While S&P Global Ratings' outlooks on the majority of financial institutions in Asia-Pacific remain stable, the past quarter saw a number of developments and rating changes. Notably, we lowered our ratings on some banks in Japan, which has an ultracompetitive banking industry characterized by persistently low profitability. In Australia, meanwhile, we revised our outlooks on the major banks to stable from negative reflecting greater clarity on government policy affecting systemically important banks.
Economic Slowdown Continues
The Asia-Pacific region's economic slowdown continues to weigh on the ratings on nonfinancial corporates. While the transmission to the credit profiles of Asia-Pacific financial institutions is not yet significant or widespread, 2020 is shaping up to be a more challenging year for financial institutions. We expect regional GDP growth overall to continue slowing broadly in line with China's (see table 1).
Most Outlooks Remain Stable
As of Aug. 30, 2019, 79% of rating outlooks on Asia-Pacific financial institutions were stable, and our expectation is that stability at or about this level should persist into the first quarter of 2020. The regional trend of a greater number of positive outlooks (about 16%) compared to negative outlooks (about 5%) is mainly due to the effect of the positive outlook on the Japan sovereign rating on systemically important Japanese banks. But for this factor, the net positive bias regionally would be only about 1%, not 11%.
Japan Banking--High Competition, Wafer-Thin Interest Margins
While the outlook on the Japan sovereign remains positive, industry risks affecting banks in Japan are higher. The negative interest rate policy in Japan has bolstered current domestic economic growth but failed to lift bank profitability because there is a surplus of funds in the private sector. The negative interest rate environment and delayed restructuring by regional banks are likely to keep industrywide profitability low. In the past quarter, we lowered our issuer credit ratings on several Japanese banks (see table 3). At the same time, we affirmed our issuer credit ratings on some other Japanese banks; despite weaker stand-alone creditworthiness affecting these banks, we believe that likely support from a parent or government affords some ratings headroom.
Major Australian Bank Outlooks Revised To Stable
A further factor influencing the regional ratings outlook was our revision of the outlooks on the Australian major banks last quarter to stable from negative (see table 3). This rating action was based on greater policy clarity regarding government support following the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority's announcement that it is proceeding with its plan to strengthen Australian banks' loss-absorbing capacity. Increased loss-absorbing capacity could lessen the need for the Australian government to provide financial assistance to banks in a stress scenario. At the same time, we believe that the plan to strengthen loss-absorbing capacity does not introduce any policy or process impediments to the government bailing out a systemically important bank, in the unlikely event extraordinary government support was required.
China's Biggest Banks Remain Resilient
Notwithstanding trade tensions, China's biggest banks remain resilient. Credit divergence is continuing, however, between China's biggest banks, and some small and midsize banks where problems are surfacing. Highlighting this was the Chinese government's takeover of Baoshang Bank in May 2019, and a coordinated effort to bolster the troubled Bank of Jinzhou in July. Our expectation is that more difficulties will surface over the next year, and that some problem banks will exit the market.
Banking Industry Developments Are Otherwise Mixed
Aside from Japan and Australia, rating developments were broadly stable although some banking systems are facing idiosyncratic challenges that could ultimately negatively impact financial institutions' credit quality.
Hong Kong banks to date have withstood the impact from protests in the Hong Kong special administrative region, which have exacerbated the economic drag of U.S.-China trade tensions and slowing growth in China. We retain our view that the Hong Kong banks' overall creditworthiness will continue to benefit from either Hong Kong government support (depending on their systemic importance) or parent group support.
Indian banks' asset quality and growth is likely to remain under stress, given fragile financial markets, rising risk aversion, and weakness in some highly leveraged corporate sectors. The resolution of legacy weak assets is key to banks' recovery. The finance companies' growth and earnings will remain under pressure amid tight liquidity and high borrowing costs.
Meanwhile in New Zealand, we believe that the economic risks facing New Zealand banks have reduced as growth in average residential property prices across the country has slowed over the past two years, following a period of substantial growth in private debt and property prices. The slower house price growth has moderately reduced the likelihood of a severe house price correction and with it, the potential losses that banks in New Zealand may face in such a scenario.
Meanwhile in the emerging market of Mongolia, we have revised our industry risk trend to stable from positive. This mainly reflects our view that lower profitability could amplify competitive behavior among Mongolian banks.
Fintech Takes Further Shape
While financial technology (fintech) continues to evolve across Asia-Pacific's banking sectors, developments to date have not influenced competitive dynamics to the extent that have caused rating changes. In Taiwan, the local regulator recently issued three banking licenses for virtual (online only) banks to operate in Taiwan's competitive banking market. Meanwhile, Hong Kong is making slow progress on open banking more than a year after the Hong Kong Monetary Authority announced an initiative to develop an open application programming interface.
|Real GDP Scenarios|
|*For India, 2018 = FY2018-19, 2019 = FY 2019-20, 2020 = FY 2020-21, 2021 = FY 2021-22. §Asia Pac: Australia, Japan, and emerging markets Asia. †EM Asia: emerging markets Asia = China, India, NIEs, and ASEAN. ‡NIE: Newly industrialized economies = Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan; ‡‡ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.|
Key Banking Sector Risks
The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about key risks and risk trends for banking sectors in Asia-Pacific countries where we rate banks. For more detailed information, please refer to the latest Banking Industry Country Risks Assessment (BICRA) on a given country. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').
Banking Sector Research
- India's Cooperative Bank Troubles Reflect Governance Deficit, Oct. 7, 2019
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: China, Oct. 4, 2019
- The Spike In U.S. Repo Rates Reflects Technical Factors, A Smaller Fed Balance Sheet, And Tighter Bank Regulation, Oct. 4, 2019
- The Future Of Banking: One Year On, Hong Kong's Open Banking Initiative Hits A Roadblock, Oct. 3, 2019
- Trade Tensions Rumble Through Asia-Pacific's Credit System, Report Says, Sept. 30, 2019
- Bail-In Debt Remodels The Risk Profile Of Bank Funding In Europe And North America, Sept. 26, 2019
- Credit FAQ: How To Say Goodbye To LIBOR Without Creating Market Chaos, Sept. 23, 2019
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: September 2019, Sept. 21, 2019
- Global Nonbank Lenders Continue To Face Stiff Competition, But Less Stringent Oversight Than Banks, Sept. 11, 2019
- Australian Property Seminar: Signs Of Life In A Slowing Economy, Sept. 11, 2019
- Climate Change: Can Banks Weather The Effects? Sept. 9, 2019
- New Zealand Financial Institution Ratings Unchanged Despite Moderating Economic Risks, Sept. 6, 2019
- Bank Of Jinzhou’s Cancelled Preferred-Share Dividend A Wake-Up Call To Investors, Sept. 5, 2019
- Hong Kong Bank Ratings To Stay Resilient Despite Volatile Operating Environment, Sept. 5, 2019
- Malaysian Banking Outlook: Lenders Drifting Into Digital Banking Era, Sept. 2, 2019
- China Credit Spotlight: The Coming Exit Of Struggling Banks, Aug. 28, 2019
- Credit FAQ: What's Hurting Indian Banks' Recovery, Aug. 27, 2019
- China Credit Spotlight: The Ties That Bind Banks And Insurers, Aug. 20, 2019
- Credit FAQ: How The Regulator's Classification Of Systemically Important Banks Affects Our Taiwan Bank Ratings, Aug. 6, 2019
- Various Rating Actions Taken On Japanese Banks On Increasing Industry Risk, Aug. 2, 2019
- Banking Risk Indicators: July 2019 Update, Aug. 1, 2019
- The Future Of Banking: Virtual And Vital--Online-Only Banks Aim To Transform Taiwan Banking, Aug. 1, 2019
- China Plays It Safe In Handling Troubled Bank Of Jinzhou, July 30, 2019
- Industry Report Card: Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks: The Long Credit Cycle Lumbers On, July 25, 2019
- China's Updated Workout Regime Takes Aim At The Chronically Insolvent, July 22, 2019
- The Resolution Story For Europe's Banks: Life In The Halfway House, July 18, 2019
- The Future Of Banking: Virtual Banks Chase The Dream In Asia-Pacific, July 17, 2019
- Global Banks Midyear 2019 Outlook: Low For Longer And Digital Prompt Further Rethink, July 11, 2019
- Major Australian Bank Outlooks Revised To Stable, Macquarie Bank To Positive, After Policy Clarity On Government Support, July 9, 2019
- India's Budget Attempts To Address The Trust Deficit In The Financial Sector, July 5, 2019
- Will China's Credit Card Boom Follow The Well-Worn Path To Bust? July 4, 2019
- Singapore Follows A Measured Approach To Virtual Banking, July 3, 2019
Economic, Sovereign, And Other Research
- Next Debt Crisis: Earnings Recession Threat, Oct. 1, 2019
- Economic Research: Asia-Pacific Quarterly: Confidence Is Shaken But Policy Is Stirred, Oct. 1, 2019
- Credit FAQ: No Winners In Korea-Japan Trade Spat But Korea Has More To Lose, Sept. 18, 2019
- The Role Of Environmental, Social, And Governance Credit Factors In Our Ratings Analysis, Sept. 12, 2019
- China's Growth To Average 4.6% Over The Next Decade, Aug. 29, 2019
- Economic Research: China Credit Spotlight: The Great Game And An Inescapable Slowdown, Aug. 29, 2019
- Global Trade At A Crossroads: Prospects For U.S.-China Deal Fade, Aug. 26, 2019
- Economic Research: China's Renminbi Moves Beyond 7, Aug. 7, 2019
Rating Methodology News
- Request For Comment: Alternative Investment Funds Ratings Methodology, Sept. 3, 2019
- Hybrid Issue Ratings Placed Under Criteria Observation Following Criteria Update, July 3, 2019
- Corporate, Financial Institution, And Insurance Ratings Placed Under Criteria Observation On Criteria Update, July 2, 2019
- General Criteria: Group Rating Methodology, July 1, 2019
- RFC Process Summary: Hybrid Capital: Methodology And Assumptions , July 1, 2019
- General Criteria: Hybrid Capital: Methodology And Assumptions , July 1, 2019
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- Webcast Replay: Will China's Credit Card Boom Follow The Well-Worn Path To Bust, Sept. 12, 2019
- Webcast Replay: Malaysian Banking Sector Update, Aug. 14, 2019
- Webcast Replay: Asia Pacific Mid-Year Banking Outlook 2019, Aug. 7, 2019
- Webcast Replay: Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update On Japan, Aug. 6, 2019
- Webcast Replay: What's Behind The Revision Of Major Australian Bank Outlooks To Stable, Macquarie Bank To Positive, July 10, 2019
Over the past quarter, we made the following changes to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs):
We have revised our economic risk score for New Zealand to '4' from '5'. We believe that the economic risks facing New Zealand banks have reduced as growth in average residential property prices across the country has slowed over the past two years, following a period of substantial growth in private debt and property prices. In our view, the slower house price growth has moderately reduced the likelihood of a severe house price correction and with it, the potential losses that banks in New Zealand may face in such a scenario. Nevertheless, New Zealand's economic imbalances remain somewhat elevated because of the country's persistent current account deficits, high external debt, and an economy that is exposed to fluctuations in commodity prices. With the aforementioned change, we have also revised our economic risk trend for New Zealand to stable from positive.
We have revised our BICRA on Japan to group '3' from group '2', and our industry risk score to '4' from '3'. We view the industry risk faced by Japanese banks as relatively higher than that faced by certain international peers because of Japan's relatively fragmented market and its low profitability, which we believe reflects increased stability risk for its banking system. The negative interest rate policy seems to have bolstered current domestic economic growth but failed to lift bank profitability because there is a surplus of funds in the private sector. The negative interest rate environment and delayed restructuring by regional banks are likely to keep industrywide profitability flat, in our opinion. With the aforementioned changes to the BICRA and industry risk score, we have also revised our industry risk trend for Japan to stable from negative.
We have revised our industry risk trend for Mongolia to stable from positive. This reflects our view that lower profitability could amplify competitive behavior among Mongolian banks, offsetting the positive developments on governance and transparency. Mongolian banks' profitability will remain under pressure at least over the next couple of years, driven by increased competition and more stringent asset quality recognition and credit provision reporting. We could see sporadic lending growth in certain targeted sectors such as unsecured consumer lending and narrowing margins as banks compete for business. If such competitive tactics are left unchecked, banks may not be able to build sufficient buffers to weather future downturns.
|Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks|
|Institution||Opco L-T ICR/outlook||Anchor||Business position||Capital and earnings||Risk position||Funding and liquidity||SACP or Group SACP||Type of support||No. of notches of support||Additional factor adjustment|
|Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||3||0|
|Commonwealth Bank of Australia||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||3||0|
|Macquarie Bank Ltd.||A/Positive||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|National Australia Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||3||0|
|Westpac Banking Corp.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||3||0|
|Agricultural Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb-||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||GRE||1||0|
|Bank of Communications Co. Ltd.||A-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb-||GRE||3||0|
|China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||Group||4||0|
|China Construction Bank Corp.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Moderate||Strong||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Moderate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bb||GRE||2||0|
|Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Very Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||GRE||2||0|
|Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bb+||Strong||Moderate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb||GRE||3||0|
|Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd.||BBB/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Weak||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb||GRE||3||0|
|Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd.||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a+||Sys. Imp.||1||(1)|
|Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd.||A+/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|The Bank of East Asia Ltd.||A-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a+||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Axis Bank Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bbb-||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb-||None||0||0|
|Bank of India||BB+/Stable||bbb-||Strong||Moderate||Weak||Avg/Strong||bb||GRE||1||0|
|HDFC Bank Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bbb-||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||None||0||(2)|
|ICICI Bank Ltd.||BBB-/Stable||bbb-||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb-||None||0||0|
|State Bank of India||BBB-/Stable||bbb-||Strong||Moderate||Moderate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|PT Bank Mandiri (Persero)||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.||BBB-/Stable||bb+||Strong||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||None||0||0|
|Chiba Bank Ltd.||A/Negative||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Strong||Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||1|
|Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.*||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Mizuho Financial Group Inc.*||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Nomura Holdings Inc.*||A-/Stable||bbb+||Moderate||Strong||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Norinchukin Bank||A/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Moderate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Resona Bank Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Moderate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Shinkin Central Bank||A/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Shizuoka Bank Ltd.||A/Negative||bbb+||Adequate||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||1|
|Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.*||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||0|
|Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings*||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Industrial Bank of Korea||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Adequate||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||GRE||4||0|
|KEB Hana Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Kookmin Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Korea Development Bank§||AA/Stable||bbb+||Moderate||Moderate||Weak||Below Avg/Adequate||bb-||GRE||10||0|
|Nonghyup Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Above Avg/Adequate||bbb+||GRE||3||0|
|Shinhan Bank||A+/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Woori Bank||A/Positive||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Moderate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Public Bank Bhd.||A-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Strong||Above Avg/Strong||a||None||0||(1)|
|Malayan Banking Bhd.||A-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|CIMB Bank Bhd.||A-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a-||None||0||0|
|ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|ASB Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|Bank of New Zealand||AA-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bbb+||Group||4||0|
|Westpac New Zealand Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Group||3||0|
|DBS Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|United Overseas Bank Ltd.||AA-/Stable||bbb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||a||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|CTBC Bank Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Strong||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.||A/Stable||bbb||Strong||Strong||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||a-||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Above Avg/Strong||bbb||Sys. Imp.||1||0|
|KASIKORNBANK PCL||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB/Stable||bb+||Adequate||Moderate||Adequate||Avg/Adequate||bb+||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd.||BBB+/Stable||bb+||Strong||Adequate||Adequate||Avg/Strong||bbb-||Sys. Imp.||2||0|
|Data as of September 20, 2019. Type of Support column -'None' includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. §This ICR applies to the Foreign Currency Rating only.|
|Recent Rating Actions: Asia-Pacific Banks|
|Release Date||Org Legal Name||Org Country||From||To|
|September 11, 2019||Syndicate Bank||India||BB+/Stable/B||BB+/Positive/B|
|September 11, 2019||Indian Bank||India||BBB-/Stable/A-3||BBB-/Negative/A-3|
|August 27, 2019||IDBI Bank Ltd.||India||BB/Stable/B||BB/WatchNeg/B|
|August 27, 2019||AMP Bank Ltd.||Australia||A-/WatchNeg/A-2||BBB+/Negative/A-2|
|August 7, 2019||Standard Chartered Bank (Taiwan) Ltd.||Taiwan||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/WatchPos/A-2|
|August 7, 2019||Standard Chartered Bank Korea Ltd.||Korea, Republic of||A-/Stable/A-2||A-/WatchPos/A-2|
|August 7, 2019||Standard Chartered Bank (China) Ltd.||China||A/Stable/A-1||A+/Stable/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Nomura Holdings Inc.||Japan||A-/Negative/A-2||BBB+/Stable/A-2|
|August 1, 2019||Nomura Trust & Banking Co. Ltd.||Japan||A/Negative/A-1||A-/Stable/A-2|
|August 1, 2019||Shizuoka Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Chiba Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Bank of Kyoto Ltd.||Japan||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Iyo Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Hachijuni Bank Ltd.||Japan||A/Stable/A-1||A/Negative/A-1|
|August 1, 2019||Japan Post Bank Co., Ltd.||Japan||A+/Negative/A-1||A/Stable/A-1|
|July 29, 2019||Australian Unity Bank Ltd.||Australia||BBB/Stable/A-2||BBB+/Stable/A-2|
|July 9, 2019||Commonwealth Bank of Australia||Australia||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||ASB Bank Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||ASB Finance Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||CBA Funding (NZ) Ltd.||Australia||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||National Australia Bank Ltd.||Australia||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||Bank of New Zealand||New Zealand||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||Macquarie Bank Ltd.||Australia||A/Developing/A-1||A/Positive/A-1|
|July 9, 2019||Macquarie International Finance Ltd.||Australia||A-/Developing/A-2||A-/Positive/A-2|
|July 9, 2019||Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.||Australia||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||Westpac Banking Corp.||Australia||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||Westpac New Zealand Ltd.||New Zealand||AA-/Negative/A-1+||AA-/Stable/A-1+|
|July 9, 2019||Australia and New Zealand Bank (China) Co. Ltd.||China||A+/Negative/A-1||A+/Stable/A-1|
|*Recent rating actions are for the period July 1, 2019 to September 20, 2019. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list.|
This report does not constitute a rating action.
S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).
|Primary Credit Analyst:||Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2092;|
|Secondary Contacts:||Vera Chaplin, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2058;|
|Ryoji Yoshizawa, Tokyo (81) 3-4550-8453;|
|Harry Hu, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3571;|
|Geeta Chugh, Mumbai (91) 22-3342-1910;|
|Ivan Tan, Singapore (65) 6239-6335;|
|Sharad Jain, Melbourne (61) 3-9631-2077;|
|Nico N DeLange, Sydney (61) 2-9255-9887;|
|Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3508 ;|
|HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2533 3597;|
|Eunice Fan, Taipei (8862) 8722-5818;|
|Research Assistant:||Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai|
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