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How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings


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How COVID-19 Is Affecting Bank Ratings

Banks across the world will inevitably face negative rating momentum through 2020 as a result of the significant effects of the coronavirus pandemic, oil shock, and market volatility. Yet, we anticipate this will mostly be limited to negative outlook revisions this year, with a comparatively smaller proportion of downgrades (see chart 1). We expect bank ratings to stay largely resilient for four key reasons:

  • The generally strong capital and liquidity position of banks globally at the onset of the pandemic, supported by a material strengthening in bank regulations over the past 10 years;
  • The substantial support and flexibility that banking systems will receive from public authorities to entice them to continue lending to households and corporates, whether in the form of liquidity or credit guarantees, and relief on minimum regulatory capital and liquidity requirements;
  • The unprecedented direct support that governments will provide to their corporate and household sectors; and
  • The likelihood, in our base-case scenario, of a 5.9% rebound in global GDP in 2021 after a sharp contraction by 2.4% this year, even if this contraction and ensuing recovery varies considerably between countries.

Chart 1


Chart 2


Our outlook on banks has turned more negative than a few weeks ago, and the bias will likely become much more negative in the weeks to come. This reflects the recent revision of our macroeconomic forecasts, in which our economists materially worsened their assumptions for GDP contraction this year (see table 1) and assumed a more gradual recovery in many countries, with continued downside risk to this base-case scenario.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak about midyear, and we are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implications. We believe the measures adopted to contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession (see our macroeconomic and credit updates here: As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.

Across the regions, public authorities view their banking systems as a conduit for economic and monetary policies, aiming to reduce the immediate impact of the economic stop associated with measures to contain the coronavirus. They have implemented a broad array of measures to incentivize banks to continue lending and show flexibility toward struggling customers. In return, banking systems are receiving substantial liquidity support, and regulations are being relaxed temporarily. Nevertheless, some banking systems will have less latitude to provide support.

Banks' creditworthiness ultimately remains a function of the economies they serve. Our current expectation of a strong rebound in most markets in 2021 suggests that short-term forbearance activity at this stage may limit credit losses later. But the long-term stress many customers will experience will, over time, flow through to banks' profit-and-loss statements.

In determining which bank ratings could be affected the most, we take into account the headroom within individual bank ratings for some deterioration in their credit metrics as well as their relative exposure to the most vulnerable sectors and customers. We also consider the relative effectiveness of their public authorities in curbing the credit impact on customers and supporting a rapid rebound once the situation abates. Finally, we also take into account how sovereign support factors influence ratings, and how subsidiaries fare in the context of group rating considerations.

The bank rating actions we have taken so far have been in jurisdictions and on entities most immediately affected by the evolving scenario, with the oil shock in many cases amplifying the expected impact of the containment measures. As we gain more visibility on the impact of the economic contraction and shape of the ensuing recovery, we will continue to update our projections and bank ratings and outlooks accordingly.

For banking industries that entered this crisis with structurally weak profitability, such as many in Western Europe, one long-term consequence of the pandemic may be that rates stay even lower for even longer, therefore tilting the outlook to a more negative bias. This could occur even if asset quality deterioration remains contained or short-lived on the back of support measures. Once authorities relax the containment measures, more structural measures at system or entity level to improve margins and efficiency may therefore be key to supporting the credit profiles of many banks globally. Moreover, the potentially sharp rise in credit loss provisions could hit the capital positions of banks with weak profitability more immediately than those generating more comfortable earnings.

A Limited Number Of Rating Actions To Date

Of the 97 ratings actions--including outlook revisions--we have taken on banks related to COVID-19 and/or the oil shock until April 17, 72 (or 74%) were outlook revisions, one was a CreditWatch Negative, and 24 (25%) were downgrades (see chart 1). Almost all the bank downgrades occurred in jurisdictions in which the oil shock also contributed materially to our expectation of weakened operating conditions for banks (see, for example, "21 Mexican Financial Institutions Downgraded On Same Action On Sovereign And Increasing Economic Risks For The Sector", "Various Rating Actions On Nigerian Banks Following Sovereign Downgrade; Outlooks Stable", "Ratings On Two Kuwaiti Banks Lowered On Weaker Support Assumption," and "Two Trinidadian Banks Downgraded To 'BBB-/A-3' From 'BBB/A-2' On Lower Hydrocarbon Prices And COVID-19 Outbreak"). In countries little affected by the oil shock, our bank rating actions have mainly consisted of outlook revisions.

We have taken a smaller proportion of rating actions on banks than on most other corporate sectors. This is not just because of the support that banks and their customers are receiving, but also because bank ratings on average tend to be higher than most nonfinancial corporates and non-bank financial institutions. These higher ratings imply less sensitivity to the deterioration in their operating environment.

Added to this, coronavirus containment measures are hitting the cash flows of a number of nonfinancial corporate sectors very rapidly and very hard. What is more, we are entering this economic downturn after years in which corporate debt has built up globally. By contrast, most banks tend to benefit from some diversification in their loan books, a stock of loans that continue to provide relative revenue stability, and access to central bank funding if needed. For corporates, years of accommodative monetary policy and abundant liquidity have fueled investor appetite for higher-yielding debt and resulted in a record number of weaker companies coming to the market for funding: 30% of speculative-grade nonfinancial corporate entities globally, and 20% of those in Europe, are now rated 'B-' and below. We expect most corporate downgrades will be at this rating level, in some cases ultimately leading to default, including in the form of distressed exchanges.

Why Bank Ratings Have Been Resilient So Far

The first factor underpinning the resilience of bank ratings is our base-case scenario of a very severe--but only a relatively short--economic contraction. Under our latest base case, the economic impact of COVID-19 is longer and more intense than we previously thought. We now see global GDP falling by 2.4% this year, with the U.S. and eurozone contracting 5.2% and 7.3%, respectively, (see "COVID-19 Deals A Larger, Longer Hit To Global GDP," published April 16, 2020). We expect global growth to rebound to 5.9% in 2021 (see table 1).

Table 1

Global GDP Growth Forecasts
--Q1 CCC-- --New--
(%) 2019 2020 2020 2021 2022
U.S. 2.3 -1.3 -5.2 6.2 2.5
Eurozone 1.2 -2.0 -7.3 5.6 3.7
Germany 0.6 -1.9 -6.0 4.3 3.3
France 1.3 -1.7 -8.0 6.1 4.5
Spain 2.0 -2.1 -8.8 5.1 4.3
Italy 0.2 -2.6 -9.9 6.4 3.2
U.K. 1.4 -2.0 -6.5 6.0 3.2
China 6.1 2.9 1.2 7.4 4.7
India* 5.3 3.6 1.8 7.5 6.5
World 2.9 0.4 -2.4 5.9 3.9
*Fiscal year ending March. CCC--Credit Conditions Committee. Sources: S&P Global Economics and Oxford Economics.

While the very near term looks bleak, infection curves are flattening and the focus has turned to the recovery. Its length and pace will depend on the combination of health and economic policies, the response of individuals and firms, and the condition of the labor market and small and midsize enterprises (SMEs). The balance of risks remains on the downside, as much could go wrong with our baseline path on the health, economic, and policy fronts. We assume that the massive liquidity support provided by central banks around the world will continue to prove effective in curbing funding and liquidity risks for banks and financial markets in general in most jurisdictions. These include the Federal Reserve's $2.3 trillion lending programs and the European Central Bank's (ECB) €1.2 trillion increase in the volume of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), as well as its new €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP).

What is more, unlike during the 2008 global financial crisis, banking sectors have not been a direct source of stress or an amplification of travails for the real economy. Indeed, some elements of monetary and fiscal policy responses, such as keeping low-cost credit flowing to households and businesses or applying forbearance measures on their loan repayments, rely on operationally effective and robust banking systems for their delivery.

Most banking sectors have gradually emerged from the financial crisis better capitalized, better funded, and more liquid. We estimate, for instance, that the capital base of the largest banks about doubled over the past 10 years. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), between June 30, 2011, and June 20, 2019, the Common Equity Tier 1 capital of the largest 100 banks increased by 98%, or by around €1.9 trillion. This comes on top of a material derisking of a number of banks' exposures during that period. Comparable progress has been made in terms of bank liquidity.

Despite these improvements, coming into this crisis our ratings on many banks were constrained by structurally weak profitability (for example in Europe and Japan) and the expectation, at some point, of a turn in the credit cycle even if we certainly didn't foresee a turn of this nature and velocity. As a result, we believe that most of our bank ratings were positioned to anticipate some deterioration in their operating environment and credit metrics.

More Bank Rating Actions Are Likely, Mainly Outlook Revisions

Our central scenario is that we will unlikely lower the ratings on the majority of banks across jurisdictions in the near term as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is because government support packages will cushion the impact on households and corporate borrowers and, in turn, banks. That said, the risks to our baseline macroeconomic forecast remain firmly on the downside since the translation from health outcomes to economic variables are highly uncertain. The contours of the recovery, in particular, are still hard to predict. We therefore expect a sustained increase in the number of entities and geographies for which we signal material downside risk to our base case. Note that a negative outlook typically signals at least a one-in-three chance of a downgrade within the next 24 months for banks with ratings 'BBB-' or above and within the next 12 months for banks rated below that level.

Also factored into our expectation of more outlook revisions is the likelihood of durable pressure that many banks will experience on their performance. Once the dust settles and economies around the world recover, the earnings' recovery for banks is unlikely to be as sharp as the GDP rebound from this crisis. Many banks will face customers that may be prone to deleverage, a cost of risk that will likely be well above pre-COVID levels, and the prospect of lower rates for even longer. All these factors will likely durably dent earnings that were already feeble in some regions at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. They will also force many banks to undertake a further round of structural measures to address chronic performance issues.

We will monitor the long-term effect of the current relaxation of various bank regulations, for instance in terms of capital buffers and forbearance. The short-term impact over the next few months is likely to be positive for banks. It should enable them to maneuver through the worst part of the crisis, and in line with the original intentions of these regulations. Chiefly, it gives banks more flexibility to manage the immediate--supposedly short-lived, but acute--crisis.

But it is still too early to predict whether some of these changes could become more durable. If so, a long-term term weakening in banks' capital and liquidity targets, or less transparency in recognizing bad debt and delays in adequately provisioning for it, could lead to durably weaker balance sheets and erode investor confidence. A weakened prospective capitalization of banks could affect a number of ratings over time, both in developed and emerging markets.

Furthermore, the next few quarters are likely to show up significant differences between banks in the way they book provisions against future credit losses. The strongest and more conservative ones are likely to be faster in recognizing weaker exposures and provisioning for future potential problems that would be revealed later for others.

Banks in the U.S. will likely be forced to take some of the largest provisions, all else equal, because of the Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) accounting standard. CECL requires banks to set reserves for expected lifetime losses on their loans. As banks increase their expectations for those losses, they may have to increase reserves markedly. U.S. banks that have reported first-quarter so far have shown such increases. While that weighs on earnings and capital initially, it should mean their provisions will be lower in future periods than they otherwise would have been.

Which Banks Are More Exposed To Rating Actions?

Factors we consider in determining whether the ratings on a bank are exposed to material downside risk in the present context include:

  • The current rating level, including to what extent there is room within it for a deterioration in credit metrics.
  • The relative exposure of the bank and the jurisdiction in which it is based to COVID-19-related downside risks and the oil shock. This includes exposure to hard hit industries (such as transportation, tourism, oil and gas, gaming, lodging, restaurants, and transport sectors) or types of lending (such as SMEs, leveraged loans, and unsecured consumer loans). Banks' relative exposure to possible fund outflows (as is the case in certain emerging markets) or concentration risk to single name exposures or particular industries may also exacerbate issuers' vulnerabilities.
  • The ability and willingness of the authorities to provide support to their banking systems and banks' customers, and our expectation of the effectiveness of these measures in reducing the short-term impact while laying the foundations for a rapid recovery of the economy.

Given the various links between sovereign and bank ratings (such as government support, strength of the economy, exposure to sovereign debt), some ratings actions (including outlook changes) may follow similar actions on sovereign ratings. This can occur, for instance, in banking systems that receive rating uplift for government support, as was the case in the recent outlook changes on a number of systemically important banks in Australia and Thailand on the back of similar actions on these sovereigns. Our bank ratings may also move independently from such sovereign actions, especially given the differences in the risks considered by sovereign and bank ratings. Bank ratings, furthermore, tend to be lower than those on sovereigns, and lower ratings indicate a greater vulnerability to shifts in economic and business conditions.

In terms of possible downgrades, jurisdictions currently with the highest proportion of negative outlooks are likely to see the highest proportion of rating changes. Over the past year, there has to date only been a modest increase in the proportion of negative outlooks on banks in the various regions, with the exception of Latin America. A big caveat, however, is that we would expect a marked increase in outlook revisions in the coming weeks on the back of our recently revised macroeconomic forecasts.

Concentrations in business models and exposures can increase banks' sensitivity to a deterioration in their operating environment. We have, for instance, revised our outlooks on a number of regional U.S. and Italian banks to reflect these potential vulnerabilities (see "Six U.S. Regional Banks Outlooks Revised To Negative On Higher Risks To Energy Industry," published March 27, 2020). We could in a number of markets see further differentiation in our rating actions between larger and less diversified players.

The relative position of banks at the onset of the crisis will also drive some differences in their vulnerabilities to the unfolding stress scenario. In terms of profitability, U.S. banks and many Asia-Pacific banks (ex-Japan) entered this period in a stronger position than in many other jurisdictions, which should give them a somewhat better ability to absorb earnings pressures. Still, even for U.S. banks, ultra-low interest rates will weigh meaningfully on profitability.

Similarly, variations in asset quality at the onset of the crisis may offer some jurisdictions more buffer for a deterioration in metrics. Not affected by the global financial crisis to the same extent as some other regions, certain large banks in Asia-Pacific, for instance, demonstrated consistently strong metrics, leading into the COVID-19 pandemic, even if the asset quality of most peers in all regions had been on an improving trajectory in recent years.

To date, about two-thirds of our rating actions (including outlook revisions) on banks were in emerging markets. This reflects generally lower ratings and the specificities of some of these banking systems. That said--based on the recent material downward revision of our macroeconomic forecasts that included a number of developed markets, and given some of the rising potential second-order effects --the gap in the proportion of rating actions between emerging and developed markets should decrease.

Asset Quality And Capital Outflows Will Expose Some Emerging Markets

In addition to asset quality deterioration that we expect for banks in developed markets, some banks in emerging markets are also exposed to additional sources of risks including:

  • Heavy reliance on external funding amid changing investor sentiment and the unprecedented pace of capital outflows.
  • Concentration of their economies on specific sectors (such as the hospitality sector or industrial or service exports to developed countries) or commodities (such as oil or gas).
  • Lack of government capacity to provide extraordinary support, weaker governance, and a higher likelihood of political and social tensions.

Against this backdrop, we expect banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will see significantly reduced revenue and credit growth in 2020. The sharp drop in oil prices and measures implemented by regional governments to contain transmission of COVID-19 will take a toll on important sectors, such as real estate, hospitality, and consumer-related industries. In response, GCC governments have also announced several measures to help corporates and retailers, including reduced taxes or requests for banks to extend additional subsidized loans to affected clients. We therefore think that banks' financial profiles will deteriorate if the crisis worsens.

For certain emerging market banks, such as in Turkey, currency fluctuations will likely contribute to the deterioration in asset quality and capital, due to the still high level of foreign currency loans, in addition to the expected pressure on funding costs as banks continue to roll over external debt.

For South African banks, the economic contraction will also lead to weaker asset quality. We have observed significant capital outflows from the country lately. Yet, given South African banks' limited dependence on external funding, we think the overall impact will be limited. In addition, the central bank is providing support to money market and interbank markets.

The oil-price shock will also compound the impact of COVID-19 on Russian banks' asset quality and profitability. But we believe that funding will remain largely resilient, supported by its reliance mainly on domestic deposits, limited external funding needs, and potential central bank liquidity support.

In Latin America, we expect a recession in 2020. Some economies were already growing below potential because of specific issues, such as debt restructuring in Argentina, soft business and investor confidence in Mexico, and social unrest in Chile. We therefore expect a shock on asset quality indicators, especially from SMEs and self-employed workers. Forbearance, as in most jurisdictions around the globe, will probably delay the full reflection of the deterioration on banks' balance sheets, and the impact will therefore likely be spread between 2020 and 2021. Nevertheless, banks in Latin America have benefitted from sound margins and profitability, and they are used to operating under volatile conditions.

As in several other emerging markets, governments in Latin America have offered some alleviating measures, but they could be insufficient. Among the largest countries in the region, banks in Argentina will suffer the most. Local banks were already operating in a weak economy, and government actions appear insufficient to contain the credit risk, given limited fiscal capacity.

We may see a greater divergence in the performance of the larger and smaller banks in some of these markets. In Latin America, we believe that the major banks can cope with a temporary disruption in capital markets. This is because retail deposits provide the bulk of their funding, and because of limited debt maturities in 2020. Moreover, large banks are benefitting from a flight to quality, given that investors and depositors are shying away from the capital markets and funds. However, as in some other regions, smaller banks and financial companies will not benefit from this trend.

Similarly, we expect the impact of the crisis on the largest Chinese banks to be manageable, while smaller banks with aggressive risk appetites or high geographic concentration in heavily hit regions could see a material squeeze on their asset quality, performance, and capitalization (see "China Banks After COVID-19: Big Get Bigger, Weak Get Weaker," April 17, 2020). Still in Asia Pacific, we also expect the banking systems of Indonesia and India to be among the hardest hit. Indonesia's role as a major commodity exporter and Indonesian corporates' reliance on foreign currency funding, with sizable unhedged portions, will weigh on asset quality. However, Indonesian banks' strong capitalization and reserves offer some succour.

India's complete lockdown, accompanied by forced closures of nonessential businesses and declining demand, are hurting the economy. We expect the sharp decline in India's GDP growth in the current year to lead to a sharp rise in nonperforming assets. We have revised the outlooks of a few Indian banks to negative as the downside risk has increased. What is more, these banks are not entering the downcycle from a position of strength (see "Rating Actions On Some Indian Banks As Operating Conditions Worsen; Government Support Key For State-Owned Entities," published April 17, 2020)

Appendix: COVID-19 And Oil-Shock-Related Bank Rating Actions As Of April 17, 2020

  • Commonwealth Bank Of Australia Outlook To Negative Following Sovereign Outlook Revision; Ratings Affirmed At 'AA-/A-1+', April 8, 2020
  • Macquarie Bank Ltd. Outlook Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Outlook Revision; Ratings Affirmed At 'A+/A-1', April 8, 2020
  • National Australia Bank Outlook Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed At 'AA-/A-1+', April 8, 2020
  • Westpac Banking Corp. Outlook Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Outlook Revision; Ratings Affirmed At 'AA-/A-1+', April 8, 2020
  • Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Outlook Revised To Negative Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed, April 8, 2020
  • Outlooks On Bangkok Bank, Bank of Ayudhya Revised To Stable From Positive Following Sovereign Action; Ratings Affirmed, April 14, 2020
  • Rating Actions On Some Indian Banks As Operating Conditions Worsen; Government Support Key For State-Owned Entities, April 17, 2020
  • Russia-Based CentroCredit Bank Outlook Revised To Negative On Potential Capital And Liquidity Constraints, March 24, 2020
  • Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige – Volksbank Outlook Revised To Negative On Sharp Economic Contraction; Ratings Affirmed, March 26, 2020
  • Italian Iccrea Cooperative Banking Group Outlook Revised To Negative On Sharp Economic Contraction; Ratings Affirmed, March 26, 2020
  • Outlooks On Five UAE Banks Revised To Negative On Deteriorating Operating Environment, March 26, 2020
  • FCE Bank Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative Following Action On Parent Ford Motor Co., March 27, 2020
  • Outlooks On Four Greek Banks Revised To Stable From Positive On COVID-19's Impact On NPE Cleanup Efforts, March 27, 2020
  • VW Bank GmbH 'A-/A-2' Ratings Affirmed Following Parent Volkswagen's Outlook Revision To Negative On COVID-19 Effects, March 27, 2020
  • La Poste, La Banque Postale Outlooks To Stable As COVID-19 Impact Offsets New Structure Benefits; Affirmed At 'A/A-1', March 27, 2020
  • Hamburg Commercial Bank AG Outlook Revised To Negative On Challenging Macro Environment; 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed, March 30, 2020
  • BankMuscat S.A.O.G. Long-Term Rating Lowered To 'BB-' Following Sovereign Downgrade; Outlook Negative, March 30, 2020
  • Ratings On Two Kuwaiti Banks Lowered On Weaker Support Assumption, March 30, 2020
  • Various Rating Actions On Nigerian Banks Following Sovereign Downgrade; Outlooks Stable, March 31, 2020
  • Eiendomskreditt AS Long-Term Ratings Lowered To 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable, March 31, 2020
  • Societe Generale Outlook To Stable As Profitability Prospects Falter In The Face Of COVID-19; 'A/A-1' Ratings Affirmed, April 3, 2020
  • Kutxabank Outlook Revised To Stable On Economic Downturn Stemming From COVID-19 Pandemic; 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed, April 7, 2020
  • Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. Outlook Revised To Stable Following Action On Shareholder PZU; 'BBB+/A-2' Ratings Affirmed, April 8, 2020
  • Portugal-Based Haitong Bank Outlook Revised To Negative From Stable On Emerging Economic Downturn; Ratings Affirmed, April 8, 2020
  • Banco Comercial Portugues Outlook Revised To Stable From Positive On Sharp Economic Contraction; 'BB/B' Ratings Affirmed, April 8, 2020
  • ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Outlook Revised To Negative On Weaker Expected Earnings Amid COVID-19 Outbreak; Ratings Affirmed, April 9, 2020
  • France-Based Socram Banque Downgraded To 'BBB' On Uncertain Business Prospects And Transformation; Outlook Negative, April 10, 2020
  • Outlooks On Two Georgian Banks Revised As Economy Heads Toward Recession; Ratings On Three Affirmed, April 10, 2020
  • PSA Banque France Outlook Revised To Negative On Similar Action On Peugeot; Ratings Affirmed, April 15, 2020
  • My Money Bank And HoldCo Outlooks Revised To Negative On Weaker Business Prospects; Ratings Affirmed, April 16, 2020
  • MONETA Money Bank, a.s. Outlook Revised To Stable Amid Czech Economic Shutdown; 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed, April 17, 2020
  • Outlooks On Six Banks Revised To Stable From Positive On Emerging Economic Downturn; Ratings Affirmed, March 23, 2020
  • IBERIABANK Outlook Revised To Negative, First Horizon National Corp. Ratings Removed From CreditWatch Positive, March 24, 2020
  • Six U.S. Regional Banks Outlooks Revised To Negative On Higher Risks To Energy Industry, March 27, 2020
Latin America
  • Banco Hipotecario S.A. Downgraded To 'CCC' From 'B-' On Weakening Financial Conditions; Still On CreditWatch Negative, March 16, 2020
  • 21 Mexican Financial Institutions Downgraded On Same Action On Sovereign And Increasing Economic Risks For The Sector, March 27, 2020
  • Three Colombian Financial Institution Outlooks Revised To Negative After Similar Action On Sovereign; Ratings Affirmed, March 30, 2020
  • Two Trinidadian Banks Downgraded To 'BBB-/A-3' From 'BBB/A-2' On Lower Hydrocarbon Prices And COVID-19 Outbreak, April 1, 2020
  • Outlook On 11 Chilean Financial Entities Revised To Negative On Higher Economic Risk, Ratings Affirmed, April 3, 2020
  • Outlook On 15 Brazilian Financial Services Companies Revised To Stable From Positive On Similar Action On Sovereign, April 7, 2020

Related Research

  • Coronavirus Impact: Key Takeaways From Our Articles
  • Covid Weekly Digest:
  • COVID-19 Deals A Larger, Longer Hit To Global GDP, April 16, 2020
  • Credit FAQ: The Ratings Process And The COVID-19 Pandemic, April 2, 2020
  • For Asia-Pacific Banks, COVID-19 Crisis Could Add US$300 Billion To Credit Costs, April 5, 2020
  • China Banks After COVID-19: Big Get Bigger, Weak Get Weaker, April 16, 2020
  • Credit Costs For China's Banks Could Rise By US$224 Billion In 2020, April 8, 2020
  • Europe’s AT1 Market Faces The COVID-19 Test: Bend, Not Break, April 22, 2020
  • European Banks' First-Quarter Results: Many COVID-19 Questions, Few Conclusive Answers, April 1, 2020
  • COVID-19 Countermeasures May Contain Damage To Europe's Financial Institutions For Now, March 13, 2020
  • The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Set To Test The Resiliency Of Italy's Banks, March 13, 2020
  • GCC Banks Face An Earnings Shock From The Oil Price Drop And COVID-19 Pandemic, April 6, 2020
  • Latin American Banks Will Cope With Coronavirus Fallout But At The Expense Of Asset Quality, March 24, 2020
  • COVID-19 Exposes Funding And Liquidity Gaps At Banks In The Middle East, Turkey, and Africa, April 6, 2020
  • Recession And Market Volatility Will Test The Resilience Of Russian Banks, April 2, 2020
  • Three Big Risks For Kazakh Banks: Oil Prices, Foreign Exchange Rates, And The Coronavirus, April 2, 2020
  • Who The U.S. Government Plans Help, Who They Don't, And What That Means For Financial Institutions, April 16, 2020
  • U.S. Financial Institutions Face A Rocky Road Despite A Boost From Government Measures, April 8, 2020
  • Most U.S. Banks, Helped By Fed Actions, Are Well Positioned To Meet Corporate Borrowers' Demand For Cash, March 24, 2020
  • Stress Scenarios Show How U.S. Bank Ratings Could Change Amid Pandemic-Induced Financial Uncertainty, March 24, 2020
  • The Fed's Crisis Actions Will Further Bolster Liquidity For U.S. Banks, But Earnings And Asset Quality Are Set To Worsen Substantially, March 18, 2020

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analysts:Alexandre Birry, London (44) 20-7176-7108;
Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2092;
Emmanuel F Volland, Paris (33) 1-4420-6696;
Secondary Contacts:Brendan Browne, CFA, New York (1) 212-438-7399;
Bernd Ackermann, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-153;
Cynthia Cohen Freue, Buenos Aires +54 (11) 4891-2161;
Mohamed Damak, Dubai (971) 4-372-7153;
Geeta Chugh, Mumbai (91) 22-3342-1910;

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