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NEWS

77 Ratings On 32 Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Deals Placed On Watch Negative Over Reduced Travel Due To Coronavirus


77 Ratings On 32 Aircraft And Aircraft Engine ABS Deals Placed On Watch Negative Over Reduced Travel Due To Coronavirus

NEW YORK (S&P Global Ratings) March 19, 2020--S&P Global Ratings today placed its ratings on 77 classes from 32 aircraft and aircraft engine ABS transactions on CreditWatch with negative implications (see list). The tranches have been placed on CreditWatch with negative implications due to the unprecedented collapse in world travel caused by global travel restrictions and social distancing enacted to combat the spread of COVID-19. These measures are expected to make traveling highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, which will place a significant stress on the liquidity and credit quality of the underlying lessees in these transactions.

Global economic conditions--especially in the aviation sector--have weakened substantially and are worsening beyond initial expectations as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to pose serious challenges to the industry and threatens operators' near-term liquidity and long-term credit quality. The ultimate impact of the coronavirus on our global airline ratings will depend on the duration and severity of the situation, and the type and severity of measures airlines and governments take to mitigate it. These decisions will be partly informed by global, national, and local health authorities' advice on travel to highly affected areas.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak in June or August, and we are using this assumption in assessing the economic and credit implications. We believe measures to contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession and could hurt employment levels and housing markets (see "COVID-19 Macroeconomic Update: The Global Recession Is Here And Now" and "COVID-19 Credit Update: The Sudden Economic Stop Will Bring Intense Credit Pressure," published on March 17). As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly.

CREDITWATCH

To resolve these CreditWatches, we may conduct scenario testing to determine whether the transactions have sufficient liquidity to absorb prolonged rent deferrals and payment holidays, possible downward migration in portfolio credit quality, longer-than-usual remarketing and repossession time, and the potential for distressed aircraft sales due to remarketing difficulties. Potential scenario tests may be more severe than what our methodology currently considers (see Related Criteria section).

While transactions rated by S&P Global Ratings after the financial crisis generally include structural enhancements such as liquidity and maintenance reserves, debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), and utilization rate-based turbo payment mechanisms--which may partially offset the impact of the flight cancellations and route suspensions caused by the pandemic--we believe that the severity of the stress could exceed the benefits provided by these structural mitigants.

We highlight what our methodology currently encompasses and the possible scenario analyses where its assumptions may come under stress below.

METHODOLGY AND POSSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS STRESS SCENARIO ANALYSIS

In general, our methodology focuses on the aspects described in table 1 below when we rate aircraft and aircraft engine ABS transactions. These may also be the factors that, if further stressed based on the current scenario, could lead to potential rating migration on the aircraft ABS liabilities, in our opinion.

Table 1

Aircraft ABS Rating Factors
Factor Analytical approach Impact
Servicer strength Assign a servicer score based on its experience and management of assets Future re-lease rates and sale values during our modeled recessions
Airline ratings Use S&P Global Ratings' issuer credit rating or estimate for the credit quality of unrated airlines Determines the probability of default for an aircraft portfolio
Default rates Assume a portion of the pool (65%-90% at 'A' level) to be defaulted during our modeled recessions Stresses lease revenues and creates liquidity risk for the ABS structure
Recession Assume one recession will occur in every seven- to 10-year commercial aviation industry cycle. Start recession from day one. Stresses lease revenues and also residual values if an aircraft is re-leased or sold during a recession
Depreciation Between 91% and 96% depreciation for newer-technology aircraft and between 88% and 93% depreciation for older-technology or out-of-production aircraft Future re-lease rates and residual values
Useful life Up to 25 years for passenger aircraft and 22 years for regional jets; and typically around 20-25 years for aircraft engines Aircraft or engine sale time and residual value
Aircraft/engine on ground (AOG) 6-11 months during recession (lower time at lower rating levels) and three months outside recession No cash flows from an aircraft or engine on ground creates liquidity risk for the ABS structure
Re-lease terms 36 months during recession and 60 months outside recession for aircraft; 36-60 months during recession and 36-84 months outside recession for engines based on their phases (shorter term as engine ages) Lease revenues
Lease rate decline Additional haircut to lease rates and residual value (40%-75% at 'A' level) during the modeled recessions Future lease revenues and residual value
ABS--Asset-backed securities.
Regional Exposure

Given the global outbreak of the coronavirus and the rate at which it is spreading, it seems somewhat outdated to quote statistics on the number of cases in any specific region. However, we believe it is helpful to provide the exposure to impacted areas based on a point in time in outstanding S&P Global Ratings-rated aircraft securitizations, as the timing and severity of the impact could come from regions hit earliest with the highest cases, so far.

We reviewed WHO data as of March 16, 2020, to determine the exposure to impacted areas in the outstanding S&P Global Ratings-rated aircraft securitizations issued between 2013 and 2019. We classified areas with over 200 cases as moderate-threat countries and areas over 1,000 cases as high-threat countries.

Table 2 summarizes the exposure of the current aircraft ABS portfolios rated by S&P Global Ratings since 2013 to the identified countries.

Table 2

Summary Of Exposure To Identified Countries
Moderate-threat countries High-threat countries Combined
No. of countries 14 13 27
No. of aircraft 97 176 273
No. of lessees 31 54 85
No. of transactions 22 23 23
Top aircraft type (no. of aircraft) A320-200 (29) B737-800 (63) N/A
No. of wide-bodies 17 19 36
Top lessee (by no. of aircraft) | ICR GOL Linhas Aereas S.A (13) | B/Watch Neg/-- American Airlines Inc (24) | BB-/Watch Neg/-- N/A
Top lessee domicile Brazil United States N/A
Exposure Range (%)(i)(ii) 0.89 - 60.43 1.89 - 55.64 33.15 - 85.87
(i)Means the lowest and highest exposure in the portfolios to lessees in these countries. (ii)Calculated based on the half-life values for each deal. ICR--Issuer credit rating. N/A--Not applicable.

Tables 3A and 3B list the identified countries and the number of aircraft currently on lease in each of those countries.

Table 3A

Moderate-Threat Countries
Countries identified as moderate threat No. of aircraft
Canada 20
Brazil 14
Malaysia 13
Qatar 10
Austria 7
Australia 6
Portugal 6
Singapore 5
Japan 4
Bahrain 3
Finland 3
Greece 3
Denmark 2
Israel 1
Total 97

Table 3B

High-Threat Countries
Countries identified as high threat No. of aircraft
United States 50
China 24
South Korea 22
Italy 18
Spain 14
United Kingdom 11
France 10
Netherlands 9
Belgium 7
Germany 5
Norway 2
Taiwan 3
Switzerland 1
Total 176

Appendix A and B break down the lessee exposure to each of these countries.

Assumptions In Our Methodology

Lease rates 

We know from some of our rated lessors, as well as servicers of S&P Global Ratings-rated aircraft lease transactions, that many lessees have requested rent deferrals. We believe that this could be a common occurrence that may impact a significant portion of the lease rentals of our rated transactions. While a lessor's decision to grant a deferral depends on a variety of factors, including the desire to maintain a long-term relationship with the airline operator, it also depends on the lessee's financial health. Should the travel restriction and the pandemic continue for an extended period of time, it is highly likely that many airlines will come under severe stress with limited cash resources and will request rent deferrals.

These additional rent deferrals, or just delinquencies, are expected to further curtail cash flows in addition to the increasing default likelihood of the lessees. We do not usually assume this additional cash flow stress when a lessee does not default under our assumptions.

Although the effect of COVID-19 has already surpassed the 2003 SARS outbreak, data from this event suggests that considerable time is needed for the industry to recover. Therefore, we believe future lease rates will also be depressed for an extended period of time. Under our rating methodology, once an aircraft lease expires or defaults, it is released after 6-10 months on the ground at a stressed lease rate. The stressed lease rate, which is based in part on the aircraft's depreciated value and its age, is then further reduced between 40% and 75% under our 'A' stress if the re-lease occurs during any of our three modelled recessions. Considering the uncertainty related to the end of the health emergency, travel restrictions, and the depth of the ensuing recession in this industry, it is entirely possible that the decline in re-lease rates and aircraft on-the-ground timing may be more strenuous then our current assumptions.

Aircraft type and age matter 

Government restrictions on international travel will put more pressure on the already challenged widebody aircraft market. As international travel is the most affected travel at this time, widebody aircraft are almost entirely grounded. Tables 4A and 4B shows the exposure to widebody aircraft in our rated transactions. Our assumptions include higher repossession, remarketing and refurbishment costs, and steeper depreciation rates for widebody aircraft. In addition, these aircraft are typically the first to default under our analysis as we assume aircraft with the highest value will default first. While in our assumptions we also bias defaults toward the widebody aircraft included in the pool, our cash flow analysis may have not contemplated the complete halt of cash flows from these types of aircraft for such an extended period and at all times.

Table 4A

Aircraft Type Distribution In Moderate-Threat Countries
Aircraft type Airframe type S&P depreciation factor (%) No. of aircraft in moderate-threat countries Wtd. avg. age as of Feb. 29, 2020 No. of transactions Exposure range (%)
A320-200 Narrowbody 93.00 29 10.14 11 3.15-29.15
B737-800 Narrowbody 94.00 25 8.30 13 2.81-21.15
B737-700 Narrowbody 93.00 11 13.88 6 1.40-9.9
A321-200 Narrowbody 92.50 9 9.98 6 2.48-10.77
A330-300 Widebody 92.00 8 8.86 5 6.57-17.64
A330-200 Widebody 92.00 4 14.49 2 11.28-18.32
CRJ700 Narrowbody 90.00 4 14.36 1 6.48
A350-900 Widebody 92.50 2 4.57 2 16.25-18.70
B787-9 Widebody 93.00 2 3.44 2 14.32-17.86
A319-100 Narrowbody 93.00 1 20.95 1 1.72
B737-300 Narrowbody 84.00 1 19.09 1 0.89
B777-300ER Widebody 92.50 1 11.86 1 12.35

Table 4B

Aircraft Type Distribution In High-Threat Countries
Aircraft type Airframe type S&P depreciation factor (%) No. of aircraft in high-threat countries Wtd. avg. age as of Feb. 29, 2020 No. of transactions Exposure range (%)
B737-800 Narrowbody 94.00 63 11.15 21 2.48-23.79
A320-200 Narrowbody 93.00 36 9.61 17 3.30-14.55
A319-100 Narrowbody 93.00 32 14.35 10 1.72-22.18
A321-200 Narrowbody 92.50 12 6.60 9 4.45-13.14
B737-700 Narrowbody 93.00 10 17.94 8 1.28-12.85
A330-200 Widebody 92.00 7 12.32 4 4.11-28.27
A330-300 Widebody 92.00 4 9.76 3 7.37-11.63
B777-300ER Widebody 92.50 3 7.26 3 14.6-15.53
B777-200ER Widebody 91.00 3 15.14 2 2.29-8.03
A321-100 Narrowbody 91.00 1 20.96 1 1.49
A321neo Narrowbody 94.50 1 2.87 1 9.64
A330-200F Widebody cargo 89.00 1 7.20 1 10.24
B747-400F Widebody cargo 90.00 1 17.78 1 5.16
B757-200 Narrowbody 89.00 1 21.20 1 1.65
E175 Narrowbody 92.00 1 8.35 1 1.90

Although older aircraft have reaped the benefits of relatively low fuel costs and a shortage in supply of aircraft due to the grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX, demand for these aircraft may be more vulnerable and less likely to rebound from the crisis. While our assumptions assume steeper lease rate declines on older aircraft, we believe that the utilization rate and, therefore, lease rates of older aircrafts will come under pressure even once the travel restrictions are lifted and the health threat from the virus has subsided.

Further, we believe that the ability to remarket the airplanes and the consequent on-the-ground time will be severely impaired and lengthened during this period. While our methodology assumes longer on-the-ground time during recessions, we believe that the impact of these travel restrictions could extend well beyond our assumptions in particular for widebody aircraft.

Servicer strength 

In our rating analysis, we place importance on the experience, prominence, and reputation of the servicer for the successful and active management of aircraft assets. Accordingly, we believe that during periods of stress in the industry such as this one, a strong servicer with longer track record and experience is more likely to be successful in negotiating lease terms with the airlines as well as remarketing and placing the aircraft during period of excess capacity. While our methodology adjusts certain assumptions such as lease rate decline based on the score we assign to each servicer, the possible unprecedented number of airline defaults in a compressed period of time would put smaller or less experienced servicers to the test and possibly increase their insolvency risk.

Recession timing and lessees' rating transitions 

In our analysis, we typically assume one recession will occur every seven-10 years. The first recession begins on day one of the transaction when the loan-to-value ratio of the liabilities is the highest. During each recession, the methodology includes stresses to the aircraft's values and lease rates. In addition, we assume lessee defaults and higher re-leasing and re-marketing costs. We believe that the assumption of starting the first recession immediately is consistent with the current industry environment. The steepness of the recession, however, does not contemplate the sudden collapse of air travel for an extended period of time; rather, the recession is assumed to be more gradual.

Ratings deterioration and potential defaults among airlines is highly likely at this time. Should the situation continue for an extended period of time, even some of the bigger airlines may not continue to operate without their respective governments' intervention. Our methodology assumes approximately 65%-75% of the lessees defaulting during the first downturn, which should capture this risk. In addition, we also factor in the potential for further ratings deterioration during the second and third recessions, adding an additional 10-15% on to our initial default rate. Therefore, default rates in the second and third downturns typically range from 75%-90% in our rating scenarios. While these default assumptions would seem very onerous in normal circumstances, the unprecedented travel restrictions and social distancing will make typical travel volumes highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that almost all the lessees in our rated transactions may be driven into default without government support.

Depreciation and sales values 

As travel has been severely curtailed across the globe, should the situation persist, we expect airlines to retire aircraft at a higher speed. We would expect that the excess capacity and increased retirement would severely and negatively affect the value of aircraft, in particular older aircraft, which we would also expect to be retired first. Currently, we assume that all aircraft will be sold at the end of their assumed useful life (usually 22-25 years for commercial aircraft) at their then depreciated value, with an additional haircut if the sale occurs during a recession. Our methodology currently does not include assumptions for retirements of aircraft in advance of their useful life, which would further decrease the amount of cash flow received by our rated transactions.

We will resolve today's CreditWatch negative placements following our completion of a comprehensive review of the transactions.

Appendix A

Lessees In Moderate-Threat Countries
Lessees Domicile Flag carrier No. of aircraft No. of transactions Exposure range (%)(i)
GOL Linhas Aereas S.A Brazil Yes 13 7 4.39-12.95
Qatar Airways Qatar Yes 10 4 15.14-20.15
Air Canada Canada Yes 9 6 3.44-17.86
Laudamotion GMBH Austria No 7 4 1.97-8.52
Malindo Air Malaysia No 6 4 4.31-11.08
WestJet Canada No 6 3 2.6-9.9
Air Asia Malaysia No 5 2 10.07-10.52
Air Transat Canada No 4 3 2.93-9.5
Finnair Finland Yes 3 3 2.48-6.57
TAP Air Portugal Portugal Yes 3 3 1.72-7.78
Gulf Air Bahrain Yes 3 2 4.04-12.85
Qantas Australia Yes 3 2 9.31-11.58
Virgin Australia Australia No 3 2 4.17-10.68
Aegean Airlines Greece No 2 2 3.17-3.25
Jet Time Denmark No 2 2 1.4-4.47
Scoot Singapore No 2 1 8.76
Singapore Airlines Singapore Yes 2 1 17.64
AirAsia X Berhad Malaysia No 1 1 9.79
Blue Bird Greece No 1 1 2.81
Canadian North Canada No 1 1 0.89
Euroatlantic Airways Portugal No 1 1 2.29
Hi Fly Portugal No 1 1 4.24
Israir Airlines Israel No 1 1 1.94
MAS Malaysia Yes 1 1 3.08
Peach Aviation Limited Japan No 1 1 4.10
SATA Portugal No 1 1 8.50
Skymark Airlines Inc. Japan No 1 1 3.41
Spring Japan Japan No 1 1 5.44
Star Flyer Inc. Japan No 1 1 4.54
TAM Linhas Aereas Brazil No 1 1 9.93
Tiger Airways Singapore No 1 1 3.15
(i)Means the lowest and the highest exposure of the lessee in any portfolio.

Appendix B

Lessees In High-Threat Countries
Lessees Domicile Flag carrier No. of aircraft No. of transactions Exposure range (%)(i)
American Airlines Inc. United States No 24 9 3.27-15.79
Asiana South Korea No 11 8 4.39-14.35
Alitalia Italy Yes 11 3 1.9-30.55
Vueling Airlines Spain No 8 6 4.63-9.55
Spirit Airlines United States No 8 5 4.49-9.24
Alaska Airlines United States No 6 4 4.17-10.65
Air France France Yes 5 4 1.72-14.6
Brussels Belgium Yes 5 4 1.89-3.95
Hainan Airlines China No 5 4 2.44-11.25
Jet2.com United Kingdom No 5 3 1.47-23.18
Transavia Netherlands No 5 3 1.82-9.08
Southwest Airlines United States No 4 4 2.19-5.75
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Netherlands Yes 4 3 4.64-15.53
Spring Airlines China No 4 3 4.85-7.01
Beijing Capital Airlines China No 4 2 10.9-11.99
United Airlines United States No 4 2 3.23-14.92
Korean Airlines South Korea Yes 3 3 1.49-4.58
Transavia France France No 3 3 2.82-7.62
Air China China Yes 3 2 2.3-6.05
Air Italy Italy No 3 2 3.08-3.46
easyJet Airline Company Limited United Kingdom No 3 2 4.26-5.92
Sun Country Airlines United States No 3 2 4.26-5.93
TUI Travel Aviation Finance Limited United Kingdom No 3 2 4.28-8.35
T'way South Korea No 3 2 2.44-15.26
Air Europa Spain No 2 2 5.39-10.65
Ernest Airlines Italy No 2 2 1.01-3.17
EVA Airways Corporation Taiwan No 2 2 5.3-15.18
Iberia Airlines Spain Yes 2 2 4.07-11.63
Iberia Express Spain Yes 2 2 1.54-3.44
Xiamen Airlines China No 2 2 4.4-4.42
Eastar Jet South Korea No 2 1 10.17
NEOS SpA Italy No 2 1 7.00
Norwegian Air Shuttle Norway No 2 1 12.63
Air Austral France No 1 1 3.37
British Airways United Kingdom Yes 1 1 4.48
Chair Airlines Germany No 1 1 2.76
China Airlines Taiwan Yes 1 1 4.75
China Eastern/ China United China No 1 1 5.09
China Southern China No 1 1 4.05
China United Airlines China No 1 1 3.24
Condor Germany No 1 1 4.45
Europe Airpost France No 1 1 1.28
Frontier United States No 1 1 5.88
Jeju Air South Korea No 1 1 3.90
Lufthansa Germany Yes 1 1 4.45
Qingdao Airlines China No 1 1 4.87
Shenzhen Airlines Company Limited China No 1 1 4.13
Sichuan Airlines China No 1 1 10.24
Sundair Germany No 1 1 1.37
Swiss International Air Lines Limited Switzerland Yes 1 1 1.49
Thai Eastarjet Co. Ltd South Korea No 1 1 5.07
TUIfly Germany No 1 1 3.52
Tway Airlines South Korea No 1 1 2.27
Virgin Atlantic United Kingdom No 1 1 3.41

Related Criteria

  • Criteria | Structured Finance | General: Incorporating Sovereign Risk In Rating Structured Finance Securities: Methodology And Assumptions, Jan. 30, 2019
  • Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Revised Cash Flow Assumptions And Stresses For Global Aircraft And Aircraft Engine Lease Securitizations, Aug. 26, 2010
  • Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: Rating Considerations For Lease Pools, Sept. 1, 2004
  • Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: Maintenance And Related Issues, Sept. 1, 2004
  • Criteria | Structured Finance | ABS: Aircraft Securitization Criteria: The Rating Process For Aircraft Portfolio Securitizations, Sept. 1, 2004

Related Research

  • COVID-19 Macroeconomic Update: The Global Recession Is Here And Now, March 17, 2020
  • A U.S. Recession Takes Hold As Fallout From The Coronavirus Spreads, March 17, 2020
  • COVID-19 Credit Update: The Sudden Economic Stop Will Bring Intense Credit Pressure, March 17, 2020
  • Coronavirus' Global Spread Poses More Serious Challenges For Airlines, March 12, 2020

In addition to the criteria specific to this type of security (listed above), the following criteria articles, which are generally applicable to all ratings, may have affected this rating action: "Counterparty Risk Framework: Methodology And Assumptions," March 8, 2019; "Post-Default Ratings Methodology: When Does Standard & Poor's Raise A Rating From 'D' Or 'SD'?," March 23, 2015; "Global Framework For Assessing Operational Risk In Structured Finance Transactions," Oct. 9, 2014; "Methodology: Timeliness of Payments: Grace Periods, Guarantees, And Use of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," Oct. 24, 2013; "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," Oct. 1, 2012; "Methodology: Credit Stability Criteria," May 3, 2010; and "Use of CreditWatch And Outlooks," Sept. 14, 2009.

Ratings List
Rating
Issuer Series Class To From

Aircraft Certificate Owner Trust 2003-A

2003-A E A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)

Aircraft Finance Trust

1999-1 A-1 CC (sf)/Watch Neg CC (sf)

Blackbird Capital Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited 2016-1

2016 AA AA (sf)/Watch Neg AA (sf)

Blackbird Capital Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited 2016-1

2016 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Blackbird Capital Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited 2016-1

2016 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.

2006-1 A-1 B- (sf)/Watch Neg B- (sf)

Blade Engine Securitization Ltd.

2006-1 A-2 B- (sf)/Watch Neg B- (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1

2016-1 A Loans A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1

2016-1 B Loans BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Securitization Trust 2016-1

2016-1 C Loans BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1

2017-1 A Loans A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1

2017-1 B Loans BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Castlelake Aircraft Structured Trust 2017-1

2017-1 C Loans BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

DCAL Aviation Finance Limited

2015 A-1 A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

DCAL Aviation Finance Limited

2015 B-1 BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

DCAL Aviation Finance Limited

2015 C-1 BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

ECAF I LTD.

2015-1 A-1 A- (sf)/Watch Neg A- (sf)

ECAF I LTD.

2015-1 A-2 A- (sf)/Watch Neg A- (sf)

ECAF I LTD.

2015-1 B-1 BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg BBB- (sf)

Falcon Aerospace Limited

A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Falcon Aerospace Limited

B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Falcon Aerospace Limited

C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

FAN Engine Securitization Ltd.

2013-1 A BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Harbour Aircraft Investments Limited

2017 A Loans A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Harbour Aircraft Investments Limited

2017 B Loans BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Harbour Aircraft Investments Limited

2017 C Loans B (sf)/Watch Neg B (sf)

JOL Air 2019-1

2019-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

JOL Air 2019-1

2019-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Limited

2017-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Limited

2017-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

KDAC Aviation Finance (Cayman) Limited

2017-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Labrador Aviation Finance Limited

2016 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Labrador Aviation Finance Limited

2016 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Lease Investment Flight Trust

2001-1 A-1 CC (sf)/Watch Neg CC (sf)

Lease Investment Flight Trust

2001-1 A-2 CC (sf)/Watch Neg CC (sf)

MAPS 2018-1 Ltd.

A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

MAPS 2018-1 Ltd.

B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

MAPS 2018-1 Ltd.

C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

MAPS 2019-1 Ltd

2019-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

MAPS 2019-1 Ltd

2019-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

MAPS 2019-1 Ltd

2019-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC

2016-1 A A- (sf)/Watch Neg A- (sf)

Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC

2016-1 B BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg BBB- (sf)

Merlin Aviation Holdings DAC

2016-1 C B+ (sf)/Watch Neg B+ (sf)

Raptor Aircraft Finance I Limited

A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Raptor Aircraft Finance I Limited

B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Raptor Aircraft Finance I Limited

C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

RASPRO Trust 2005

2005-1 B AA- (sf)/Watch Neg AA- (sf)

Rotor Engines Securitization Ltd.

2011-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Rotor Engines Securitization Ltd.

2011-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Shenton Aircraft Investment I Ltd

2015-1A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Shenton Aircraft Investment I Ltd

2015-1B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

S-JETS 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

S-JETS 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

S-JETS 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Sprite 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Sprite 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Sprite 2017-1 Limited

2017-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

START Ltd.

A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

START Ltd.

B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

START Ltd.

C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Tailwind 2019-1 Limited

2019 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Tailwind 2019-1 Limited

2019 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

Tailwind 2019-1 Limited

2019 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Thunderbolt Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited

A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Thunderbolt Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited

B BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg BBB- (sf)

Thunderbolt Aircraft Lease Securitization Limited

C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Turbine Engines Securitization Ltd.

2013-1 2013-1A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

Turbine Engines Securitization Ltd.

2013-1 2013-1B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

UCAT 2005-1

2005-1 A BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg BB+ (sf)

WAVE 2017-1 LLC

2017-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

WAVE 2017-1 LLC

2017-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

WAVE 2017-1 LLC

2017-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

WAVE 2019-1 LLC

2019-1 A A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)

WAVE 2019-1 LLC

2019-1 B BBB (sf)/Watch Neg BBB (sf)

WAVE 2019-1 LLC

2019-1 C BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)

Zephyrus Capital Aviation Partners 2018-1 Ltd

2018-1 A Loans A (sf)/Watch Neg A (sf)
Primary Credit Analysts:Belinda Ghetti, New York (1) 212-438-1595;
belinda.ghetti@spglobal.com
Deborah L Newman, New York (1) 212-438-4451;
deborah.newman@spglobal.com
Rajesh Subramanian, Centennial (1) 303-721-4241;
rajesh.subramanian@spglobal.com
Analytical Manager:Ildiko Szilank, New York (1) 212-438-2614;
ildiko.szilank@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Maxym Rumyantsev, New York + 1 (212) 438 0302;
maxym.rumyantsev@spglobal.com
Mita Singh, New York + 212-438-1679;
mita.singh@spglobal.com
Peter J Lorbiecki, Centennial (1) 303-721-4992;
peter.lorbiecki@spglobal.com

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