Recession risks threaten the prospects for Asia-Pacific financial institutions as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to weigh on bank credit quality in the region.
Our ratings outlook bias for financial institutions in the region remains firmly negative. Negative outlooks (about 18% of ratings) significantly outnumber positive outlooks (about 2% of ratings). Remaining ratings on positive outlook represent a diminishing pool of credits influenced by idiosyncratic factors rather than systemic trends.
Our macroeconomic forecasts are the principal driver of our view of the outlook for Asia-Pacific financial institution credit. We expect the Asia-Pacific economy to contract 1.3% in 2020, and then rebound to 6.9% growth in 2021 (see table 1). This contrasts sharply with our prior assumption (set before the outbreak) of 4.7% growth in 2020, and 4.8% growth in 2021. While we expect GDP trends to revert to pre-COVID levels by the end of 2023, we believe the outbreak will have permanently reduced the region's economy by 2%-3%. We see looming risk of a "balance sheet recession" weighing on Asia-Pacific's economic growth (see "Asia-Pacific Losses Near $3 Trillion As Balance Sheet Recession Looms," published on June 25, 2020). That said, we expect the hit to the Asia-Pacific economy in 2020 to be less severe than the eurozone (-7.8%) and the U.S. (-5.0%).
We currently expect that credit metrics may not recover to 2019 levels until 2023. In addition, the low interest rate environment does not bode well for bank profitability. For India and Indonesia, the path to recovery from the pandemic may be more painful than for some other Asia-Pacific banking jurisdictions. India is seeing a very sharp economic contraction and had high nonperforming loans leading into COVID-19. Indonesian firms, meanwhile, are burdened by a slow economy, weak commodity prices, and high foreign exchange debt, which may spill over to the country's banks.
Many large banks in Asia-Pacific demonstrated strong metrics at the onset of COVID-19. Earnings capacity (aside from Japan), and capitalization are in generally good shape, and provide a buffer to the effects of COVID-19, even as the future pathway for the virus remains uncertain. We anticipate, however, that the pandemic will significantly test these buffers over the next six to 18 months.
The pandemic has hit hard and many banks may be challenged to preserve their financial strengths at current rating levels over the next six to 18 months. For our most recent views on our Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks, see "Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks: COVID-19 Drives Downside Risks As Credit Losses Jump And Earnings Fall," published on July 15, 2020.
We have made various negative rating or outlook changes in the last quarter in India, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea. Driving these changes are the negative economic effects of the spillover of COVID-19 on banks, weakening sovereign credit trends impacting systemically important private sector commercial banks, or a combination of these factors.
Globally, the vast majority of bank downgrades to date have occurred in jurisdictions in which the oil shock also contributed materially to our expectation of weakened operating conditions for banks or on the back of other sovereign rating actions. We continue to expect that bank downgrades this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic will be limited by banks' strengthened balance sheets over the past 10 years, the support from public authorities to household and corporate markets, and our base case of a sustained economic recovery next year (see "How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings: June 2020 Update," published June 11, 2020).
China, Hong Kong, And Korea Are Showing Resilience
Despite significant headwinds, the outlooks on most banks in China, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, and some South East Asian jurisdictions remain stable, so far, due to idiosyncratic factors offsetting the effects of COVID-19.
China: We see a stable trend for economic risks affecting China's banking sector; these risks are already high, in a global context. We believe the country's banking sector, on average, has the buffer to withstand worsening asset quality due to COVID-19. In particular, the larger banks benefit from strong earnings capacity and holding reasonable provisions against nonperforming assets (NPAs)--a broad measure that includes forbearance loans. However, risks remain on the downside and regional banks with aggressive risk appetite or high geographic concentration in regions heavily hit by the virus are most vulnerable.
Uncertainties over the strategic confrontation with the U.S., high private sector debt, and a potential correction to elevated property prices are notable risks, particularly amidst the economic slowdown. Also, net interest margin pressures and new credit provisions are likely to constrain industrywide profits even as loan growth stays high. We project NPAs will double to 10% of gross loans and that credit losses will rise by about 1.45 percentage points of gross loans in 2020. For the Chinese banks, the rate at which forborne loans turn into NPAs will largely be driven by the strength of the economic recovery, in our view (see "The $2 Trillion Question: What's On The Horizon For Bank Credit Losses," published on July 9, 2020).
Hong Kong: Uncertain operating conditions, and in particular political developments between the U.S., China, and Hong Kong, remain a risk for Hong Kong's banking sector. However, the sector's strong fundamentals such as capitalization provide banks with a buffer to absorb losses. These banks also benefit from stable customer deposits and limited reliance on short-term wholesale funding.
Korea: Economic performance has been better than other countries this year with a modest contraction of 1.5%. COVID-19 containment, no significant lockdowns, targeted fiscal easing, and high exposure to the resilient technology sector mostly explain Korea's resilience. Adequate capitalization should also act as a buffer despite weakening profitability. We expect the banks' return on average assets to gradually improve after dropping to around 0.3% in 2020 from around 0.5% in previous years. This will be led by reduction in credit costs as the economy rebounds in 2021 onward.
Other Key Banking Systems Face Various Tests
Japan: COVID-19 will pose further challenges for banks and constrain profitability. We forecast Japan's economy to shrink 4.9% in 2020 and rebound by 3.4% next year. Notwithstanding the country's apparent success in containing COVID-19, and an enormous fiscal package with direct transfers to households, consumers have yet to recover from the blow of a consumption tax increase last year. We expect the banking industry's profitability to be squeezed as credit losses rise due to deterioration in asset quality and an increased likelihood of falls in interest rates globally place pressure on interest margins. We expect banks' ratio of credit costs to total loans exposures to surge to 0.6%-0.7% in 2020 before falling to 0.25% in 2021. Progress in restructuring will be key to the industry's profitability. Meanwhile, funding and liquidity remains strong, backed by stable customer deposits (see "Japanese Major Bank Credit Costs Rise On COVID-19," published on June 16, 2020).
Australia: Australian banks face a substantial but temporary increase in economic risks due to the COVID-19 outbreak. We forecast credit losses to rise to about six times those in 2019 before easing. We also expect house prices to fall by about 10% before resuming modest growth around the middle of 2021. However, we expect that most Australian banks should be able to absorb our forecast rise in credit losses within their earnings despite lower interest and fee income.
Singapore: The banking sector in Singapore is resilient with healthy buffers to withstand shocks and recession, in our view. As a trade-dependent economy and a major aviation hub, Singapore will be hit hard by the COVID-19 outbreak. We expect that the banks will experience higher credit costs and weaker earnings as the COVID-19 outbreak pushes the economy into recession. The banks have consistently strengthened their balance sheets during good times and maintained healthy Tier-1 capital adequacy ratios of about 15%. The large domestic banks maintain healthy liquidity buffers amid the turmoil.
India: We expect asset quality to deteriorate, credit costs to rise, and profitability to decline due to the challenging operating conditions. We expect the banking sector's weak assets to shoot up to 13%-14% of gross loans by the end of fiscal 2021 from an estimated 8.5% as of March 31, 2020. The nonbank financial companies (NBFC) sector (at 8.8% of the banking system's loans) is another source of vulnerability for banks, in our view. We expect that the current economic downturn will hit a small part of the NBFC sector harder than the banking sector, given some of the NBFCs lend to weaker customers. NBFCs also face accentuated liquidity risks, in our view. However, with regard to the banking sector, a very high likelihood of government support underpins the creditworthiness of government-owned banks, in our opinion (see "COVID And Indian Banks: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," published June 30, 2020).
Key Risks For The Next Six To 18 Months
Key risks for the financial institutions in Asia-Pacific include a worsening of our baseline scenario for COVID-19--because the health scenario becomes more entrenched or prolonged--that will hurt the economic outlook and financing conditions with a consequent weaker outlook for financial institution ratings. High private sector indebtedness and still high asset prices set the scene for financial system stress in many countries. Banks' high exposure to property, still-high property prices that are likely to weaken, and corporate-sector property risks may hurt banks' asset quality.
COVID-19 Accelerates The Digitization Drive In Asia-Pacific
Social distancing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic is driving digitalization of banking in various Asia-Pacific banking systems. Measures to limit transmission is driving more customers toward contactless payments and mobile and online banking. We have published a series of reports in which we examine factors that affect technological disruption in retail banking for Hong Kong, Australia, and Singapore. The reports also discuss how the respective banking industries are dovetailing with financial technology companies (see "Social Distancing Spurs Digital Banking In Asia-Pacific, Reports Say," published June 3, 2020.)
S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its peak in some regions but will remain a threat until a vaccine or effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until the second half of 2021. We are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic (see our research here: www.spglobal.com/ratings). As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.
|Real GDP Forecast|
|Forecasts||Change from April 2020 forecast (ppt)|
|(% year over year)||2019||2020||2021||2022||2023||2020||2021|
|Note: For India, the year runs April to March, e.g. 2019-- fiscal 2019 /2020, ending March 31, 2020. ppt--percentage point. Source: S&P Global Ratings.|
Key Banking Sector Risks
The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about key risks and risk trends for banking sectors in Asia-Pacific countries where we rate banks. For more detailed information, please refer to the latest Banking Industry Country Risks Assessment (BICRA) on a given country. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').
Banking Sector Research
- Industry Report Card: Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks: COVID-19 Drives Downside Risks As Credit Losses Jump And Earnings Fall, July 15, 2020
- India Banks Boost Capital For Rocky Times, July 15, 2020
- The $2 Trillion Question: What's On The Horizon For Bank Credit Losses, July 9, 2020
- Global Banks Outlook Midyear 2020: A Series Of Reports Look At The Profound Implications Of The COVID-19 Shock, July 9, 2020
- Asia-Pacific Credit Conditions: China Leads Region's Recovery From COVID, Says Report, June 30, 2020
- COVID And Indian Banks: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, June 30, 2020
- Outlooks On Malaysian Banks Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed, June 29, 2020
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: June 2020, June 26, 2020
- Four Indian Finance Companies Downgraded On Weakening Economic Conditions Due To COVID-19; Ratings On Two Affirmed, June 26, 2020
- Axis Bank Downgraded On Worsening Operating Conditions; Indian Bank On CreditWatch Negative; BICRA Lowered To Group '6', June 26, 2020
- Outlooks On Malaysian Banks Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed, June 29, 2020
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: June 2020, June 26, 2020
- Four Indian Finance Companies Downgraded On Weakening Economic Conditions Due To COVID-19; Ratings On Two Affirmed, June 26, 2020
- Axis Bank Downgraded On Worsening Operating Conditions; Indian Bank On CreditWatch Negative; BICRA Lowered To Group '6', June 26, 2020
- China's Financial Leasing Firms Fall Back On Parent Support Amid Airlines Slump, June 24, 2020
- New Zealand Bank Ratings Can Withstand Rising Economic Risks, Multifold Rise In Credit Losses, June 23, 2020
- Industry Report Card: Japanese Major Bank Credit Costs Rise On COVID-19, June 16, 2020
- Bank Regulatory Buffers Face Their First Usability Test, June 11, 2020
- How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings: June 2020 Update, June 11, 2020
- Tech Disruption In Retail Banking: Australia's Big Banks Hold Their Ground As Tech Takes Center Stage, June 3, 2020
- Tech Disruption In Retail Banking: Singapore Banks Are Front-Runners In Digital Race, June 3, 2020
- Tech Disruption In Retail Banking: Hong Kong's Large Banks Are Pioneering The City's Fintech Development, June 3, 2020
- DFCC Bank Downgraded To 'B-' From 'B' Following Similar Action On The Sovereign; Outlook Stable, May 20, 2020
- Australia's Mutual Lenders Can Weather COVID-19 Downturn, May 19, 2020
- Bulletin: Bank Rakyat Braces For Asset Quality And Profitability Pain, May 14, 2020
- Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Monitor 2Q2020: COVID-19 Crisis Could Add US$440 Billion To Credit Costs, May 14, 2020
- Papua New Guinea Banks Face Rising Economic Risks, May 11, 2020
- Bulletin: Macquarie's Solid Results Fend Off COVID-19 Uncertainties, May 8, 2020
- How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings: May 2020 Update, May 7, 2020
- Philippine Banks Bolster Buffers For Turbulence Ahead, May 6, 2020
- Research Update: Kiwibank Ltd. Outlook Revised To Stable From Positive; 'A/A-1' Ratings Affirmed, May 6, 2020
- Bulletin: Axis Bank's Q4 Loss Reflects Rise In Systemic Risks, May 5, 2020
- Bulletin: Westpac Can Handle Higher Credit Loss Provisions, May 4, 2020
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: April 2020, May 1, 2020
- Bulletin: ANZ's Dividend Deferral Supportive Of Credit Quality, April 30, 2020
- Research Update: Bank of South Pacific Ltd. Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'B-' Following Sovereign Downgrade; Outlook Stable, April 29, 2020
- Nearly All Australian Bank Ratings Can Withstand Rising Economic Risks, Credit Losses, April 29, 2020
- Outlook On Indonesian Banks Revised To Negative As Operating Conditions Worsen; Ratings Affirmed, April 28, 2020
- Bulletin: NAB Bolsters Balance Sheet Against COVID-19 Hits, April 27, 2020
- Bulletin: SPDB Can Withstand COVID-19 Shock, April 24, 2020
- Outlook On Japan's Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank Revised Down To Stable As COVID-19 Stalls Gains; 'A/A-1' Ratings Affirmed, April 24, 2020
- How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings, April 22, 2020
- Asia-Pacific Credit Conditions Stay Tight As Pandemic Hits Western Economies, April 22, 2020
- Various Rating Actions Taken On Indian NBFCs On Weakening Economic Conditions Due To COVID-19, April 17, 2020
- Rating Actions On Some Indian Banks As Operating Conditions Worsen; Government Support Key For State-Owned Entities, April 17, 2020
- China Banks After COVID-19: Big Get Bigger, Weak Get Weaker, April 17, 2020
- Research Update: Outlooks On Bangkok Bank, Bank of Ayudhya Revised To Stable From Positive Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed, April 14, 2020
- Major Australian Banks And Macquarie Bank Outlooks Revised To Negative, Mirroring Sovereign Outlook; Ratings Affirmed, April 8, 2020
- For Asia-Pacific Banks, COVID-19 Crisis Could Add US$300 Billion To Credit Costs, April 6, 2020
- Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis: Australian Banks Resilient To COVID-19 Crisis, April 1, 2020
Economic, Sovereign, And Other Research
- Economic Research: Asia-Pacific Losses Near $3 Trillion As Balance Sheet Recession Looms, June 26, 2020
- Economic Research: The China Confidence Game, June 18, 2020
- China Debt After COVID-19: Flattening The Other Curve, June 4, 2020
- India's Economy To Shrink 5% This Fiscal Year, May 28, 2020
- Economic Research: China's New Stop-Go Cycle, May 25, 2020
- Liquidity Lifeline For Distributors Is No Panacea For Indian Power Sector, May 18, 2020
- Economic Research: Jobs And The Climb Back From COVID-19, April 20, 2020
- Economic Research: Up Next: The Complicated Transition From COVID-19 Lockdown, April 17, 2020
- Economic Research: COVID-19 Deals A Larger, Longer Hit To Global GDP, April 16, 2020
Ratings Methodology News
- Guidance | Criteria | Financial Institutions | Other: Alternative Investment Funds Methodology, Jan. 13, 2020
- Criteria | Financial Institutions | Other: Alternative Investment Funds Methodology, Jan. 13, 2020
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- Coronavirus Insights Series: Monday Asia-Pacific Credit Focus, July 13, 2020
- Webinar Replay: S&P Global Ratings LIVE: ESG – The New Differentiator, July 9, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Impact Of COVID-19 On The South Korea Sovereign, Economy, Financial Institutions & Insurers, July 8, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Kookmin Bank US$7 Billion Global Covered Bond Program Assigned Preliminary 'AAA' Rating; Outlook Stable, July 3, 2020
- Webinar Replay: COVID-19 And Indian Banks: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, July 3, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Global Credit Conditions 2020 - Shape Of Recovery (APAC), July 2, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Malaysia - Fiscal And Debt Risks Reflect Impact Of COVID-19, July 1, 2020
- Webinar Replay: India's Sovereign Ratings – Expectations for the Recovery, June 12, 2020
- The Future of Banking: Social Distancing Spurs Digital Banking In Asia-Pacific, June 10, 2020
- Webinar Replay: How COVID-19 Is Affecting Singapore Banks? May 27, 2020
- Live Webinar and Q&A: COVID-19: How are Malaysian Banks Placed in A Turbulent 2020? May 20, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Views and Recent Rating Actions on Nonbank Financial Institutions, May 19, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Impact Of COVID-19 On Hong Kong Economy, Property Market And Banking System, May 13, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Impact of COVID-19 Outbreak On New Zealand Sovereign, Local Council & Bank Ratings, May 7, 2020
- Webinar Replay: How Thai Credits Will Ride Out This Pandemic Storm? May 5, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Credit Updates On The Indonesian Sovereign, State-Owned Companies & Indonesian Banks, April 29, 2020
- Webinar Replay: Global Banking Outlook - Asia-Pacific And European Banking Sectors, April 29, 2020
- Webinar Replay: COVID-19: Impact on Australian Sovereign, State Governments & Major Banks, April 9, 2020
Over the past quarter, we made the following changes to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs):
We revised our BICRA for India to Group '6' from Group '5', and our economic risk score to '7' from '6'. We believe risks stemming from challenging operating conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have increased for Indian banks. Drastic efforts to curtail the spread of the coronavirus have resulted in a sharp economic contraction. The government's stimulus package, with a headline amount of 10% of GDP, has about 1.2% of direct stimulus measures, which is low relative to that of countries with similar economic impacts from the pandemic. The remaining 8.8% of the package includes liquidity support measures and credit guarantees that will not directly support growth. We now forecast a 5.0% contraction in the economy in fiscal 2021. We anticipate Indian banks' asset quality will deteriorate, credit costs will rise, and profitability will decline over the next 12-24 months.
We also revised our economic risk trend for India to stable from negative. This is because we expect the country's economy will recover following the containment of the pandemic. We forecast that the economy will achieve a strong recovery following the deep contraction this year, with real GDP growth at 8.5% in fiscal 2022. The economy's long-term outperformance highlights its resilience. India's wide range of structural trends, including healthy demographics and competitive unit labor costs, works in its favor. Therefore, the banking system's nonperforming loans and credit costs will start to reduce gradually.
We revised our BICRA for Sri Lanka to Group '10' from Group '9', our economic risk score to '10' from '9', and our industry risk score to '9' from '8'. With the aforementioned changes, we have also revised our economic risk trend to stable from negative, and our industry risk trend to stable from negative.
We expect operating conditions for Sri Lankan financial institutions to worsen amid subdued economic activity globally post the COVID-19 pandemic. Sri Lanka was already facing heightened economic challenges post the Easter Sunday attacks last year. We expect Sri Lankan banks' NPLs to rise in the next 12-18 months. NPLs increased to 4.7% of total loans as of Dec. 31, 2019, from 3.4% as of Dec. 31, 2018. The central bank's announcement to allow banks to provide a moratorium on loans affected by the pandemic follows last year's request to banks to grant a moratorium on loans related to the tourism industry. Consecutive years of forbearance by the regulator will delay recognition and resolution of bad loans, but do not necessarily address the problem. In our view, such forbearance could hurt the credit culture of the banking system. With more than 40% of Sri Lanka's total public debt denominated in foreign currency, the external position is vulnerable to adverse exchange rate movements and shifts in global credit conditions. This could result in a sharp deterioration in the government's access to external financing. It could also affect the banking sector, although it has limited reliance on external funding compared to the Sri Lanka sovereign.
We revised our economic risk trend for New Zealand to negative from stable. We consider that there is a one-in-three likelihood in the next two years that we assess the economic risk score as having worsened by one category within our BICRA for New Zealand. This could occur if we foresee the economic downturn--or its impact on the banking sector--becoming significantly more prolonged or severe than our current forecasts. For example, if we consider that credit losses are likely to rise substantially above our current forecasts, or if we see indications of structural weaknesses in the credit risks in the economy such as the financial strength of the corporate sector or underwriting standards followed by the banks, we could revise downward the economic risk score.
Papua New Guinea
We revised our economic risk trend for Papua New Guinea to negative from stable. PNG's already weak economy faces additional downward pressure from delays to key resource sector projects, low global energy prices, and COVID-19 driven lockdowns--all of which are suppressing demand for domestic goods and services. In our view, PNG is a high-risk banking system by global standards. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues against a backdrop of volatile markets and growing credit stress, we expect a global recession for calendar 2020. The global slowdown and quarantine restrictions are weighing on oil and gas prices, which will have a flow-on effect on PNG government revenues, and economic growth forecasts.
We revised our economic risk trend for Australia to negative from stable. We consider that there is a one-in-three likelihood in the next two years that we assess the economic risk score as having worsened by one category within our BICRA for Australia. This could occur if we foresee the economic downturn--or its impact on the banking sector--becoming significantly more prolonged or severe than our current forecasts. For example, if we consider that the credit losses are likely to rise substantially above our current forecasts; or if we see indications of structural weaknesses in the important factors driving the credit risks in the economy such as the financial strength of the corporate sector or underwriting standards followed by the banks.
We revised our economic risk trend for Indonesia to negative from stable. In our view, the economic risk for Indonesian banks is rising due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected tourism, transport, trade, manufacturing, and investment in the country. The pandemic is also hurting private consumption, which accounts for almost 60% of Indonesia's GDP, given the social distancing measures imposed to contain the outbreak. We estimate Indonesia's economic growth will decelerate to 0.7% in 2020, compared with 5% in 2019. We could lower our economic risk assessment for Indonesia's banking sector if the COVID-19 pandemic worsens or drags on for longer, leading to significantly slower economic growth compared with our forecast, translating to higher-than-expected nonperforming assets and credit losses. We could also lower our assessment if the rupiah depreciates further and remains at that level for an extended period, resulting in a further weakening of Indonesia's external position or higher delinquencies among corporate borrowers, which may affect banks. Although the rupiah has shown some signs of stability and strengthening in recent weeks, further depreciation due to the turmoil in financial markets could be a risk for the banking system.
|Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks|
|Institution||Opco L-T ICR/outlook||Anchor||Business position||Capital and earnings||Risk position||Funding and liquidity||SACP or Group SACP||Type of support||No. of notches of support||Additional factor adjustment|
|Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.||AA-/Negative||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Commonwealth Bank of Australia||AA-/Negative||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Macquarie Bank Ltd.||A+/Negative||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|National Australia Bank Ltd.||AA-/Negative||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Westpac Banking Corp.||AA-/Negative||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Agricultural Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb-||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||GRE||1||0|
|Bank of Communications Co. Ltd.||A-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb-||GRE||3||0|
|China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||Group||4||0|
|China Construction Bank Corp.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Moderate||Strong||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Moderate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bb||GRE||2||0|
|Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Strong||Moderate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb||GRE||3||0|
|Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||GRE||3||0|
|Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd.||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a+||Sys. Imp.||1||(1)|
|Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd.||A+/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|The Bank of East Asia Ltd.||A-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a+||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Axis Bank Ltd.||BB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bb+||None||0||0|
|Bank of India||BB+/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Moderate||Weak||Above Avg/Strong||bb||GRE||1||0|
|HDFC Bank Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Strong||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||None||0||(2)|
|ICICI Bank Ltd. §||BBB-/Negative||bb+||Strong||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb-||None||0||0|
|State Bank of India||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Moderate||Moderate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|PT Bank Mandiri (Persero)||BBB-/Negative||bb+||Strong||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.||BBB-/Negative||bb+||Strong||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|Chiba Bank Ltd.||A-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Strong||Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.*||A/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Mizuho Financial Group Inc.*||A/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Nomura Holdings Inc.*||A-/Stable||bbb+||Moderate||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Norinchukin Bank||A/Negative||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Moderate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Resona Holdings*||A/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Moderate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Shinkin Central Bank||A/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Shizuoka Bank Ltd.||A-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.*||A/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings*||A/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Industrial Bank of Korea||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||GRE||4||0|
|KEB Hana Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Kookmin Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Korea Development Bank§||AA/Stable||bbb+||Moderate||Moderate||Weak||Below Avg/Adequate||bb-||GRE||10||0|
|Nonghyup Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb+||GRE||3||0|
|Shinhan Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Woori Bank||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Public Bank Bhd.||A-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Strong||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||(1)|
|Malayan Banking Bhd.||A-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|CIMB Bank Bhd.||A-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd.||AA-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|ASB Bank Ltd.||AA-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|Bank of New Zealand||AA-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Group||4||0|
|Westpac New Zealand Ltd.||AA-/Negative||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|DBS Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|United Overseas Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|CTBC Bank Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|KASIKORNBANK PCL||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Moderate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Data as of June 30, 2020. Type of Support column -'None' includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. §This ICR applies to the Foreign Currency Rating only.|
Table 3: Recent Rating Actions: Asia Pacific Banks
|Release Date||Org Legal Name||Org Country||From||To|
|29-Jun-20||Public Bank Berhad||Malaysia||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|29-Jun-20||RHB Bank Berhad||Malaysia||BBB+/Stable/A-2||BBB+/Negative/A-2|
|29-Jun-20||Malayan Banking Berhad||Malaysia||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|29-Jun-20||CIMB Bank Berhad||Malaysia||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|29-Jun-20||AmBank (M) Berhad||Malaysia||BBB+/Stable/A-2||BBB+/Negative/A-2|
|26-Jun-20||Axis Bank Ltd.||India||BBB-/Negative/A-3||BB+/Stable/B|
|12-Jun-20||AMP Bank Ltd.||Australia||BBB+/Negative/A-2||BBB+/WatchNeg/A-2|
|10-Jun-20||Development Bank of Japan Inc.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|10-Jun-20||Hachijuni Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|10-Jun-20||State Street Trust and Banking Co. Ltd.||Japan||A+/Positive/A-1||A+/Stable/A-1|
|10-Jun-20||Shinsei Bank, Limited||Japan||BBB+/Negative/A-2||BBB/Stable/A-2|
|10-Jun-20||Shizuoka Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|10-Jun-20||Chiba Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|10-Jun-20||Seven Bank, Ltd.||Japan||A+/Positive/A-1||A+/Stable/A-1|
|29-May-20||Shinsei Bank, Limited||Japan||BBB+/Stable/A-2||BBB+/Negative/A-2|
|29-May-20||Taiwan Shin Kong Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.||Taiwan||BBB/Stable/A-2||BBB/Negative/A-2|
|21-May-20||Sony Bank Inc.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/WatchNeg/A-1/WatchNeg|
|20-May-20||DFCC Bank||Sri Lanka||B/Negative/B||B-/Stable/B|
|19-May-20||Hokuriku Bank Ltd.||Japan||A-/Stable/--||A-/Negative/--|
|19-May-20||Hokkoku Bank Ltd.||Japan||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|19-May-20||Bank of Kyoto Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|19-May-20||Higo Bank Ltd.||Japan||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|19-May-20||Kagoshima Bank Ltd.||Japan||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/Negative/A-2|
|19-May-20||Iyo Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|6-May-20||Kiwibank Ltd.||New Zealand||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|29-Apr-20||Bank of South Pacific Ltd.||Papua New Guinea||B/Stable/B||B-/Stable/B|
|29-Apr-20||Fubon Bank (China) Co. Ltd.||China||BBB+/Stable/A-2||BBB+/Negative/A-2|
|28-Apr-20||PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.||Indonesia||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|28-Apr-20||PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.||Indonesia||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|28-Apr-20||PT Bank Mandiri (Persero)||Indonesia||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|27-Apr-20||The Master Trust Bank of Japan Ltd.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|27-Apr-20||Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd.||Japan||A-/Positive/A-2||A-/Stable/A-2|
|27-Apr-20||Trust & Custody Services Bank, Ltd.||Japan||A-/Positive/A-2||A-/Stable/A-2|
|24-Apr-20||Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.||Japan||A-/Positive/--||A-/Stable/--|
|24-Apr-20||Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. (China) Ltd.||China||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corp.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Mizuho Trust & Banking Co. Ltd.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Mizuho Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.||Japan||A-/Positive/--||A-/Stable/--|
|24-Apr-20||Mizuho Financial Group Inc.||Japan||A-/Positive/--||A-/Stable/--|
|24-Apr-20||MUFG Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||Mizuho Bank (China) Ltd.||China||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|24-Apr-20||MUFG Bank (China) Ltd.||China||A/Positive/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|23-Apr-20||Rabobank New Zealand Ltd.||New Zealand||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|17-Apr-20||ICICI Bank Ltd.||India||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|17-Apr-20||Axis Bank Ltd.||India||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|14-Apr-20||Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd.||Thailand||BBB+/Positive/A-2||BBB+/Stable/A-2|
|14-Apr-20||Bank of Ayudhya Public Co. Ltd.||Thailand||BBB+/Positive/A-2||BBB+/Stable/A-2|
|7-Apr-20||Commonwealth Bank of Australia||Australia||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||ASB Bank Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||ASB Finance Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||National Australia Bank Ltd.||Australia||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.||Australia||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||Bank of New Zealand||New Zealand||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||Macquarie Bank Ltd.||Australia||A+/Stable/A-1||A+/Negative/A-1|
|7-Apr-20||ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||Macquarie International Finance Ltd.||Australia||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|7-Apr-20||Australia and New Zealand Bank (China) Co. Ltd.||China||A+/Stable/A-1||A+/Negative/A-1|
|7-Apr-20||Westpac Banking Corp.||Australia||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|7-Apr-20||Westpac New Zealand Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Stable/A-1+||AA-/Negative/A-1+|
|*Recent rating actions are for the period April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list.|
This report does not constitute a rating action.
|Primary Credit Analyst:||Ryoji Yoshizawa, Tokyo (81) 3-4550-8453;|
|Secondary Contacts:||Vera Chaplin, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2058;|
|Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2092;|
|Sharad Jain, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2077;|
|Geeta Chugh, Mumbai (91) 22-3342-1910;|
|Harry Hu, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3571;|
|Ivan Tan, Singapore (65) 6239-6335;|
|Nico N DeLange, Sydney (61) 2-9255-9887;|
|Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3508 ;|
|HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533 3597;|
|Eunice Fan, Taipei (8862) 8722-5818;|
|Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo (81) 3-4550-8578;|
|Fern Wang, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3536;|
|Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3532;|
|Lisa Barrett, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2081;|
|Research Assistant:||Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai|
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