Turkey

Elif Beyza Cakir / CERA / Analyst
Joanna Neoob / CERA / Analyst
Alija Bajramovic / CERA / Principal Analyst

December 31, 2025

Executive summary

- Turkey's annual domestic gas demand is around 50 Bcm, with imports meeting the majority of this need, as domestic production accounts for only 4% of demand. Its proximity to major gas producers such as Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran facilitates pipeline imports that cover the bulk of the supply. LNG also plays a crucial role and is supported by ample regasification capacity, with five regasification terminals in operation — three operated by state-owned BOTAŞ and two by private firms, EgeGaz and Etki Liman.
- Since a peak in 2021, reliance on Russian supplies has decreased as Turkey seeks to diversify its sources. In line with this strategy, Turkey signed a landmark supply deal with Turkmenistan in Q1 2025 to import up to 2 Bcm/a through a swap agreement. Meanwhile, BOTAŞ has extended its legacy contract with Russia for around 22 Bcm/a by a single year amid negotiations aimed at a lengthier renewal. Negotiations with Iran continue ahead of the July 2026 contract expiration.
- LNG has been used for supply flexibility during pipeline disruptions and periods of peak seasonal demand. However, Turkey has invested in import infrastructure to enhance its role as a key transit hub for Europe, with LNG additions helping its goals of reducing dependence on pipeline imports. Throughout 2024 and 2025, multiple LNG contracts were signed as part of this dual strategy, with approximately 5.4 MMtpa in firm SPAs signed in 2024 and an additional 8.5 MMtpa in 2025. After annual contract volumes reached a ten-year low of 3.7 MMtpa via a single Sonatrach contract in 2024, Turkey’s portfolio of SPAs will exceed 10 MMtpa each year from 2026 through 2036.
  - In 2024, gas re-exports from Turkey (not including dedicated Russian volumes crossing Turkish territory via the TurkStream pipeline) reached a record high of 1.7 Bcm, doubling from 2023.
  - The expiration of Russia’s transit agreement with Ukraine at end-2024 has shifted some European demand to Turkish infrastructure. Slovakia began receiving Russian gas rerouted via TurkStream in February 2025.
  - BOTAŞ aims to establish itself as a key gas re-exporter to Europe, while managing its relationships with Russia and the European Union. However, concerns about the potential entry of banned Russian gas into Europe pose significant challenges to this objective. Moreover, pipeline capacity constraints at the Turkey-Bulgaria border will restrict re-exports to 3–4 Bcm/a in the near term. Additionally, existing pipeline contracts with destination clauses further limit export potential.
- Gas demand in Turkey is highly seasonal and is expected to rise as the economy grows. Historically, the power sector was the largest gas consumer. However, since the 2020s, residential-commercial and industrial sectors have grown more rapidly. Gas-fired generation is anticipated to decline with the first unit of the 4.8-GW Akkuyu nuclear plant expected to become operational by mid-2026, and long-term growth will be further limited by the expansion of renewables.
- Although gas production has historically been below 1 Bcm/a, the Sakarya gas field discovered in the Black Sea in 2020 promises to transform Turkey’s supply landscape. Phase 1 of the field’s development reached around 3.5 Bcm in mid-2025, with the Osman Gazi FPSO expected to double production to ~7.3 Bcm by mid-2026. Production is expected to reach ~14.6 Bcm/a by 2028, meeting Turkey’s household gas demand.

LNG supply-demand gap

Turkey: Contracted LNG supply by source country vs. LNG demand (MMtpa)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Only showing firm contracts.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

- Turkey accelerated LNG procurement in late 2025, with BOTAŞ signing 12 new contracts totalling around 8.5 MMtpa. Many of the deals are relatively short-term in nature, but major signings include a 2.9 MMtpa, 20-year SPA with Mercuria starting in 2026 and a nine-year, 0.5 MMtpa SPA with Woodside beginning in 2030. In 2024, the company also secured 5.4 MMtpa through firm agreements with ExxonMobil and Shell.
  - The market is expected to be largely covered by long-term contracts in the decade beginning in 2026, after years of heavy reliance on spot purchases to meet LNG demand.
- LNG has transitioned from a backup source to a crucial element of diversification strategies due to geopolitical tensions, price volatility, and supply disruptions from pipeline suppliers. Long-term contracts were established with Algeria and Nigeria, followed by short-term agreements with Qatar and TotalEnergies. Oman's 10-year SPA (1 MMtpa) began in 2025, while the Algeria contract was extended until 2027. The newly signed contracts with portfolio majors reflect a shift towards greater destination flexibility and supplier diversification compared to previous take-or-pay obligations.
- We forecast LNG demand to nearly double to 19 MMtpa by 2050, driven by pipeline contract losses and growing export needs for neighboring markets. While renewables and nuclear power are expected to temporarily moderate gas consumption by 2030, growth thereafter is driven by re-export activity. Turkey is leveraging its geographic advantage and diverse LNG portfolio to supply gas to EU markets.

Recent market developments

- Turkey is intensifying its efforts to become a regional gas hub through aggressive LNG procurement. In December 2025, BOTAŞ signed 10-year contracts with SEFE (0.44 MMtpa) and ENI (0.4 MMtpa) for winter supply. In September 2025, multiple agreements were concluded during Gastech Milan: a 20-year contract with Mercuria starting in 2026 (2.9 MMtpa), a preliminary agreement with Woodside Energy later converted to an SPA in December (0.5 MMtpa), and multiple short-term deals with bp, Shell, ENI, Cheniere, SEFE, Hartree, JERA, and Equinor. In December 2025, BOTAŞ added two 10-year deals starting in 2028 for 0.4 MMtpa each with Eni and SEFE. These built on 2024 contracts with ExxonMobil and Shell totaling 5.4 MMtpa and a TotalEnergies 1.1 MMtpa HOA. Turkey's annual firm long-term LNG commitments will now exceed 10 MMtpa from 2026-36, peaking at 13.8 MMtpa in 2027, representing a significant increase from around 5 MMtpa in 2025. This expansion aims to reduce import dependency while enhancing re-export capabilities.
- Turkey is also actively involved in efforts to enhance pipeline gas trade.
  - In December 2025, BOTAŞ secured a one-year extension of Russian pipeline contracts covering 21.75 Bcm through 2026 via Blue Stream and TurkStream. The short-term nature reflects Turkey's strategy to maintain supply flexibility while building alternative sources, particularly as its LNG portfolio expands, and hints at continued negotiation ahead. Meanwhile, negotiations with Iran are ongoing ahead of the July 2026 expiration of the 10 Bcm/a Tabriz-Ankara pipeline contract. Iranian officials have expressed confidence in renewal, though historical challenges remain around supply reliability during peak winter demand and payment complexities linked to US sanctions.
  - Turkey has expressed strong willingness to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, emphasizing that it has already completed the key infrastructure needed to double gas flows to Europe. However, Turkish officials have stressed that further expansion hinges on firm, long-term purchase commitments from European buyers. The TANAP (16 Bcm/a) pipeline is expandable to 31 Bcm/a and TAP (10 Bcm/a) can be doubled. However, the TAP consortium has agreed to expand capacity to 11.2 Bcm/a by January 2026.
  - A Turkmenistan swap arrangement via Iran delivered around 0.5 Bcm between March and June 2025 before suspension due to payment issues. Turkey is actively seeking to revive the deal.
  - Following the expiration of Gazprom's Ukraine transit agreement at end-2024, Slovakia began receiving Russian gas rerouted via TurkStream in February 2025, and BOTAŞ is in discussions to expand this supply arrangement as a strategic alternative to the disrupted transit route. Turkey also signed supply agreements with Moldova (~1 Bcm/a from October 2023) and Bulgaria (1.5 Bcm/a from January 2023), though the Bulgaria contract faces economic viability issues.
  - Bulgaria and Turkey agreed in April 2025 to explore doubling border capacity from 3.5 to ~7 Bcm/a through infrastructure upgrades.
- In April 2025, the Sakarya gas field reached 3.5 Bcm/a in production capacity, completing its first phase of development. Further growth is anticipated with the commissioning of Turkey’s first floating production, storage and offloading vessel (FPSO) Osman Gazi, which arrived at Filyos Port in May 2025 and is scheduled to begin operations in 2026. According to the energy ministry, this deployment will increase annual output to 7.3 Bcm/a, with further expansion planned by 2028 through a second FPSO (Phase 3 contracts worth over $2.5 billion were awarded in September 2025 to Saipem and Subsea7, with arrival targeted by end-2027).

Gas supply

Turkey: Gas supply (Bcm)



Data compiled June 24, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; EPDK.

Turkey: Gas supply (Bcm)



Data compiled Nov. 27, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; EPDK.

- In 9M 2025, domestic gas consumption rose by 17% YOY. Although pipeline imports grew 14% YOY overall, this masked diverging trends among suppliers: Russian and Iranian supplies increased 16% YOY to capture market share, but Azerbaijani flows barely expanded (4% YOY) as Shah Deniz volumes were prioritized for European contracts and new Syrian export commitments. To bridge the widening gap between increasing demand and constrained pipeline growth, Turkey turned increasingly to LNG markets. The supply mix also welcomed a new entrant in April when Turkmenistan began swap deliveries, accounting for about 8% of total imports and providing additional diversification, although these were interrupted by the end of Q2 amid Iran sanctions-related payment issues.
- In 2024, total imports rose by around 5 Bcm, driven mainly by stronger pipeline deliveries, particularly from Russia and Azerbaijan. Although LNG volumes declined that year, domestic production exceeded 2 Bcm due to growing output from the Sakarya field.
- Turkey relies on pipelines for 70-80% of its gas imports, with Russia as the main supplier. However, rising LNG imports have reduced Russia's contribution in the supply mix to 30-40% since start of the decade, down from 50-60% (2015-19). Turkey's gas mix is also highly sensitive to oil prices due to its oil-linked pipeline contracts, with pipeline imports increasing when oil prices are low.
- Since 2019, the share of LNG imports has averaged more than 25% of Turkey's gas imports due to increased supply diversification and flexibility needs. However, in the past couple of years, the high price environment coupled with a lack of seasonal uptick and weak economic conditions have hindered annual growth. In the long term, the share of LNG is expected to remain consistently above 30% due to limited growth in pipeline supplies.

Pipeline supply

- In mid-February 2025, Turkey and Turkmenistan state companies (BOTAŞ and Turkmengaz) signed a swap agreement for up to 2 Bcm annually. In 2025, total flows reached 0.5 Bcm between March and June before being suspended in June 2025 due to payment issues linked to US sanctions on Iran-related transactions. President Erdogan visited Ashgabat in December 2025 seeking to revive the arrangement, with Turkmengaz indicating readiness to resume once obstacles are cleared.
- BOTAŞ's flurry of LNG contract signings aimed to strengthen its negotiating position ahead of the expiration of 32 Bcm/a of gas supply contracts with Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC). In December 2025, BOTAŞ secured a one-year extension with Gazprom covering 21.75 Bcm through 2026 via Blue Stream (16 Bcm/a) and TurkStream (5.75 Bcm/a), maintaining supply flexibility rather than committing to a long-term deal. Negotiations with Iran continue ahead of the July 2026 contract expiration, with NIGC officials expressing confidence in renewal. The rise in gas re-exports to Europe, on the back of supply agreements with neighboring markets, underscores the critical role of pipeline supplies in Turkey's gas market.
- Turkey and Russia started their gas cooperation with a major contract in 1997, delivering 16 Bcm/a via Blue Stream pipeline which commenced in 2003. Despite geopolitical tensions and pricing disputes, the energy partnership remains strong due to economic interdependence. The TurkStream pipeline began delivering about 8 Bcm/a of gas starting 2020. In January 2022, the legacy contract was extended to 2025, with BOTAŞ increasing its delivery volume from 4 Bcm/a to roughly 6 Bcm/a. Additionally, the contract for 6 Bcm/a with private companies was extended until 2043.
  - In 9M 2025, Russian gas imports (15.4 Bcm) were notably higher by 16% YOY. Russia remained the country's largest single source of gas imports in 2025.
- Turkey's gas relationship with Iran, initiated by a 1996 contract for 9.6 Bcm/a, has encountered several challenges. Contractual deliveries, originally set for an earlier date, began in 2001. BOTAŞ has frequently requested price reductions and the removal of the "take or pay" clause, leading to two arbitration cases. Gas supplies have been inconsistent, especially during winter months, due to Iran prioritizing its domestic needs, as seen in the winter of 2022. Additional disruptions have stemmed from militant attacks on pipeline infrastructure and US sanctions. The 30-year agreement is set to expire in July 2026.
  - In 9M 2025, Turkey's imports from Iran rose (5.3 Bcm) by nearly 16% YOY as Iran increased export allocations to generate foreign currency revenue.
- Turkey began importing 6.6 Bcm/a of gas from Azerbaijan in 2007 via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline under a 15-year contract. In 2018, BOTAŞ secured an agreement for 6 Bcm/a from Shah Deniz Phase II, valid until 2033. The gas is transported to the Georgia-Turkey border through the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and enters the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). The 6.6 Bcm/a contract expired in April 2021 and was replaced by a 3-year contract for 3.5 Bcm/a, which was extended until 2030 in June 2024.
  - In 9M 2025, Turkey's imports from Azerbaijan reached 8.5 Bcm, almost flat YOY with a slight 4% increase.

Gas infrastructure

- Turkey imports gas from: Russia (Turkstream and Blue Stream pipelines), Iran (Tabriz-Ankara pipeline) and Azerbaijan (Trans-Anatolian pipeline) and exports via Southern Gas Corridor to Greece, and Balkan Stream to Bulgaria.
  - The 16 Bcm/a TANAP is a key part of Southern Gas Corridor delivering Azerbaijani gas to Turkish and European markets. Expansion to 31 Bcm/a is under study, pending firm European demand commitments.
  - TurkStream runs from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea. It has two axes, each capable of transporting around 16 Bcm/a. The first line delivers gas directly to Turkey, while the second line supplies to Europe through Bulgaria and Serbia.
  - Blue Stream connects Russia directly to Turkey beneath the Black Sea to the northern Turkish city of Samsun. It primarily serves the domestic market.
- Turkey's five regasification terminals now provide 161 MMcm/d capacity. Onshore terminals, such as Marmara Ereğlisi near Istanbul and Izmit, and Aliağa in Izmir, are close to Turkey's major population centers and industrial zones. The Marmara terminal is also connected to a storage facility. The Dörtyol FSRU terminal caters to the southern region, distant from northern pipeline infrastructure. The Saros FSRU terminal on the Aegean coast caters to demand and facilitates supply to nearby European markets.
- Turkey relies on two major underground natural gas facilities: the Silivri facility and the Tuz Gölü facility, both owned and operated by BOTAŞ.
  - Located near Istanbul, the Silivri facility has a capacity of 4.6 Bcm. Plans are underway to expand capacity to between 5.6 and 6 Bcm (2027-2028).
  - Tuz Gölü (Central Anatolia) has a storage capacity of 1.2 Bcm in its operational artificial salt caverns. An expansion aims to increase this capacity to around 6 Bcm by adding caverns, with completion expected by 2028.

Turkey: LNG and gas infrastructure



Data compiled April 23, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights upstream E&P/midstream content (EDIN): 250805-01.

Gas prices: LNG and domestic

- Turkey continues to subsidize domestic natural gas consumption. However, these subsidies are putting pressure on the country's currency reserves. To address this, the government, through BOTAŞ, is moving toward targeted subsidies. This approach aims to shift more of the fiscal burden to non-residential consumers while keeping prices relatively lower for households.
  - Since the summer of 2018, domestic LNG and gas prices have been adjusted repeatedly as BOTAŞ has navigated the plunge in the lira's value.
  - After July 2025, BOTAŞ maintained stable pricing through December 2025, with industrial gas at 15.00 TRY/m³, while residential gas and domestic LNG remained aligned at 10.40 TRY/m³

Turkey: Gas prices (nominal $/MMBtu)



Data compiled Dec. 11, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; BOTAŞ.

- BOTAŞ has frequently revised industrial gas prices before July 2025 increase, with a notable hike of 20% month-over-month occurring in April 2025, which raised the price to 13.84 TRY/m³ from 11.38 TRY/m³. Adjustments to regulated prices for power plants have followed a similar pattern.
  - Industrial prices surged to a record peak of 15.83 TRY/m3 between September 2022 and January 2023. However, to ensure the global competitiveness of Turkey's energy-intensive exports, BOTAŞ subsequently reduced industrial prices three times from February to September 2023.
  - In dollar terms, prices have been declining since reaching record highs in the winter of 2022/2023. In 2025, residential and industrial prices have averaged $6.82/MMBtu and $9.45/MMBtu, respectively, reflecting decreases of 35% and 60% from their September 2022 levels
- Average domestic LNG prices in Turkish lira, which had been declining year-over-year since 2022, stabilized in 2025 with a slight 2% YOY increase.
- The Turkish lira has been on a persistent depreciation trend since 2018 due to structural imbalances and external financing pressures, reaching around 42 TRY/USD in December 2025. This helped reduce domestic gas prices in dollar terms from record-high levels. For domestic LNG prices in dollar terms, formula-based pricing allowed prices to exceed $38/MMBtu in October 2022 before falling. In 2025, domestic LNG prices have averaged $8.22/MMBtu, down 14% YOY.

LNG imports

Turkey: LNG imports by source (MMt)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.

Source: S&P Global Energy.

- In 11M 2025, Turkey imported 9.8 MMt of LNG, up 38% YOY, driven by higher gas demand in the residential and power sectors. The surge in residential demand was primarily influenced by colder-than-average winter temperatures, while power sector consumption rose to compensate for low hydropower output. Supportive gas tariff policies further encouraged gas-fired generation over alternative fuels. As of late December 2025, Turkey has imported more than 2.4 MMt in the month, breaking a monthly record for imports.
  - In 2025, the US solidified its position as Turkey's dominant LNG supplier, accounting for about 50% of total imports (5.2 MMt), almost doubling YOY. This marks a continuation of the US's growing market share since 2019. The US overtook Algeria in 2022 and has maintained its leading position, driven by flexible cargoes and Turkey's diversification strategy ahead of pipeline contract renewals with Russia and Iran.
  - Algeria, historically Turkey's largest LNG supplier due to long-term agreements with Sonatrach, supplied 2.9 MMt in 11M 2025, or 30% of imports, down 23% YOY.
  - Turkey expanded its supply source mix from five countries in 11M 2024 to eleven in 11M 2025. In addition to the US and Algeria, Nigerian LNG delivered 0.5 MMt (5% of imports). Turkey did not import Russian LNG in 11M 2025, compared to 0.6 MMt in 11M 2024, as Turkey diversified its LNG portfolio away from Russian sources while maintaining pipeline gas imports via TurkStream and Blue Stream. Other LNG suppliers included Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad, Cameroon, Mauritania-Senegal, Mozambique, Oman, and Brazil.
- Turkey ranked as the fifth-largest LNG importer in Europe in 11M 2025, accounting for almost 10% of the region's LNG import volume, thereby intensifying competition with the rest of the Mediterranean and Northwestern Europe for available supply from the Atlantic Basin.

Regasification terminals

Marmara Ereglisi: Monthly LNG imports and capacity (thousand tons)

Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

Aliaga: Monthly LNG imports and capacity (thousand tons)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

- **Marmara Ereğlisi**: The BOTAŞ operated onshore terminal in western Turkey has an import capacity of around 10 MMtpa. It began operations in 1994, and an expansion completed in 2018 increased its capacity from the initial 5 MMtpa. The terminal has a regasification capacity of 37 MMcm/d and features three storage tanks, each with a capacity of 85,000 m³. Jetty upgrades in 2017 allow accommodation of Q-Flex and Q-Max vessels. Traditionally, the terminal handled long-term deliveries under a contract with Algeria's Sonatrach and is the only Turkish terminal with re-export capabilities. In the first 11 months of 2025, terminal utilization increased to 43%, up from 30% in 11M 2024. Notably, in 11M 2025, total deliveries rose by 41% YOY to 3.9 MMt, 40% of Turkey's total imports.
- **Aliağa**: Egegaz owns and operates the largest onshore terminal in western Turkey, with an import capacity of about 11 MMtpa. The terminal began operations in December 2006 and has undergone several expansions, increasing its capacity from the original 4 MMtpa. It features regasification capacity of 40 MMcm/d and includes two storage tanks, each with a capacity of 140,000 m³. US deliveries totaled 65% of the terminal's receipts in 11M 2025. In 11M 2025, utilization increased to 20% from 19% YOY and Aliağa accounted for around 20% of Turkey's total imports. Since 2022, no LNG imports have been recorded for the month of April.

Regasification terminals (continued)

Etki: Monthly LNG imports and capacity (thousand tons)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

Dortyol: Monthly LNG imports and capacity (thousand tons)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

- **Etki**: The FSRU-based facility located near the onshore Aliağa terminal in western Turkey has an import capacity of almost 6 MMtpa and began operations in January 2017, just six months after the declaration of FID. Initially served by ENGIE's *Neptune* FSRU, it was replaced by 170,000 m³ *Turquoise P* in July 2019. The terminal, owned by Etki Liman IDIT, has a regasification capacity of 21 MMcm/d and can accommodate Q-flex vessels. Most LNG deliveries to this terminal come from Algeria based on offtake agreements between Sonatrach and BOTAŞ. In the first 11 months of 2025, imports rose 50% to 1.5 MMt, with the United States (0.6 MMt) and Algeria (0.5 MMt) the leading sources. Terminal utilization rose to 31% from 20% during the same period in 2024.
- **Dörtyol:** The FSRU terminal, located in Hatay province near the town of Dörtyol on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, has an import capacity of nearly 8 MMtpa. Operational since February 2018, the terminal hosted the MOL-chartered Challenger for the initial 4.1 MMtpa project, with the first cargo arriving in October 2018. Initially, it was used sparingly until the winter of 2019-20 when it was heavily utilized during a period of record-high imports for Turkey. In April 2021, BOTAŞ received the FSRU *Ertuğrul Gazi* from Hyundai Heavy Industries, with a storage capacity of 170,000 m³ and a regasification capacity of 28 MMcm/d. The terminal began operations with the FSRU in June 2021. The utilization rate averaged 25% (up from 14% in 11M 2024) as LNG deliveries increased by 79% YOY to 1.7 MMt to meet peak demand in 11M 2025.

Regasification terminals (continued)

- **Saros**: In early 2023, BOTAŞ launched an FSRU terminal in the Gulf of Saros, with a capacity of around 5.4 MMtpa. It is designed to meet the gas demand of the Marmara region, particularly during the peak winter months, and facilitate cross-border trade with nearby markets through its connection to the TANAP-TAP gas infrastructure. The vessel *Saros* (formerly *Vasant 1*) has a sustained regasification capacity of 21 MMcm/d with short-term peak capacity of 28 MMcm/d.
- Since start-up, monthly utilization has been limited. However, in December 2024, it reached over 70% utilization rate for the first time. This trend continued into 11M 2025, when imports increased 52% YOY to 11 cargoes.

Saros: Monthly LNG imports and capacity (thousand tons)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

- The terminal's utilization is driven by the energy needs of the Marmara region, including Istanbul. However, a lack of an uptick in domestic consumption in 2024 limited its usage during the year. The infrastructure sharing agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria was intended to enhance Saros utilization. However, the contract is under negotiation as critics argue that Bulgargaz is paying more for unused capacity under existing terms. Meanwhile, Bulgargaz maintains capacity rights at Greek terminals and continues to import gas from there.
- India’s Swan Energy originally agreed to lease the vessel to BOTAŞ on a one-year rental at the reported rate of $250,000 per day, with an extension possible based on mutual agreement. The Vasant 1 was originally built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in 2020 for the offshore terminal of Jafrabad in Gujarat, India. In August 2024, it was reported that Swan Energy intended to sell a stake in an FSRU, believed to be the Vasant 1, to BOTAŞ for $399 million.
- Peak winter demand in the country increased the utilization rate to about 21% in 7M 2025, up from 15% in 7M 2024. However, no imports were recorded after the month of April 2025, highlighting the terminal’s use to help meet peak demand during the winter months.
- In 11M 2025, the Saros terminal contributed only about 7% of Turkey’s total LNG import volumes, making it the smallest contributor among the country’s LNG import terminals. Its capacity was 14% utilized over the period, up from 9M 2024, with large gaps in use in the summer months of both years.

Regasification terminal forecast

Capacity build by project (MMtpa)



Data compiled Dec. 17, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

- Turkey has invested in LNG infrastructure to diversify its gas supply and manage peak demand, with two onshore and three offshore terminals operational. The existing capacity from five terminals (39 MMtpa) exceeds its domestic gas demand (equivalent of 37 MMtpa). FSRUs along the West Coast (Etki), Southern Coast (Dörtyol) and Northwestern Coast (Saros) provide direct access to global LNG supplies from the Mediterranean and Atlantic. These terminals not only cater to major demand centers within Turkey but also facilitate access to neighboring European markets.
- Since 2017, Turkey has increased LNG's share to around 30% or more to take advantage of low spot prices and counter fluctuating pipeline supplies. Three FSRU terminals were also added between 2017-23.
- S&P Global expects no additional regasification projects in the near term, owing to large gas discoveries in the Black Sea and the government's effort to boost its renewable and nuclear power fleet targeting 30% of energy demand by 2030. BOTAŞ is promoting bunkering operations and small-scale operations at terminals, which could provide some near-term support for terminal expansions. Long-term prospects will be boosted by strong contracting activity, as a total of 9 Bcm of LNG contracts were finalized by BOTAŞ in 2024 to align with regional energy hub aspiration amid EU intention to find alternative to Russian supplies.
- The gap between LNG imports and capacity will close after 2030 due to increased contractual deliveries, re-export opportunities, and rising domestic gas demand.

Gas demand

Turkey: Gas demand by sector (Bcm)



Data compiled March 31, 2025.
Source: S&P Global Energy.

Turkey: Gas demand (Bcm)



Data compiled Nov. 27, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; IEA; EPDK.

- The residential sector is the major demand driver in Turkey, driven by more subscribers and regulated gas prices. Industrial consumption spiked in 2021 due to the Turkish Lira's depreciation, which boosted manufactured exports. However, higher input costs have limited industrial activity, decreasing industrial gas demand to ~13 Bcm in 2024 from 15 Bcm in 2021.
  - Turkey's natural gas demand is projected to reach around 74 Bcm by 2040, driven by rising industrial and residential consumption. Even though gas is expected to be used mainly to balance the power system as more renewables and nuclear come online, power generation is still likely to make up about 20–25% of total national gas demand over the short and long term. This shows that gas will continue to play a meaningful role during the energy transition. Industrial demand is also expected to rise, approaching 24 Bcm by 2040, supported by the availability of domestically produced cheap gas.
- In 9M 2025, total gas consumption rose 17% YOY to 43 Bcm, the highest 9M demand in Turkey over the past decade. Daily usage peaked at a record 0.33 Bcm on 24 February; this surge was driven by extreme cold, stronger industrial demand, low hydro output and supportive gas tariffs.
- In 2024, industrial gas demand was 12.6 Bcm, up almost 20% due to a slight rebound in industrial production. Residential demand was also up 4% YOY to 22.5 Bcm supported by expansion of the gas distribution network. However, power sector demand down 11% YOY to 11.7 Bcm, influenced by higher renewable generation. Despite these fluctuations, the overall trend since 2022 has been a moderation in total gas consumption, stabilizing at 50 Bcm annually.

Power generation by source

Turkey: Annual power generation by fuel type (TWh)



Data compiled March 31, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; TEİAŞ.

Turkey: Gross monthly power generation by fuel type (TWh)



Data compiled Dec. 11, 2025.
Sources: S&P Global Energy; TEİAŞ.

- Historically, gas accounted for 40-50% of Turkey's power output. However, the Russia-Ukraine crisis led to rising gas prices, and the influx of cheap Russian coal contributed to the decline in gas generation. Additionally, since 2019, Turkey has boosted its renewable energy capacity, with hydro leading the expansion drive. Consequently, gas-fired generation has dipped to 20% in 2025.
  - The National Energy Plan 2023–35 targets 190 GW of total installed capacity by 2035, aiming for 53 GW from solar and 30 GW from wind. This requires adding 3 GW of solar and 2 GW of wind capacity annually. Gas-fired capacity is projected to reach 35 GW, while nuclear targets are set at 7 GW by 2035 and 20 GW by 2050. The 4.8 GW Akkuyu plant, originally scheduled for 2023, is now expected to start operations in 2026.
- Turkey’s total electricity output reached 321 TWh in 11M 2025. Contribution from renewables was only slightly higher (41%) compared to the same period in 2024 (39%) due to a sharp decline in hydro generation (down by 27% YOY to 55 TWh) compensated by the increase in solar energy (increased by 28% YOY to 35 TWh). As a result, gas-fired generation surged by almost 30% YOY to 69 TWh. Coal generation slightly decreased from 11M 2024 at 106 TWh, contributing to one-third of the total generation.
- In 2024, coal-fired generation, which comprises of over one-third of the power mix, rose by 6% to 121 TWh. Wind (38 TWh) and solar (28 TWh) power also saw annual growth leading to a reduction in gas-fired generation to 62 TWh (down by 7%). Higher hydro generation during winter months further decreased reliance on gas power.

Contact us

Primary contact(s)

Siddhartha Pant
siddhartha.pant2@spglobal.com

Alija Bajramovic
alija.bajramovic@spglobal.com

Terrell Benke
terrell.benke@spglobal.com

Contact us

Americas	+1 800 597 1344
Asia-Pacific	+60 4 296 1125
Europe, Middle East, Africa	+44 (0) 203 367 0681

www.spglobal.com/en/enterprise/about/contact-us.html
www.spglobal.com



S&P Global
Energy