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COMMENTS

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Plurinational State of Bolivia


Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Plurinational State of Bolivia

BICRA Group8
Government SupportSupportive

Major Factors

Rationale

S&P Global Ratings classifies the banking sector of Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (BB-/Stable/B) in group '8' under its Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA). Other countries in group '8' include Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, and Paraguay.

Chart 1

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Our bank criteria use our BICRA economic risk and industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit rating. The anchor for banks operating only in Bolivia is 'bb-'.

In our view, Bolivia continues facing relatively high economic risks mainly due to its vulnerable economic structure and still low GDP per capita. Despite relatively stable macroeconomic conditions, Bolivia remains susceptible to fluctuations in commodities prices, especially natural gas, while its economic performance heavily depends on high levels of public-sector expenditures. We don't perceive significant sources of economic imbalances such as credit-fueled asset-prices bubbles because housing prices seem to be stable. Moreover, although credit has grown rapidly in recent years as result of government's measures to expand banking services and promote social and economic development in the country, we believe banks have been able to manage credit expansion, as seen in stable credit losses. In addition, we expect credit growth to slow down in the next few years because, as of December 2018, all banks complied with government requirements for loans compositions. However, we consider low income still limits debt capacity, which increases credit risk among financial institutions. In addition, stiff lending competition in the sectors, which the government aims to develop, led to aggressive lending and underwriting standards. This also raises lending concentration in vulnerable sectors and single-name exposures, although asset quality metrics have remained stable and better than those of regional peers.

We still believe the Bolivia's financial industry faces high risks. We view the institutional framework as weak because governing public institutions are still developing and susceptible to political influence. In this sense, the central bank and the financial regulatory body directly report to the Ministry of Economy, limiting independence and autonomy of these entities. In addition, Bolivia's regulatory framework still lags far behind international standards. On the other hand, the 2013 financial law gives the government powers to set interest rates and direct lending to specific sectors (60% of credit portfolios directed to productive sectors and low-income housing), which has been distorting competitive dynamics, in our view. Given these policies, we have seen changes in competition and pricing dynamics in the system, which pressures the financial institutions' profitability. We believe Bolivia's financial institutions benefit from a stable base of funding and that the government has a track record of providing guarantees and liquidity during periods of market fluctuations through various monetary tools. However, lack of a developed capital market limits the availability of alternative funding sources.

Economic And Industry Risk Trends

We consider the trend of Bolivia's economic risk is stable. We expect healthy economy growth to continue thanks to stable macroeconomic conditions, public-sector investments, and favorable commodity prices. However, low GDP per capita will remain the main limiting factor. We expect Bolivia's real GDP to grow 4.2% in 2019 (6.7% in per capita terms). On the other hand, after aggressive credit growth during 2013-2018 stemming from regulatory requirements on lending quotas, growth started to slow down during 2019, and we expect the credit-to-GDP growth to continue decelerating in 2020 and 2021. Credit risks will remain unchanged due to the borrowers' limited debt capacity, credit concentration in vulnerable sectors, and aggressive lending and underwriting standards.

We believe the trend of the industry risk is stable. Government-directed lending pressures the industry's competitive dynamics because of stiff competition to comply with the government requirements, and due to the system's risk appetite to maintain adequate profitability metrics in a regulated business environment. Since December 2018, banks are complying with credit quotas and interest rates set by regulation. However, we believe the industry will continue facing market distortions as result of government-directed lending, which our current competitive dynamics evaluation reflects. On the other hand, we don't foresee significant changes in the regulatory framework or in the system-wide funding during the next year.

Economic Risk  |  8

We base our economic risk score for Bolivia on our assessment of economic resilience, economic imbalances, and credit risk in the economy. The country's economy continues growing thanks to ambitious investment projects, low inflation, and favorable oil and gas prices. Nevertheless, low GDP per capita limits economic development and the private sector's debt capacity. The industry has been able to successfully manage rapid credit growth, as its historical stable profitability metrics demonstrate. However, aggressive underwriting standards, and weak payment culture and rule of law increase credit risks, in our view.

Economic resilience: Investment projects, low inflation, and favorable oil and gas prices support growth prospects

Economic structure and stability.  We anticipate Bolivian GDP to grow around 4.1% during 2019-2022 (2.4% in per capita terms), after growing 4.3% in 2018. Economic performance has been, and we expect it to continue to be, underpinned by high levels of public-sector investments in strategic sectors of the economy. The natural gas sector is and will likely remain an important driver for the Bolivian economy. Recently, Bolivia and Argentina renegotiated their long-term gas supply contract. We expect that by 2019 Bolivia and Brazil will also renegotiate their gas contract (which expires in 2020).

Economic growth is also driven by developments in mining and agriculture. Commodity exports account for more than 80% of total exports, while natural gas is about one-third of all exports. Low inflation, aided by a stable exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar, and sustained investment should also support growth in the next couple of years. We estimate GDP per capita to average $4,100 in 2019-2022.

Macroeconomic policy flexibility.  General government results should gradually improve in 2019-2022 but remain in deficits of around 2.9% of GDP, reflecting relatively higher hydrocarbon prices and the gradual conclusion of large public investments that make up the government's economic development strategy. We expect the government to fund this deficit using a mix of resources, including drawing upon its ample fiscal reserves and other domestic sources and local debt issuances. As a result, we expect net general government debt would increase by an annual average of 3.3% of GDP during 2019-2022. We project net general government debt could approach 24% of GDP in 2019, and average 26% of GDP in 2020-2022.

Inflation is likely to be 4% in 2019, just slightly above what it was in 2018, and hover around 4.5% over the coming three years. Inflation will be anchored by Bolivia's stable exchange rate; however, we believe that it remains vulnerable to supply shocks. Bolivia's stable exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar since 2011 has anchored inflation expectations and contributed to significantly lower dollarization in the country, which reached its lowest level as of April 2019. However, steps toward greater exchange-rate flexibility would contain external vulnerabilities given persistent current account deficits (CADs) and the expected drop in foreign-exchange reserves.

Political risk.  More than a decade of sustained economic growth and declining poverty continues to underpin the government's popular support. President Evo Morales, from the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) political party, will run for a fourth term this October. In our opinion, Bolivia still shows an evolving institutional capacity to design and implement policies and key projects. Moreover, decision-making is highly centralized, and checks and balances are still developing. As evidence, Bolivia ranks low in corruption governance indicators and ease of doing business indices in surveys performed by recognized international institutions such as Transparency International and the World Bank.

Table 1

Economic Resilience
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Nominal GDP (bil. $) 33.00 33.00 33.94 37.51 40.29 43.66 47.45
Per capita GDP ($) 3,124 3,077 3,117 3,392 3,588 3,829 4,098
Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 4.9 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.0
Inflation (CPI) rate (%) 5.8 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.3 4.0 4.5
Net general government debt as % of GDP 8.3 13.9 16.4 20.6 24.8 26.9 27.3
F--forecast.
Economic imbalances: Manageable credit growth

Our economic imbalances assessment includes factors such as potential credit-fueled asset price bubbles and current account imbalances, which could affect financial institutions. We believe Bolivia's economy is in an expansionary phase with no threat of asset price bubbles. Domestic macroeconomic conditions and the government's efforts to increase banking services to the population and to promote social and economic development have boosted rapid credit growth in the past five years. However, credit growth slowed down in 2018, and we expect it to remain stable at 10% over the next years. Moreover, inflation will remain low and stable during 2019 and 2021.

Private sector credit growth.  After a period of rapid credit growth in recent years, expansion pace stabilized at 12% in 2018. All domestic banks are now in compliance with regulatory requirements for the loan portfolio composition. Therefore, we expect loan growth to moderate to 10% per year (on nominal basis) in 2019 and 2020. Private credit as percentage of GDP surged to 61.3% in 2018 from 37.8% in 2012, and we believe this ratio will continue rising at one percentage point per year.

The 2013 financial law requires banks to comply with earmarked lending composition (oriented towards "productive" economic sectors and "social" mortgage lending) with interest-rate caps. Moreover, the number of borrowers increased by 24% in the past five years as result of the government's efforts to increase access to banking services.

Real estate prices.  Bolivia lacks an official residential price index. Therefore, we base our real-estate prices assessment on indicators such as inflation-adjusted residential construction costs, which dropped in the last few years. As a result, we don't perceive significant risks of an asset price bubble, given mild oscillations, pointing to a soft correction in this market. We'll closely monitor real estate prices because mortgages account for 24.6% of total loans, a higher share than those of other Latin American banking industries. Low-income housing loans account for 14.4% of total loans, and the remaining portion--10.2%--relates to traditional mortgages with real guarantees.

Equity prices.  The equity market in Bolivia is underdeveloped and currently has very few participants. Banks have a limited exposure to equity markets, for example, we estimate banks' market cap to GDP is less than 6%. Moreover, market capitalization data suggest that annual change of inflation-adjusted equity prices have remained at 12% in the past two years.

Current account and external debt position.  Still relatively high oil prices, which are linked via a formula to Bolivia's natural gas prices, along with lower levels of imports due to declining levels of capital spending, will help to narrow CADs to an average of 3% of GDP in 2019-2022. Prolonged CADs have gradually eroded the country's external position. The combination of relatively low oil prices for natural gas and minerals, along with strong imports related to the public sector's expenditure program, resulted in an average CAD of 5.4% of GDP in 2015-2018.

We expect Bolivia's gross external financing needs to rise to an average of 84% of current account receipts (CARs) and usable foreign exchange reserves in 2019-2022. We project that Bolivia's narrow net external profile will move to a debtor position of 6.4% of CARs on average in 2019-2022 from a creditor position of 7.5% in 2018.

Table 2

Economic Imbalances
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Annual change in claims of resident depository institutions in the resident nongovernment sector in % points of GDP 2.7 8.2 6.8 0.4 2.2 (0.2) (0.3)
Annual change in key index for national residential house prices (real) (%) (1.9) (3.7) (1.2) (4.2) (2.7) (3.5) (4.0)
Annual change in commercial real estate price index (real) (%) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (4.2) (2.7) (3.8) (4.0)
Current account balance/GDP 1.7 (5.9) (5.7) (5.0) (4.9) (5.0) (3.3)
Net external debt/GDP (%) (44.5) (35.7) (20.8) (12.2) (7.7) (3.9) (3.3)
F--forecast.
Credit risk in the economy: Still low income limits debt capacity; lending concentration in cyclical or vulnerable sectors remains, but asset quality is high

Private-sector debt capacity and leverage.  Although Bolivia has made remarkable improvements in social indicators and infrastructure in recent years, large informal workforce and low GDP per capita still limit private-sector debt capacity, which remains below those of larger Latin American countries. We estimate GDP per capita to average $4,000 in 2019-2021. We don't foresee significant commodity price volatility in the near future that could dent household and enterprise income. On the other hand, private-sector leverage increased rapidly over the past years mainly because of the government initiatives to promote access to banking services. As a result, credit as percentage of GDP soared more than 20 percentage points in the past five years to 61.3% in 2018. Bolivia's stable economic performance should continue supporting credit expansion, but we expect slower growth than in recent years. Therefore, the credit-to-GDP ratio will rise to about 64% by 2021 under our base-case scenario. Like most of its regional peers, Bolivia's economy still struggles with structural limitations that constrain growth in income levels to support debt capacity.

Lending and underwriting standards.  We believe Bolivia's lending and underwriting standards have been aggressive in the past few years to accommodate regulatory requirements on lending quotas. The increasing volume of lending to cyclical sectors, coupled with concentrations in certain sectors and higher average tickets to meet the lending targets, raises risks in the system, in our view. Loans to cyclical or vulnerable sectors such as manufacturing, construction, and agriculture, represent 44% of the system's portfolio as of December 2018. Microlending makes up 30% of the portfolio, followed by corporate loans (21%), mortgages (26%), small- and medium-size enterprise (SME) loans (13%), and consumer loans (10%). Due to the government's policies, mortgage growth spiked, as seen in an annual increase of 37% in mortgages for low-income borrowers. We estimate that the system's mortgage portfolio has an average loan-to-value ratio of 75%-80%.

Asset quality metrics have remained high and stable despite rapid credit growth and risky portfolio composition. The nonperforming loans (NPLs) ratio has remained consistently below 2% since 2011, and we expect it to remain about 2.0% in 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, the considerable reduction in the country's foreign-currency exposure has reduced credit risks. Dollar-denominated lending has plunged to below 2% of total lending as of the end 2018 from 93% in 2005.

Payment culture and rule of law.  We continue to assess Bolivia's payment culture and rule of law as very weak, which pose additional potential credit risks to the economy. We base our opinion on the World Bank's governance indicators for "rule of law" and "control of corruption", which are rated on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. It ranked Bolivia at -1.2 and -0.7, respectively, in 2017 (the most recent public report). Moreover, we still perceive weaknesses stem from unpredictability of the legal framework and ineffective judicial system.

Table 3

Credit Risk In The Economy
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Claims of resident depository institutions in the resident nongovernment sector as a % of GDP 44.7 52.9 59.7 60.1 62.2 62.0 61.8
Household debt as % of GDP 14.1 16.7 19.8 20.7 21.5 21.8 22.1
Household net debt as % of GDP 14.1 16.7 19.8 20.7 21.5 21.8 22.1
Corporate debt as % of GDP 28.6 33.4 37.8 38.0 39.4 40.0 40.5
Foreign currency lending as a % of total domestic loans 7.7 4.7 3.2 2.2 1.6 1.1 0.7
Domestic nonperforming assets as a % of systemwide domestic loans (year-end) 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9
F--forecast.

Base-Case Credit Losses

We expect the NPL ratio in the next 12-18 months to be about 2% based on the following assumptions:

  • Bolivia's real GDP growth of 4.2% in 2019 and 4.0% in 2020;
  • Slowing nominal loan growth to about 10% for both years; and
  • Stable unemployment rate of 4%, and inflation of 4.0% in 2019 and 4.5% in 2020.

Industry Risk  |  7

The key factors that support our industry risk score for Bolivia are the regulation framework lagging international standards, authorities' track record of reactive measures to manage turmoil in the financial sector, and the aggressive competition in the banking industry. On the positive side, the industry benefits from stable sources of funding, while the government has demonstrated liquidity support in times of distress.

Institutional framework: Progress on regulation in past years, but still lags international standards

Banking regulation and supervision.  We continue to assess Bolivia's banking regulation and supervision as weak. The industry still lags international standards, and we don't expect the regulator nor any lender to implement Basel III capital requirements in the short term. Regulatory capital framework doesn't fully address certain risks, for example, there are no capital requirements for operational risks, although the regulator is working on this matter to strength its capital framework as it did in past years by introducing enhanced approaches to estimate liquidity and credit risk requirements. Moreover, the governmental and regulatory efforts to reduce the system's exposure to foreign-exchange risk have been constantly paying off in recent years. We believe the Autoridad de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (ASFI), the financial institutions regulatory body, promotes the stability of the financial system through examinations, periodic reporting, legal and policy framework reviews, and license management. It monitors the liquidity coverage and stable funding ratios, although it hasn't set minimum levels for banks. Finally, we still believe the regulator doesn't have full autonomy from the government, given that the former reports to the Ministry of Economy and Public Finances. We believe these regulatory weaknesses increase the system's vulnerability in scenarios of distress.

Regulatory track record.  The regulator's track record reflects a more reactive than proactive response in times of turmoil. Furthermore, banking regulatory goals are currently oriented not only to ensure the financial system's stability but also to promote the government's social and development policies. For instance, the regulator imposed higher taxes on foreign-exchange activities to reduce dollarization in the system, while the financial services law introduced interest-rate caps and lending quotas on specific types of loans, which have squeezed net interest margins (NIMs) and the system's profitability. In our view, these factors could limit banks' ability to withstand economic downturns and may hinder ASFI's capacity to address problems and implement corrective actions.

Governance and transparency.  In our view, the Bolivian banking system's governance and transparency remain at least adequate, based on the timeliness and transparency of reporting and the implementation of the corporate governance model for financial institutions. Banks are required to report financial statements according to GAAP standards and prudential indicators to ASFI on a frequent basis. Also, the regulator monitors banks' liquidity levels on a daily basis. The regulator also discloses detailed information of the financial system on a monthly basis. Moreover, the central bank's financial stability report provides a detailed evaluation of the country's financial industry.

Competitive dynamics: Regulatory requirements continue pressuring risk appetite and industry stability

Risk appetite.  We assess Bolivia's banking industry risk appetite as moderate based on still relatively high profitability metrics, with return on equity (ROE) at around 12.1%. Despite the decreasing profitability in recent years, ROE still remains higher than the average of non-financial companies at 3.2% as of December 2018. Average ROE among domestic banks has consistently dropped in recent years--to 12.1% in 2018 from 17.7% in 2014--primarily due to the implementation of government initiatives to expand banking services in the country and promote development on productive economic sectors, which tightened competition and pressured the banks' NIMs. We expect ROE to stabilize at 10%-11% in the next two years.

Although credit grew rapidly--at an average of 18% per year-- during the past five years, the industry was able to maintain NPLs at below 2%. On the other hand, financial institutions don't offer complex products, only simple credit and traditional financial operations with no subprime mortgages or securitizations. Nevertheless, a large presence of microfinance lenders in the market pushes up risk for their portfolios, given the volatile financial conditions of micro lenders.

Industry stability.  We assess the competitive environment in the Bolivia financial industry as unstable, based on high competition stemming from requirements for lending quotas. Moreover, narrow profits, especially among small players, could trigger consolidation in the industry in the next few years. The Bolivian banking system consists of 17 players: 15 private commercial lenders and two public entities. There are also some nonbank financial institutions, including credit unions, entities financing housing, and development financial institutions, but these entities together represent only 8.2% of the system's loans and are regulated. The top three banks account for roughly 34% of the loans.

Market distortions.  We believe the financial services law, which established lending quotas aimed at productive economic sectors and minimum interest rates, introduces market distortions. In addition, government-owned banks--Banco Unión S.A. (BB-/Stable/B) and Banco de Desarrollo Productivo S.A.M.--which account for about 12% of total loans, could bring further distortion because of an inherent likelihood of political influence in the public banks' operations. However, public banks are currently not generating further market distortion, in our view. Banco Union is the third- and second-largest bank in terms of loans and deposits, respectively, with market shares of 10.9% and 12.5% as of the end of 2018. The bank provides a wide range of banking products, including deposit accounts, corporate, mortgage, small- and mid-size enterprise (SME), and consumer lending, along with microfinancing. The bank also operates some government-related businesses, including tax collection and management of public trusts and fiscal accounts. On the other hand, Banco de Desarrollo Productivo is a small lender focused on the development of the agricultural, livestock, manufacturing, fish farming, and timber and non-timber forest sectors.

Table 4

Competitive Dynamics
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Return on equity (ROE) of domestic banks 17.7 15.1 15.3 14.5 12.1 11.0 10.0
Systemwide return on average assets (%) 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
Market share of largest three banks (%) 32.2 31.7 32.4 34.3 34.6 34.0 34.0
Market share of government-owned and not-for-profit banks (%) 9.6 9.4 9.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 10.0
Annual growth rate of domestic assets of resident financial institutions (%) 17.4 19.5 7.8 12.0 7.4 10.0 10.0
Systemwide funding: Funding consists of a large core customer deposit base; but domestic capital markets are still narrow and shallow

Core customer deposits.  Bolivia's banking system has a wide core customer deposit base, which funds 70.3% of total loans as of December 2018, which helps stabilize the system-wide funding base. The large base of deposits reflects customer confidence in the system, but also the absence of suitable alternative investment products. The system's funding structure is mainly composed of deposits that represent 89% of liabilities and 9% of interbank loans, while bond issuances only represent 2.7% of the funding base. As loan growth has expanded rapidly in recent years, core customer deposits to loans ratio dropped to 70.3% in 2018 from 85.8% in 2015. However, the ratio would stabilize at about 68% in the next two years because we expect loans disbursements to slow down.

Deposits have proven to be unstable during past episodes of speculation about currency and commodity price volatility. However, the system and authorities have made considerable progresses in recent years in reducing the share of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities, which would help mitigate run on deposits risks.

External funding.  The banking system holds a net creditor external position. Bolivian banks generally don't access cross-border funding. The banking sector's gross debt to system-wide domestic loans continues to decline over time, which was 1.9% as of December 2018.

Domestic debt-capital markets.  We still view Bolivia's domestic debt capital market as narrow and shallow, given that private-sector debt issuances represent only slightly less than 5% of the country's GDP. We believe domestic capital market is still underdeveloped and private issuances will still remain limited in the near future.

Government role.  In our view, Bolivia's government has an effective track record of providing guarantees and liquidity during periods of market fluctuations. The central bank offers credit facilities to banks and deposit insurance to the public. The government responded to liquidity needs during 2017 and it has provided such support during volatile conditions through repurchase agreements, credit lines with guarantees from the fund of required liquid assets (the RAL fund), early redemption of callable bonds, and reserve requirements.

Table 5

System-Wide Funding
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F
Systemwide domestic core customer deposits by formula as a % of systemwide domestic loans 86.0 85.8 74.2 71.2 70.3 69.6 69.0
Net banking sector external debt as a % of systemwide domestic loans (16.1) (16.8) (15.4) (14.1) (14.0) (13.8) (13.5)
Systemwide domestic loans as a % of systemwide domestic assets 62.5 61.4 67.3 67.7 70.7 70.7 70.7
Outstanding of bonds and CP issued domestically by the resident private sector as a % of GDP 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.3
Total consolidated assets of FIs as a % of GDP 68.3 81.6 85.6 86.7 86.7 88.0 89.1
Total domestic assets of FIs as a % of GDP 68.3 81.6 85.6 86.7 86.7 88.0 89.1
F--forecast.

Peer BICRA Scores

Like its peers, Bolivia has a weak resilience due to a highly concentrated economy and low GDP per capita. Bolivia and its peers don't face serious economic imbalances such as credit-fueled asset-price bubbles or current account imbalances, but they're exposed to credit risk because of very low GPD per capita, relaxed or aggressive lending underwriting standards, and weak payment culture and rule of law. Bolivia and its peers have weak institutional frameworks, with a poor track record of anticipating bank failures and implementing proactive regulatory measures. Regarding competitive dynamics, peers have overall moderate risk appetite in unstable industries. Most of peers have a stable deposit base, although their limited access to external funding and their narrow and shallow debt capital markets limit their system-wide funding scores.

Table 6

Peer BICRA Scores
Argentina Bolivia El Salvador Honduras Jamaica Paraguay
BICRA group 8 8 8 8 8 8
Economic risk score 9 8 9 8 8 8
Industry risk score 7 7 7 7 8 8
Country classification of government support Uncertain Supportive Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain
Source: S&P Global Ratings

Government Support

We evaluate the Bolivian government's support toward the banking system as supportive, reflecting its track record during the last banking crisis in 1994 and the deposit run in 2010. The central bank created a rescue fund (the Financial Restructuring Fund) in 2004, which the 2013 financial services law replaced with the saving protection fund (Fondo de Protección al Ahorrista). The funds consist of mandatory contributions from all licensed financial institutions, while the central bank--as a lender of last resort (LOLR)--can provide additional funding.

Table 7

Five Largest Banks In Bolivia
As Of The End Of 2018
Assets (mil. $)*

Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A.

5,212

Banco Union S.A.

4,403

Banco Nacional de Bolivia S.A.

3,853

Banco Bisa S.A.

3,116
Banco de Crédito de Bolivia 2,970
*Source: ASFI.

Related Criteria And Research

Related Criteria
  • S&P To Publish Economic And Industry Risk Trends For Banks, March 12, 2013
  • Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update, July 30, 2019

Sovereign Rating Methodology, Dec. 23, 2014

  • Analytical Linkages Between Sovereign And Bank Ratings, Dec. 6, 2011
  • Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
  • Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
Related Research
  • Summary: Bolivia, May 22, 2019

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analyst:Camilo Andres Perez, Mexico City + 52 55 5081 4446;
camilo.perez@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Sergio A Garibian, Sao Paulo (55) 11-3039-9749;
sergio.garibian@spglobal.com
Sovereign Analyst:Carolina Caballero, Buenos Aires (54) 114-891-2118;
carolina.caballero@spglobal.com

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