Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate bbb+ Group 4 0
Westpac New Zealand Ltd. AA-/Negative bbb Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Group 3 0
DBS Bank Ltd. AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a Sys. Imp. 2 0
United Overseas Bank Ltd. AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong a Sys. Imp. 2 0
CTBC Bank Co. Ltd. A/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Strong a- Sys. Imp. 1 0
Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. A/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Avg/Adequate a- Sys. Imp. 1 0
Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. BBB+/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Above Avg/Strong bbb Sys. Imp. 1 0
KASIKORNBANK PCL BBB+/WatchNeg bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Strong bbb- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. BBB/WatchNeg bb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Avg/Adequate bb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0
Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. BBB+/Negative bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Avg/Strong bbb- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Data as of March 31, 2021. Type of Support column -'None' includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. §This ICR applies to the Foreign Currency Rating only.

Table 4

Recent Rating Actions: Asia Pacific Banks
Release Date Org Legal Name Org Country From To
March 24, 2021

Fubon Bank (China) Co. Ltd.

China BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Stable/A-2
March 24, 2021

Cathay United Bank (China) Ltd.

China BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Stable/A-2
Feb. 22, 2021

Members Equity Bank Ltd.

Australia BBB/Stable/A-2 BBB/WatchPos/A-2
*Recent rating actions are for the period January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2021. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list.

Editor: Jasper Moiseiwitsch

Digital designer: Evy Cheung

This report does not constitute a rating action.

S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations

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